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1.
INTRODUCTION
To most people in the VIestern world the term "the Geneva
Conventions" is familiar but vague; it dimly connotes a body
of rules established to regulate the conduct of nations in
waging war and is most commonly associated with the protection
of prisoners of war during the first and Second World Wars.
In fact, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 constitute an
exclusive, minutely detailed and sophisticated area of inter-
national law. Their origin may be directly traced to the
humanitarian sentiment of a Swiss citizen, Henri Dunant, who,
shocked by the human suffering which he witnessed during the
Battle of So l f e r i n o in 1863, resolved to mitigate the horror
of war as far as possible. The formation of the Red Cross
society followed. In 1864 the first Geneva Convention, pro-
viding merely for the most elementary measures "::0 protect
wounded and sick in war , was drawn up, to be replaced succes-
sively by the Geneva Convention of 1906, "t h e Geneva Conventions
of 1929 and finally the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which
separately accord protection to wounded and sick on land
(Convention I), wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea (11),
prisoners of war (III), and civilians (IV) .
Virtually every nation in the world has become a party to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which, probably on this ground
alone, constitute the most significant part of that body of
rules which comprises the law of war. Ironically, their
greatest strength is also their greatest weakness. Fashioned
out of the experience of warfare fought between States on a
world-wide scale, t he Conventions have increasingly come to
be seen as irrelevant to regulation of conduct in the form of
2.
warfare overwhelmingly predominant since the Second World Har,
viz. low-intensity or guerilla warfare, most commonly waged by
a rebel group within a country against the established authority
in that country. Furthermore the Conventions have emerged from
a Western tradition of humanitarianism and for this reason,
among others, have been regarded as ill-suited to the conflict
situations prevalent 1n the developing countries of the Third
World and since 1945 it 1S in these countries that almost all
conflicts have occurred.
It would be surprising, therefore, if some attempt had not
been made to revise the law of war as represented by the Con-
ventions of 1949 to accommodate both the changing forms of
warfare and the aspirations of newly independent Third World
countries. Four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva between 1974
and 1977, which itself was preceded by a conference of govern-
ment experts and an International Red Cross Conference on the
same topic, produced the so-called Additional Protocols. j These
consist of two separate sets of rules, Protocol I relating to
international conflicts, Protocol 11 to non-international, and
are supplementary to the Conventions of 1949 which remain intact.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess, with specific
reference to the South African situation, the possible impact
and influence which the Additional Protocols may have in situa-
tions of conflict traditionally regarded as internal in the
sense of being waged, not between States, but between insurgent
and government forces within a State. The means for arriving
at this desired assessment are, of necessity, circuitous and
3.
involve a close examination of aspects of the 1949 Conventions
themselves.
Firstly Chapter I of this thesis places the so-called
Geneva law, viz that body of law comprising the Conventions of
1949 and, since 1977, the Additional Protocols, within the con-
text of the law of war as a whole. Of particular importance
for the purpose of this thesis is an understanding of the
general principles of the law of war for without such an under-
standing no assessment of any merit can be made of innovatory
and revisionary law, which Protocol I certainly comprises in
the form of certain provisions.
Common Article 3 is important because it represents the
first attempt by the international community to impose a basic
humanitarian standard of conduct in the waging of internal war.
Art i c 1 e J. (4) of Protocol I, which provides that wars waged
against colonial domination and alien occupation, and against
4.
racist reglmes will be regarded as international for the
purposes of applying the Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I
of 1977, represents a revolutionary step in the trend
initiated by common Article 3. Protocol 11 is applicable in
situations of internal conflict and extensively elaborates
upon the elementary provisions of common Article 3. Given
South Africa's particular standing in international law,
Article 1(4) clearly poses enormous difficulties.
In Chapter IV the law of war, traditional and as revised
by the Additional Protocols of 1977, is examined in relation
to one particular category of protected persons, viz. prisoners
of war. The law created by the Additional Protocols radically
departs from the traditional approach as contained in the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949 (Prisoners of War). Obviously such
law, and claims as to its applicability, are highly relevant to
South Africa's immediate position. It is essential therefore
to assess the value of such new law and to anticipate the
difficulties which its application will hold for South Africa.
Since there is no doubt that South Africa will not become
a party to the Additional Protocols, it must be determined
·whe t h e r South Africa can become bound by them in any other
way. This involves a discussion, in Chapter V, of the position
in international customary law which the Additional Protocols
mayor may not assume in time.
It must be only too apparent that this thesis has focused
upon highly selective areas of the humanitarian law of war and
does not in any way presume to glve an overVlew of the 1949
Conventions and 1977 Protocols as a whole. Far the greater
part of the substantive law contained therein is left entirely
5 •
untouched. Even where the discussion tends to be more specific
and restricted, as in dealing with the law relating to prisoners
of war, it must be borne in mind that the law relating to other
categories of protected persons, notably civilans, deserves de-
tailed analysis given the increasing involvement of the civilian
population in conflict.
This thesis then is primarily concerned with the applica-
bility of the humanitarian law of war in Southern Africa. It
is an attempt to determine what humanitarian law South Africa,
as a party to the Conventions of 1949, is obliged to apply in
the conflict situations which have developed and are likely to
develop on her borders. It is an attempt further to assess
the value as law of certain radical provisions contained in
Protocol I particularly and to formulate a rational response,
founded on a discussion of the law of war as law, to the de-
mands that South Africa regard conflicts waged against her as
international.
6 .
C H APT E R I
THE CLASSIFICATION AND GE NERAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE HU~ANITARI&~LAW OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
The humanitarian law of war (hereinafter referred to
simply as the law of war) ln its developed and mature form as
we possess it is a relatively modern phenomenon, having aspired
to the sophistication it now comprises only in the period which
has elapsed since the first Red Cross Convention of 1864 (Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
in Armies in the Field). However certain basic rules, it
appears, may be s~id to have originated in primitive civiliza-
(1l
tions of several thousand years ago. Despite the increas~ng
complexity of the rules which constitute the law of war t he e l e -
mentary principles remain crucially importan~ since they are
universally accepted as fundamental and law in the making which
fails to take account of them will thereby be reduced in effec-
tiveness at its very inception.
Such principles form part of the customary law of war
which continues to develop, albeit gradually and in increasingly
restricted areas, parallel to the revision and extension of law
as embodied in numerous multilateral treaties. In assess ing
the possible influence of emerging law it is necessary to con-
sider at what stage, if at all, and by what process such law
(1) Edward KossoyLivirigwith Guerilla 9 states that the
prohibition against killing women and children can be
traced to the Old Te s t ame n t (Exodus 22 v 21-24; 23 v 6-7;
20 v 13-14) and appears at the latest in the Middle Ages.
7 .
will be constituted customary international law binding on
all nations generally, with possible exceptions. This will
be dealt with at length in Chapter V.(2)
. This Chapter t h e r e f or e i s devoted to the classification
of the law of war whereby the so-called Geneva law is placed
in context and to the general principles of the law of war
since these form a touchstone for an appraisal of new law.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF WAR
It is fairly generally recognized that the law of war may
be divided into two related but distinct branches, one dealing
with the actual regulation of the conduct of hostilities, the
other concerned with the protection of war victims and the
mitigation of their suffering. This describes the dichotomy
between the so-called Geneva and Hague Law, the former consis-
ting of the law as developed by the successive Geneva Conven-
tions, and the latter consisting of the St Petersburg Declara-
tion of 1868, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Geneva Gas
Protocol of 1925 and the Hague Convention on Cultural Property
of 1954. This formulation may, however, be regarded as too
narrow and thus Forsythe(3) ln addition to Hague (here restric-
ted to the law as contained ln the Hague Regulations of 1907)
and Geneva Law includes two further ca-tegories: Nuremburg Law
(viz. that law which has developed from the judgments handed
~
down in the trials of war criminals held at Nuremburg after
the Second World War) and Other Law (by which is meant custom-
ary law, the Lieber Code or 1865,(4) the St Petersburg Declaration
(2) Infra 148. '
(3) D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics 110.
(4) The Lieber Code was drawn '!Jp in 1865 by an American aca.demi c
Francis Lieber as a field guide on how to wage war in
8 •
of 1868, the Geneva Protocol on Poison Gas of 1925 and
national military manuals).
The classification of Hague and Geneva Law need not be
followed; a different result is obtained by dividing the law
of war into
1. restraints on the use of force, which are to be found
in "pure" international law; and
2. "game rules" which are in turn divided into law
governing the protection of non-combatants (Geneva
Law) and law governing the conduct of warfare itself
(Hague Law). (5)
This approach merely reflects the traditional distinction be-
tween the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
A different classificatory approach has been adopted by
(6 )
Schwarzenberger who distinguishes four categories of rules
of warfare:
1. Those rules which are effective without limiting or
coming into conflict with the necessities of war.
"Sadistic acts of cruelty, which do not purport to have
terrorisation as their object, or wanton acts of destruc-
tion of property, which cannot even claim to form part
of a 'scorched earth' policy, belong to this category".
Such rules are therefore prohibitive of acts which do not
in any event possess direct or even indirect military
relevance.
(5) See J E Bond TheRtil~s dfRidt 110.
(6) G Schwarzenberger TnternationalLaw vol 2 9-14.
9.
2. Those rules in terms of which h~~anitarian considerations
take absolute priority over military demands and so limit
the means of waging warfare. Such a rule is the blanket
prohibition on the us.e of poison and poisoned weapons.
3. Those rules which embody a true compromise between the re-
quirements of military necessity and of humanitarianism.
Thus Schwarzenberger quotes the example of the St Peters-
burg Declaration of 1868 which prohibited the use of ex-
plosive or inflammable projectiles below 400g in weight
(the so-called dum-dum bullet); i£, however, "owing to
greater weight, these weapons were more likely to attain
their appointed object of disabling or killing the greatest
possible number of the military forces of the enemy, their
use did not run counter to the 'laws of humanity' as
enunciated in the Declaration". Explosive or inflammable
projectiles heavier than the stipulated weight were there-
fore permissible.
4. Those rules which provide a mere token or formal comproffilse
between military necessity and humanitarianism but in fact
allow complete preponderance of the demands of war through
the insertion of "as far as possible" clauses, ie humani-
tarian principles are ~o be followed as far as possible.
Since the determination of what is and is not possible will
invariably be made by military personnel, it is unlikely
that any sacrifice will be made in the cause ofhumani~
tarianism.
For the purposes of this thesis the classification of
Geneva and Hague Law is important since the merging of the two
categories presages a growing tend. The distinction between
10.
Gen e va a nd Hague Law i s e n do r s e d by Marxist writers, bu t on
t he rath er pervers e gr oun d that Hague Law i s to be di s tinguished
as wholly without value. Herczegh, for example~ denies that
Hague Law can be accorded any place whatsoever in international
humani t arian law be cause in r egulating warfare by implication
and by its very nature it l e g i t i mi ze s warfare as a legally
, d d f t Li d i (7) H hrecognlse and accepte means 0 se t lng lsputes. erczeg
appe a rs thus to ide nt i f y t he law of war wi t h Ha gue Law alone a nd
would suggest that Geneva Law ("genuinely humanitarian law")
falls within the ambit of human rights law but Hague Law not.(8)
The humanitarian considerations which initially prompted the
development of Hague Law are now "obsolete" and Herczegh pro-
poses that Hague Law should give way to Geneva Law.(9) Hague
Law stands discredited. The grounds upon which Herczegh seeks
the fact of war 'can hardly
to distinguish Hague and Gen~va Law are essentially : false since
both have as their fundamen al purpose the limitation of
suffering of individuals.
be willed away simply by abblishing t h o s e rules which seek to
restrict its destructiveness. In any event, Hague Law certainly
now forms part of the body of customary international law and
as such is generally binding.
(10)
Kun z has argued not that Ha gue Law should concede its
p l ace to Geneva Law but rather that they cannot be objectively
differentiated. He bases this proposition upon the important
(7) G Herczegh "Recent Problems of I n t e r n a t i on a l Humanitarian
Law" in G Har as zti ( edl .9u~s t i o I1 s of I n t ern a t i ona l Law '
77 a -t 83.
(8) See generally on human rights and the law of war K D Suter
"An Enquiry i nto t he Meaning of the Phras e 'Human Righ ts
in Armed Conflict' " 1976 Mi l i t a r y Law and Law of War
Re v i ew 393.
( 9 ) Op ci t (n 6.) at 85 .
(10) J L Kun z "The Laws of War''' (1956) 5 0 AJ I L , : 312 at 322.
11.
consideration that t he two branches of t he law of war are bot h
founded upon fundame n tal principles of the law of war (the
principles of military necessity a nd humanitarianism) which co-
exist in an uneasy state of equilibrium and tension. Kunz
further points out that the clear distinction which the use of
the terms Hague and Geneva Law indicates is in fact misleading
since there are undoubtedly areas in which humanitarian protec-
tion of war victims and the humanitarian regulation of the con-
duct of war overlap. For example, the law of belligerent occu-
pation, which traditionally would be regarded as forming part
of Hague Law, is surely shaped in some small measure by Geneva
Law in the form of the following provisions: the prohibition
of reprisals against protected persons, the prohibition of the
taking of prisoners, the prohibition of individual or mass
transfer of civilians being protected persons, the prohibition
of the deportation of protected persons from occupied territory,
the granting of prisoner of war status to members of organized
resistance movements under certain conditions, even in occupied
territory, etc.
The above argument is lent substance by the emergence 1n
international law of the Additional Protocols of 1977 which
would appear to have eroded considerably the distinction between
Hague and Geneva Law. For example, the provision embodied in
Article 56 of Protocol I (and repeated in a drastically ex-
purgated form 1n Article 15 of Protocol II) to the effect that
1f(1) Works or installations containing dangerous forces,
namely, dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even
where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the ,r e l e a s e of dangerous forces and con-
sequent severe losses among the civilian population lf ,
would certainly place a significant restriction upon a means of
12.
conducting warfare, V1 Z the destruction of i nstallations vital
to the enemy. (One should note in this connection Article 56(2)
of Protocol I does specify restricted circumstances in which
the protected works and installations may be attacked) . .
The merglng of Hague and Geneva Law is discernible in an
area of law which constitutes probably the most visible and
effective example of the protection the humanitarian law of war
has afforded in the past, ie the protection of prisoners of
war. (11) The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 grants broadly
. f . ~. di . d 1 (12 )prlsoner 0 war status to two categorles o~ In lVl ua s:
1. those who form part of the regular forces belonging to
a State; and
2. those not falling under (1) but who satisfy several con-
ditions, viz
a. being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
b. having a fixed sign recognisable at a distance;
c. car-ry i.ng arms openly; and
d. conducting their operations In accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
In the light of the modern approach to the humanitarian law of
war as typified by the Additional Protocols of 1977 it is now
clear that particularly Third World countries regard the reten-
tion of the conditions precedent to the conferral of prisoner
(11) The law relating to prisoners of war lS dealt with in
detail in Chapter IV infra 118..
(12) It must be emphasized that this categorization is a gross
over-simplification but serves for the discussion at this
point.
13.
of war status as a Western ploy t o we~ken their potential
military strength since obviously such conditions necessarily
exclude the strategies and tactics (possibly the only strate-
gies and tactics) available to them in waging a conflict. Low
intensity conflict is waged not by armies but insurgents or
rebels whose greatest advantage commonly lies in the fact that
they are not distinguishable from the civilian population. In
being required to observe the four conditions upon which pri-
soners of war status is _gr a n t e d er withheld, this military ad-
vantage is lost.
Thus a provision of humanitarian law has come to be conten-
tious and regarded as favouring Western nations which have
regularly constituted arm1es. Humanitarian law 1S now regarded
as an area in Vlhich military advantages are gained or lost.
Humanitarian law, both Geneva and Hague, is increasingly being
used to regulate the waging of war, not because of any humani-
tarian benefit to be gained, but because such law is no longer
regarded as neutral. If the rules governing prisoners of war
status favour the developed nations of the West, they can also
be changed to redress the balance (and a little more) in favour
of the Third World.
The distinction between Hague and Geneva Law 1S thus be-
coming increasingly irrelevant. Geneva Law can be used to
regulate warfare, as the issue of prisoner of war status shows.
The significance of Geneva Law lS no longer restricted simply
to the protection of war victims, that of Hague Law is no
longer restricted to the banning of certain practices (the use
of dum-dum bullets, for exampleL Rather both as a whole are
seen increasingly as a means tc obtaining political and mili-
tary advantage.
A party to a conflict will invariably
:1.4· •
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE HUt-1A.NITARIAN LAW OF WAR
An understanding of the fundamental principles of the law
of war is essential for an evaluation of emerging rules, and
. d Loo i 1 h · . (13)may be of value 1n eve op1ng ru es were none eX1st.
The law of war, it 1S generally agreed, is founded upon
the two opposing principles of military necessity and humani-
tarianism which exist in a state of constant tension and to
each of which due significance must be attached. In an im-
perfect society where war is an ever present reality, the law
of war must seek to establish as far as possible the predomi-
nance of humanitarian considerations ("the standard of civili-
zation") over the necessities of war. Clearly, however, this
will not a Iways be achieved. Hhere a rule fails to take ac-
count of military necessities, then compliance with that rule
1S likely to be minimal. The policy of deforestation employed
by the Allied forces in Vietnam in order to deprive the
Vietcong of shelter and a food supply may certainly be regarded
as inhumane in its effect on the civilian population. But pro-
hibition of such a practice 1S likely to be meaningless if it
is the only effective means of depriving guerilla forces of
shelter and food supplies. The use of napalm presents similar
difficulties.
On the other hand, where negligible inroads are made upon
the necessities of war, then it is likely that humanitarian
considerations will prevail since no conflict with the strategic
b · t f . (14)o Jeco war ar1ses.
(13) See D P OtConnell International LaH vol 2 6.
(14) G Schwar-zenber-ge r- opcit (n6) 171-172;
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prefer to follow a humane policy wher e the publicity value of
that policy outweighs the pos sible military advantage to be
gained from ·it. The humanitarian law of war, then, is very
much the art of what is possible in given circumstances. It
must seek to gain the maximum concessions to the principles of
humanitarianism. But where rules are created which are not
capable of practical implementation because t~ey set too strict
a limitation upon what is military necessary, then the general
failure to comply with such rules vlill diminish the effective-
ness of humanitarian law in war as a whole. The rules that do
exist must be observed; if new rules will not be observed then '
it is better not to introduce them at all since the resulting
non-compliance will almost certainly call the validity of
existing rules into question.
The duality of humanitarianism and military necessity in
the law of war h as not always existed, and whatever the unde r-
lying principles of that law may presently be, various rules
have frequently arisen from motives not in themselves especially
commendable. In regard to the distinction between combatant
and no~-combatant, for example, the law of war is derived from
the so-called Law of Arms, which was not primarily or even at
all concerned with humanitarian considerations:
"Both by reason of honour, which weighed heavily with
the knightly classes and professional men-at-arms, and
for the great profit that could be obtained by ransom
and spoils, warmaking was a strictly limited activity
so far as the class of participants was concerned. The
Law of Arms is an amalgam of honour and cOR~ercium
Humanitarian considerations are not In point."(lS)
(is) G I A D Draper "Combatant Status An Historical Per-
spective" (.1972) XI Military Law and Law of War
Review .135 at .137.
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Similarly, practice s amo ng t he Gr e eks a nd Roman s which are n ow
characterised as human i t arian ( p r ohibition of poison and poi-
soned weapons, truc es t o allow the burial of the dead, exchange
of prisoners, ranS Oln, spa r i ng o f non - c omba t ant s and t heir
property) we re motiv a t e d by reasons of self-int erest, for
example, the need to a s similat e a conquered people within an
. (16)
empire, the expectation o f reclprocal treatment, etc.
While he suggests that the only criteria in wagi ng war are
military advan tag e and effective fight i ng, Stowell(17) conce des
that there remain certain principles which are effective t o a
certain extent in mitigating the c r uelty of war, a lthough even
these rules are mostly founded not upon humanitarian considera-
tions but rather self-interest and mutual advantage:
1. Rules of wa r f a re which make for military advantage - e g
the prohibi tion of pillage, since pi llage disr~pts mili-
tary discipline, alienates local inhabitan ts, unneces-
sarily burdens military transport, etc.
2. Unnecessary cruelty, which does not have a military object
nor aids in securing a victory and which mu s t be avoided
in the interests of efficiency.
3. Rules of warfare recognized as mutua lly beneficial to both
contestants .
4 . Restraini ng i nfluenc e of popular s entiments and tradit i o n s;
there are, however, certain restrictions wh i ch are essen-
t i a l l y humanitarian in character and are base d upon an
innate sense of rightness and chivalry.
(16)
' ( 17)
J E Bond o p c it Cn 5 ) 10 - 12 .
E Stowell "Military Repr is a l s and the Sanct ions of t h e
Laws of War" ( 19 42) 36' A J .r .L . 643 a t 644-649.
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5. Punishment and retaliation; the threat of these act as
a deterrent to those who wou l d in the absence of such
threat v i o Lat e the laws of war .
Certainly the effectiveness of the law of war rests upon
several diverse motives and StoHel1 is probably correct in
assigning self-interest a major share. But to ascribe the
implementation of humanitarian law to self-interest alone is
surely an over-simplification. For example, a party to a con-
flict may implement humanitarian principles and yet be so over-
whelmingly powerful in relation to its adversary that it need
have no cause to require a reciprocal implementation of hlli~ani-
tarian law by that adversary. Nevertheless the motive of self-
interest is strong and probably underlay, for example, the un-
conditional release of prisoners taken by Castro rebels in
their struggle against the Batista regime in Cuba, since this
would contribute to wlnnlng the support of the local population.
Schwarzenberger, (18) however, discerns in the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 a movement away from the de-emphasis of humani-
tarian imperatives which might detract from the necessities of
war. In his view the Conventions represent a tendency
"towards situations where there is a conflict [between
humanitarian and military imperatives] but, by general
consent, the standard of civilization is intended to
prevail."(19)
Whatever the motive behind the implementation of humani-
tarianlaw, the formulation of rules promoting humanitarian
principles at the expense of military efficacy must obviously
(18) G Schwarzenberge~ bp cit (n 6 ) 541 .
(19) Ibid.
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proceed by way of consensus. Such consensus will be forth-
coming only if the proposed rules embody values which are
generally recognized to be absolutely good and if such rules
are applied equally to and by all parties. The corollary of
consensus 1S reciprocity which may operate positively or
negatively; where one party fails to comply with a particular
provision which has humanitarian value but which is militarily
restrictive, the other is virtually compelled to disregard that
ok ° of ° • ff ° 1° dO d (20)rule 11 eW1se 1 1t 1S not to su er a m1 1tary 1sa vantage.
The rule against the destruction of dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations(21} is unlikely to be observed
by one party to a conflict when his adversary disregards it
and thereby ~ecures for himself a substantial military advantage.
Rules which do notmaterially limit military necessity are
likely to function without difficulty on the basis of rec1pro-
city; where, however, the necessities of war have to any sig~
nificant extent been sacrificed to humanitarian considerations,
the likelihood of breach will increase in proportion to the
inroads made by humanitarianism. The more parties forego 1n
respect of the necessities of war, the greater temptation to
one or all to take advantage thereof and breach the relevant
rule in order to make some military gain or prevent some de-
fea~0(22) Reciprocity may almost be taken for granted in areas
where there is no conflict between the principles of humanity




F C Kalshoven The Law of Warfare 108.
Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of ~977.
G Schwarzenberger opcit (riG} 453.
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. (23)
the only basis upon which the law of war can functlon,
becomes increasingly tenuous and endangered.
R A Falk(24) proposes four general principles of limita-
tion which serve to establish the balance between humanitarian
imperatives and the necessities of war:
1. Principle of Necessity
- "a prohibition upon methods, tactics and weapons calcu-
lated to inflict unnecessary suffering". Necessity can-
not therefore be used to justify every decision or action;
the principle of necessity denies the concept of total
war free of regulation and affirms that what is militarily
advantageous may not always be militarily necessary.
2. Principle of Proportionality
- "a requirement that the military means used bear a pro-
portional relationship to the military end pursued" . It
is often difficult to distinguish the principles of neces-
sity and proportionality for it may often occur that where
the intended means to attain a given military objective are
not justified by the end itself, the objective in question
may also be excluded as a legitimate goal on grounds of
ab f i Ldt i t K 1 h (25) f" d "sence 0 ml 1 ary necessl y. a s oven . ln s ln
the principle of proportionality (the principle that "bel-
-ligerents shall not inflict on their adversaries harm out
of proportion to the legitimate goals of warfare") the
(23) Id 452: "the laws of war constitute a typical illustra-
tion of the international law of reciprocity".
(24) R A Falk in P D Trooboff (ed) Law and Responsibility
- i n Warfa.re 3~"
(25) F C Kalshoven op cit Cn 201 27.
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fundamental principle of international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts. Intrinsic to the law of
war, therefore, is the principle that parties to a con-
flict do not possess any inherent right to adopt unlimited
means of injuring the enemy.
3. Principle of Humanity
- "an absolute prohibition upon methods, tactics and
weapons that are inherently cruel in their effects and
violate minimal notions of humanity". The principles of
necessity and proportionality are both relative in imple-
mentation; neither is absolutely prohibitory, but rather
establish a criterion whereby behaviour which may be per-
missible in certain circumstances is not so in others.
The principle of humanity does not discriminate thus but
declares certain behaviour at all times and under any
circumstances impermissible.
4. Principle of Discrimination
- "a requirement that methods, tactics, and weapons
generally discriminate between military and non-military
targets and between combatants and civilians." It is
probably this principle which offers the greatest poten-
tial for humanitarian practice. "Whether particular be-
haviour has conformed In law to the principles of neces-
sity and proportionality is generally an" ex post facto
judgment. By placing certain classes of people and
property wholly outside the arena of warfare, protection
of such does not depend upon the subjective decisions of
commanders in the field but provides an absolute criterion
of who and what are legitimate objects of attack.
21.
The principle of discrimination may be divided as
follows: (26)
a. The distinction rat i one loci: "the exclusion of
geographically defined areaS and individual buildings
from the region of war".
b. The distinction rationeinstrumenti: "the prohibition
of weapons which are considered to be incompatible with
the standard of civilization". This point is probably
more relevant to the consideration of humanity.
c. The distinction ratione personae: this distinction 1S
made between combatants and non-combatants, members of
the armed forces and civilians, lawful and unlawful
combatants. This distinction is important not only
because it totally excludes civilians from the objec-
. (27 )
t1ves of attack, but also because it is relevant
in determining the status and treatment of particular
classes of participants: lawful combatants are en-
titled to prisoner of war status, the Geneva Conven-




Schwarzenberger asserts that pre-1914 rules (in which
the necessities of war prevailed} have been replaced with a




Schwarzenbe_rger 01" cit (n 6) 109-110.
Cf the Preamble to the Declaration of St Petersburg of
1868 which states that "the only legitimate object which
states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy."
G SchwarzenbergerThe Dynamics 'o f Tn'ternat'ionaTLaVl 34.
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manifests the principle o f h umanity . However, it i s probably
more likely that t h e law of war i s moving in another direction;
it is seen as a whole with political and mil itary advantages
and not merely as s e ts o f r ules t o protect certain people and
to outlaw certain weapons and practices. It is essential
therefore that the basic principl es be reaffirmed since the
cause of humanitarianism in situations of internal and other
conflicts will be lost where they are absent.
Before discussing the most recent developments ln this
field it is first necessary t o trace the first steps in the
regulation of internal conflicts. This follows in Chapter 11.
23.
C H APT E R 11
CONFLICTS INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
The scope of application of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 is governed by Article 2 ("Application of the Conven-
tions") and Article 3 ("Conflicts not of an international
character"), both articles being common to all four Conven-
tions. Article 2 is fairly unambiguous and so by far the
greater part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of
Article 3. It is necessary to develop the theme of this
thesis in this way for the following reasons:
1. Conflicts not of an international character are
obviously most relevant to the South African situa-
tion and South Africa, being a Party to the Conven-
tions of 1949, is bound in this respect by the pro-
visions of Article 3; and
2. Article 3 constitutes the first step of the de-
velopment in international law which has increa-
singly focussed attention on the regulation of
internal conflicts and which has finally resulted,
in terms of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in the
full regulation of certain types of conflict pre-
viously regarded as internal.
Traditionally international law has been denied any
influence (apart from the very limited doctrines of insurgency
and belligerency) in those conflict situations which fall en-
tirely within the jurisdiction of a single State. At the
time of its inception in law Article 3 therefore represented
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an innovatory and significant departure from previous prac-
tice. As shall be seen, Article 3 merely provides for a
handful of extremely elementary humanitarian safeguards.
Nevertheless it constituted an implicit recognition that In-
creasingly warfare would be conducted on a low intensity level
and that international law must accordingly take account of
this phenomenon.
It may be helpful at this point to note that three dis-
tinct conflict situations must be differentiated in consider-
ing the . extended jurisdiction of international humanitarian
law which the appearance of Article 3 created:
1. international conflicts, governed by Article 2;
2. internal conflicts, governed by Article 3; and
3. internal conflicts of insufficient magnitude to
warrant any attention in international law at all.
Article 3 has given rise to a number of difficulties and
these are dealt with at length below. Firstly, and most lm-
portantly, it has proved to be all but impossible to classify
a conflict as falling into one of the above three categories,
given the usual reluctance by a State to allow any encroach-
ment upon its so-called domestic affairs. Secondly, the sub-
stantive content of Article 3 is so general and unspecific
that it has little practical value. Thirdly, the provisions
of Article 3 have been superimposed upon the traditional,
albeit largely ineffectual, methods in international law of
dealing with non-international conflicts, viz recognition of
a party to the conflict as a belligerent or insurgent. That
Article 3 has not been successful is clearly demonstrated by
the fact that it has had no effect in pr-act i.ce . Some thirty
years after its inception it has been outstripped by far
more radical developments.
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THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2
Although extensive revision of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 has taken place in the period since their inception, the
Republic of South Africa has neither ratified nor acceded to
the Additional Protocols of 1977 (which amplify the Conven-
tions by some 130 articles plus appendices) and therefore re-
mains bound by the original texts of the 1949 Conventions
alone. The application of the Conventions is controlled by
the common Article 2, which provides that ,they
"shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them".
THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
It would appear that a minimum scale of confrontation
and violence will suffice to render the Conventions applicable
as between two or more Parties (bearing in mind that for
"High Contracting Parties" may be read "States,,(1». The
following are the basic types of conflict which may be defined
. . I (2)as lnternatlona :
1. unauthorized incursion by soldiers;
2. authorized small-scale incursion or border incident;
3. permitting hostile activity by private persons or
persons acting on behalf of a third state;
4. hostile short-term expedition for a limited purpose;
5. full-scale violence between States;
(1) It is nowhere expressly stated that High Contracting Par-
ties are by definition States but it is abundantly clear
that the drafters of the Conventions worked upon this
basic premise and it has been accepted as self-evident by
commentators. See John F DePue "The Amended First Article
to the First Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 - Its Impact upon Humanitarian Constraints
Governing Armed Conflict" (1977) 75 Militarv Law Revie~v 71
at 79-80. .
(2) R I Miller (ed) The Law of War 17.------ _. ._ -
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6. occupation of territory o f another S~ate without
combat but through the thre a t or use of force.
Thus, even though the intensity of the hostilities might be
so low as to enable one Party to deny the existence of a state
of wa~, the effect of Article 2 is to obviate the requirement
that a legal state of war be declared.(3) It is important
that the humanitarian purpose of the Conventions should not
be frustrated by mere political expediency which may be shown
by a Party in denying a state of war:
"It is inadvisable that a State should be entitled to
disregard treaty stipulations simply by opening hos-
tilities without previous notification to the adversary
or by giving such proceedings any other name.,,(4)
Thus the Conventions will enter into force where de facto
hostilities occur, despite the refusal by one or presumably
more(S) States to recognize the existence of a conflict.~Yne
phrase "any other armed conflict" is nowhere defined and
probably should be given as broad a meaning as possible ln
order to further the admittedly humanitarian purpose of the
Conventions. However, clearly it is ludicrous to expect the
implementation of the Conventions in cases of mere incidents
of conflict (ie very limited and localised exchanges of force)
(6)and thus Draper suggests that there
"may be some force in the contention that t he applica-
tion of the Conventions requires t he exi s t e n ce of that
kind of armed conflict which would otherwise have
amounted to a 'war' had there -been an intention, ex-
pressed by declaration or otherwise, to wage war."
(3) For a brief discussion of the legal concepts of war and
peace see Jeremy D Morley "Approaches to the Law of
Armed Conflicts" (1971) 9 Canadian Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 269.
(4) J Pictet "The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection
of War Victims" (1 951) 45 AJ T L 462 at 4 68.
(52 J Pictet (ed) IC RCC Commentary vol 4 21.
(6} G I A D Draper "The Geneva Conventions of 1949" (19651
1 Recuei l Des Cours 6 3 at 73.
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However, this would seem to set the level of conflict required
to bring the Conventions into force too high; armed conflict
cannot simply be equated with war, even if undeclared.
. ,( 7) .., bL f bl dPlctet s formulat1on 1S proDa~ y pre era e: arme con-
flict in terms of Article 2 is
"(a)ny difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed
forces".(8)
THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
As is apparent from the above discussion, all conflict
situations (with the exception of the trivial and brief) be-
tween States fall within the regUlation of Article 2. The
factual element which brings the Conventions into operation
is not so much the level of the conflict as the waging of
hostilities between States (vi z High Contracting Parties).
This distinction is important because in conflicts not of an
international character, governed by Article 3, the sole
criterion for determining when that provision is applicable
consists of an assessment of the intensity of the conflict,
an assessment which is extremely difficult to make and which
once made is invariably disputed in some quarters. Both these
approaches are beset with difficulties and these are discussed
below.
The primary test then, of whether a conflict is to be
regarded for the purposes of Article 2 as international or
not is the question of the statehood of the parties to that
conflict. In the case of Military Prosecutor vOniar Mahmud
(71 Op cit (n 5) 21.
(81 See also DePue op cit (n 1) 76: "the Conventions are
intended to cover any situation in which a difference
between two states leads to the employment of armed
forces."
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( 9 ) l' M' ~ . C t t d th tKassem and Others an Israe~l 1 l~ltary ourt s a e a
the Geneva Conventions are applicable
"to relations between States and not between a State
and bodies which are not States and do not represent
. States" .
If this distinction is not maintained then the distinction be-
tween international and internal conflicts, as reflected in
Articles 2 and 3 will similarly be lost. The criterion of
statehood possesses this advantage that it is self-evident
and thus it is difficult for a State engaged in hostilities
with another to deny the application of the Conventions to
that situation. While the intensity of a conflict will al-
ways be a matter of opinion it should be a question of fact
whether two States are engaged in conflict. Nevertheless
difficulties may arise. For example, where Rhodesian forces
have made incursions into Zambia and engaged guerilla forces,
can it be said that Rhodesia and Zambia were in a situation
of armed conflict and that the Conventions should have come
into force, even though Rhodesian and Zambian forces did not
make contact? ( 1 0 ) Th t i 11 b t . t"t ldeore lca y y~s, u ln prac lce 1 wou
appear that no serious attempt was made to enforce the Conven-
tions between Rhodesia and Zambia (and it is unlikely that the
fact of Rhodesia being technically a non-Party to the Conven-
tions was the cause).
STATES NOT BOUND BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
Article 2(3) provides as follows:
(9) 42 International Law Reports 470 at 475.
(10) It should be noted incidentally that the purported
accession of the Smith government to the Conventions
was unsuccessful.
29 •
"Al, though one of the Power-s in conflict may not be
a party to the present Convention, the Powers who
are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound
by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions hereof."
As is consistent with their avowedly humanitarian intent, the
Conventions in Article 2(3) reject any form of general par-
ticipation clause, as found in most of the Hague Conventions
of 1907, whereby the implementation of those Conventions in
any given situation falls away if one State engaged in hos-
tilities is not a Party to those Conventions. The Conventions
of 1949, however, are applicable as between those States which
are Parties, and may further apply also in relation to non-
Parties where the latter signify their willingness to observe
and be bound by the Conventions. Wnile Article 2(3) does not
make clear whether the provisions of the Conventions must be
applied by a Contracting Party thereto even pending the non-
Party's acceptance or rejection of its corresponding obliga-
. P' (11) htlons, lctet suggests t at
lithe spirit and character of the Conventions lead per-
force to the conclusion that the Contracting Power
must at least apply their provisions from the moment
hostilities break out until such time as the adverse
Party has had the time and an opportunity of stating
his intentions."
However, it is submitted that a prlor reasonable belief that
the non-Party concerned is either unwilling or unable to im-
plement the provisions of the Conventions will entitle the
Contracting Party to require clear and conclusive evidence
of implementation before it can itself be held bound under a
reciprocal duty. There are grounds for suggesting that the
(111 Pictet op cit (n 51 23. See also Draper op cit (n 6) 74.
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acceptance by the non-Party must consist in an explicit and
. (12)
formal declaratlon to that effect. However, a strict
and literal imposition of this requirement may have anomalous
results, as, for example, where the non-Party does in fact
apply the provisions of the Conventions but neglects to com-
municate this compliance in the form of a formal and explicit
declaration. It can hardly be argued that in these circum-
stances so technical an omission will entitle the Contracting
Party to escape liability for fulfilling the corresponding
obligations which arise by virtue of the non-Party's de facto
. ( 13 )
compllance. Accordingly, it appears that a de facto
application of the provisions of the Conventions will in it-
self be regarded as a declaration of intent, albeit tacit and
(
implied by the conduct of the non-Party. Nevertheless, for
\
such declaration of intent to be so implied, the conduct of
the non-Party must not in any serious respect be so deficient
as to give rise to doubt as to the bona fides of that Party.
Accordingly, the non-Party must accept and apply the provi-
sions of the Conventions; to the extent that it does not
satisfactorily fulfil its obligations, Contracting Parties
are not bound by the Conventions in respect of such non-Party.
It is convenient to consider the position of non-Parties
under the Additional Protocols. Here rather different con-
siderations are operative because, unlike the Geneva Conven-
tions, parties to a conflict other than States may become




Article 96(2) of Protocol 1 merely restates the provl-
sions of Article 2(3) of the Conventions . of 1949:
"When one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound
by this Protocol, the parties to the Protocol shall
remain bound by it in their mu t ua l relations. They
shall furthermore be bound b y this Protocol in rela-
tion to each of the Parties which are not bound by it,
if the latter accepts and applies the provisions --'
thereof."
However, national liberation movements cannot be regarded as
Parties to the Protocols which are now open for accession
only by Parties to the 1949 Conventions. (14) Accordingly,
Article 96(3) regulates the position of national liberation
movements:
"The authority representing a people engaged against
a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the
type referred to in Article 1(4) may undertake to
apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation
to that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration
addressed to the depositary. Such declaration shall,
upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation
to the conflict the following effects.
Ca) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought
into force for the said authori~y as a Party to
the conflict with immediate effect;
(b) the said authoritj assumes the same rights and
obligations as those which have been assumed by
a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and
this Protocol; and
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally
binding upon all Parties to the conflict."
Thus the scope of application of the Conventions and
Additional Protocols may be summarized as follows:
1. Where the parties to a conflict are all Parties to the
Conventions and the Protocols, then these instruments
will be applicable in .their entirety.
2. Where one party is a Party to the Conventions only, and
the other parties to the conflict Parties to both Con-
ventions and Protocols, Article 96(21 of Protocol 1 is
(141 The Conventions of 1949 presuppose that only States





applicable. The Conventions are applied generally but
the Protocols only b e t we e n those parties to the conflict
which have ratified or acceded to them.
Where a Party to the Conventions only and a national
liberation movement are involved In a conflict, Article
3 of the Conventions may apply, depending upon the level
of the conflict.
4. Where a Party to both the Conventions and the Protocols
is engaged in a conflict with a national liberation
movement, and such conflict is one which falls within
the definition as set oUL in Article 1(4) of Protocol 1
(ie a conflict fought against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes) then
Article 96(3) makes provision for an authority repre-
senting the liberation movement conce r ned to make a
declaration of intention to apply the Conventions and
Protocols. This provision gives rise to some difficulty
and lays bare a major stumbling block in the successful
application of Additional Protocol I. It lS naive in the
extreme to expect that governments likely to be classi-
fied as colonial, alien or racist will become High
Contracting Parties to the Protocols in the first place.
Furthermore no government having become a High Contrac-
ting Party would concur in a description of itself as
colonial, alien or racist. This consideration prompted
a spokesman for the Israeli delegation to the Diplomatic
Conference of '1974-1977 to state that
"draft Article 1, paragraph 4 had within it a built-
in non-applicability clause since a party would have
to admit that it was e i t her r a c i s t , al i en or colonial
- definitions which no State would ever admit to."(1Sl
(15) Official Records o f the Di p l oma t i c Conference on the
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Article 96(3) clearly anticipates that a declaration of
intention by a liberation movement to apply the Conven-
tions and Protocols will follow upon the commencement
of a struggle against a High Contracting Party. How-
ever, as is only too apparent, the situations most
likely to arise are those In which either the established
government is not a Party to the Protocols or, if a
Party, would deny that Article 1(4) of Protocol I lS
applicable. If read literally, Article 96(3) makes no
provision for a liberation movement to make a declara-
tion of intent in any struggle against a non-Contracting
Party. Given the humanitarian purpose of the Protocols,
it is unlikely that liberation movements were intended
to be denied the opportunity of making a declaration of
intent in a struggle against a non-Contracting Party.
Where a declaration is so -made, it is submitted that a
situation analogous to that envisaged In Article 96(2)
will come into being, and the onus will be shifted to
the non-Contracting Party against whom the liberation
struggle is being waged, to accept and apply the Conven-
tions and Protocols. If such is not forthcoming, it is
difficult to see why the liberation movement should be
bound by the Conventions and Protocols in its relations
to that Party, unless, of course, it continues to bind
itself out of purely humani t ar-Lan motives.
(15) (continued)
Reaffirmation and Dev;elopment of International Humani-
tarian Law Appl icablein ArmedConflict"s19 74-1977
vol VI 42.
Similarly DePue op cit Cn 1) 77 states that abandonment
of humanitarian safeguards must ensue since "no state
would recognize the legality of its opponent's cause and
concede the illegality of its own".
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The position where a dec laration of intent is made by
a liberation move ment i n a struggle against a Contrac-
ting Party which denies the a pp l i c a t i on of Article 1(4)
is also somewhat uncertain. Article 96(3) quite un-
equivocally states that the making of the declaration
shall have the effect that the Conventions and Protocol I
"are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict".
Thus the fact that the Contracting Party disputes the
application of Article 1(4) would appear to be irrele-
vant. Yet it is scarcely credible that States will con-
sent to be bound to apply the Conventions and Protocol I
in any conflict waged against it by a liberation move-
ment which considers Article 1(4) to be applicable a nd
makes a declaration of intent in terms of Article 96(3).
Having considered the scope of Article 2 of the Conven-
tions of 1949 and considered the scope of application of the
Conventions and Protocols as a whole, it is now possible to
take up the main thesis of this work, viz the determination
and cr·i tique of the humanitarian law applicable in situations
of internal conflict.
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 3
Common Article 3 provides, inter alia, that:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provi-
sions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities
... shall in all circumstances be treated humanelv
.... To this end the followin g acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respec t to the above-mentioned
persons:
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a. violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treat-
ment and torture;
b. taking of hostages;
c. outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
d. the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions Vlithout previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees w0ich are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or
part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not
, a f f e c t the legal status of the Parties to the confLd c't ;"
THE INNOVATORY NATRUE OF ARTICLE 3
The inclusion of Article 3 in the Conventions of 1949 was
hailed as a major advance in furthering humanitarian ends
within armed conflict; it has been described as "an almost
unhoped-for extension of Article 2". (16) The move to intro-
duce humanitarian regulation of internal armed conflicts be-
gan in 1912 with the submission for the first time to the
International Red Cross Conference of a draft Convention on
the role of the Red Cross in civil wars or insurrection; the
subject was not even discussed. The fact that Article 3, it-
self a much reduced provision compared to the original draft
produced by the ICRC, which provided for the application of
the Conventions in their entirety, was adopted only after
much debate and compromise demonstrates the reluctance with
which States agreed to brook interference, be frin even so
(16) Pictet op cit (n 5) 26.
36 .
limited a form as Article 3, in affairs which had previously
been regarded strictly as domestic. The traditional view was
reflected in customary international law wh i.ch
"(Drrpo s e d no requirements wi.th r-e spe ct; to the treatment
of the participants in a civil conflict, of whatever
degree of intensity. International law was envisaged
in its orthodox role as the law governing the relations
of States." ( 17)
Fundamental reservations were expressed with particular regard
to the cloak of respectability and legitimacy which Article 3
may possibly be construed as conferring upon rebel forces.
Above all, fears were expressed as to the wisdom and legiti-
macy of in any way placing fetters upon the actions which a
government in power may take in order to maintain its position
in the face of a subversive attack (although Article 3 re-
qUlres so Iowa standard of humanitarian conduct that it is
difficult to see in what way a State's military effectiveness
would be materially diminished by adherence thereto). The
fears that Article 3 aroused, therefore,were two-fold:
1. That rebel groups would acquire a form of unmerited
status in practice, even if not in law; and
2. that it is unjustifiable to restrict the means available
to an imperilled government in suppressing subversion.
The realization of these fears would almost certainly be re-
garded by the State conc~rned as an unacceptable infringement
upon its rights to protect itself against attempts to destroy
its stability and ultimately its existence. Thus, while it
has been universally recognized that the ends which Article 3
is intended to promote are undoubtedly humanitarian, it is
simply realistic to acknowledge that individual rights are
not permitted to compete with those of the State where the
existence of the latter is 'in any way threatened. Clearly,
----------------------------------
(17) Miller op cit Cn 2) 21.
37.
then, and this is substantiat ed by practice Slnce 1949, the
effectiveness of Article 3 depends almost entirely upon the
willingness of the State concerned to allow its full imple-
mentation, and such willingness is itself dependent upon the
degree to which a State is impregnable against subversive
attack. In other words, humanitarian standards, as always in
the field of humanitarian law in armed conflict, will be more
readily applied by the entrenched authority where it can af-
ford to be so expansive and does not consider that such appli-
cation will diminish its military resourcefulness. This is
merely a restatement of the conflict between the fundamental
principles of humanity and necessity. Expediency subordinates
the interest of the individual to that of the State and
Article 3 is relevant to that extent alone.
Nevertheless, Article 3 represents a ma jor step in the
development of the ,l a w which has resulted in the formulation
of the Additional Protocols. Article 3 has served to empha-
size the distinction between international and internal armed
conflicts but is not innovatory in this respect; this dis-
tinction had certainly existed before. Rather the novelty of
Article 3 consisted in the international regulation of inter-
nal conflicts: "the concept of regulating such conflicts
th h · · . " (18)roug an 1nternat1onal agreement was revolut1onary .
Thus Article 3 1S in a sense the breach which made possible
the acceptance of the prin~iple of international regulation
of internal conflicts and certainly from this initial step may
be traced the development of the law as represented by the
(18} DePue - op cit (n 1) 81.
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Additional Protocols. Moreover Article 3 is significant for
the implicit recognition which it contains that increasingly
internal armed conflict has become a focus of interest for
the community of States at large, since increasingly it is
internal conflict in its ever more sophisticated form which
poses the most real threat to the peace and stability of the
world order. Article 2 implies a clear criterion for the
determination of what constitutes an international conflict:
it must be a conflict fought between States. This criterion
fails in regard to Article 3; it cannot be construed so as
to apply to "all other types of conflict" for then it would
cover "all forms of insurrection, rebellion, anarchy, and the
k f d 1 · br-i d ,,( 19 ) Th dbrea -up 0 . States, an even p aln rlgan age. e e-
ficiency inherent in Artisle 3 is not that it has concentrated
international attention upon internal conflicts; the vast
majority of conflicts to have taken place since the end of
World War II may be classified as non-international and it
is therefore of crucial importance that humanitarian Law
applicable in armed conflict take account of this phenomenon.
Rather its fault lies in the fact that perversely wha t it
gives with one hand it takes back with the other. Thus the
innovatory step of subjecting internal conflicts to interna-
tional purview is virtually negated by an omission to provide
any clear and unambiguous guideline for determining its
(Article 3's1 application. Because this lacuna facilitates
any State in its attempt to avoid the application of Article 3
to a conflict in which it may be involved, it is essential to
arrive at a workable definition of the circumstances in which
Article 3 applies. This is discussed below. (20)
(19)
(20)
Pictet op cit Cn 5) 81.
Infra 41f f .
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Once it is accepted that non-international conflicts
are rightfully accorded some measure of attention in inter-
national law, then there seems to be no reason In logic why
the distinction between international and non-international
b . . d (21) I Id' d i ff'conflicts should e malntalne . t wou appear l _l-
cult to justify the application of Article 3 only in a case
of civil war which in terms of the scale of the conflict is
equivalent to a conventional international war; to argue
thus means one has to deny the application of the full force
of humanitarian law in armed conflict on the solitary ground
that only one of the parties participating in the conflict
f 11 '" . 1 (22) I hpossesses u capaclty In lnternatlonal aw. n t,eory,
then, the distinction is difficult to maintain and the crl-
terion should be the intensity of the struggle alone; if
this view were adopted then three situations would be dis-
tinguishable:
(21) Schwarzenberger International Law vol 2 states at 673:
"In a sociological v i.ew , the dIstinction between
international and internal armed conflicts is arti-
ficial and, at most, one of emphasis. In any age,
the areas 6f international society and those of its
constituent national or multinational communities
do not constitute self-contained compartments: they
interact. The more widespread and protracted an
internal struggle, the more it tends to affect other
members of the international society, and the more
likely it is that they will find it necessary to
intervene".
' Howe ve r it should not be thought that an internal con-
flict resembles an international war only ~'\'hen .ot her s tates
are involved: the intensity of the Biafran war, for
example, in which no other States were involved, would
surely have been ground enough for requiring the im-
plementation of the conventions of 1949 as a whole.
See also Jacques Freymond "Confronting Total War : A
' :Global' Humanitarian Policy" (1973) 67 A :J IL 672
at 675.
(22) Edward Kossoy Living with Guerrilla 38.
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1. Situations of domestic tension (riots, etc) which do
not warrant t h e i ntervention of humanitarian law.
2. Conflict situations the intensity and duration of
which warrant the application of minimum humanitarian
provisions.
3. Conflict situations the intensity and duration of
which warrant the full application of humanitarian law
in armed conflict.
Such a classification would inevitably give rlse to a
number of difficulties:
1. It will be difficult to arrive at workable objective
criteria which differentiate between each class of con-
flict with sufficient clarity that a judgment may be
made beyond dispute;
2. It will be difficult to determine at what point an
escalating conflict moves from one category to another.
Given the unworkability of Article 3 in practice and given
the inordinate difficulty of defining, so as to distinguish,
various levels of conflict (for which see below) it might
make more practical sense to devise only one category of con-
flict to be subject to humanitarian regulation at all, and to
pose criteria for its operation which would set the minimum
. l e ve l of conflict somewhere between an Article 3 situation
and a full-scale war. This would entail sacrificing humani-
tarian regulation, of perhaps little value, in low intensity
conflicts for certainty of regulation in all conflicts above
a prescribed level. The major difficulty with this approach
is that in border-line cases parties may ·very well ·not possess
the facilities or resources to comply with the complex and
sophisticated requirements whi ch international humanitarian
41.
law insists upon .
., '!
Whatever the merits of the above approaches may be, it
is clear that the distinction between international and non-
international conflicts is not about to be discarded as de-
funct. The Additional Protocols have entrenched the distinc-
tion more firmly than ever before but have sought to adapt
humanitarian law to changing circumstances by means of the
simple fiction of regarding wars fought against colonial,
alien or racist regimes as international conflicts and there-
fore competent to be regulated by the full implementation of
the Conventions and Protocol I. The Protocols have set the
development of humanitarian law upon a course which could not
easily be retraced. It is therefore probably not helpful to
propose an alternative which has at this stage no hope of
fruition.
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
The identification of a conflict as either internal or
international is essential to the correct application of the
relevant legal norms, given the distinction between interna-
tional and internal conflicts as embodied in the Conventions
and reinforced in the Protocols. Article 3 of the Conventions
has been largely superceded by Protocol 11 but while only
a few States have ratified or acceded to the Protocols and
while there are States such as South Africa which are unlikely
to become Parties to the Protocols but are involved in con-
flict situations, Article 3 will still be the only means of
implementing some form, however crude and unsatisfactory, of
humani 'tar-Lan safeguards in such situations. There still re-
m~ins, therefore a pressing need to define the bounds within
-:
which Article 3 will operate.
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Not surpri singly an inconclusive debate has arisen over
the crucial question of what constitutes "an armed conflict
" H" " (23)" I t -'-not of an international character. 1991ns lSO a es LWO
main factors which compl icate any assessment of a conflict as
internal or non-international:
1. the international community may be divided as to whether
the territory concerned is a single political unilit or
State, or two;(24) and
2. it may be claimed that what appears ostensibly as a
civil war is in fact violence formented externally;
should this be so, different considerations of both
law and policy will ensue.
But generally speaking this has been to approach the problem
from the wrong side. In the majority of cases of internal
conflict the critical issue is to distinguish the conflict
as genuinely falling within the ambit of Article 3 from mere
''civil disturbances". It is the natural response of any govern-
ment in dealing with an internal conflict to refuse to regard it
as anything rrore t han a JIEre civil commotion well within its (the
government's) jurisdiction. Initially an internal conflict
may be no more than this; but some criteria must be found by
which it can be judged when an internal conflict falls to be
regulated by Article 3.
(23) Rosalyn Higgins "Internal \oJar and International Law" i n
C Black and R A Falk (ed) The Futureofthe:!:nternational
Legal Order 81 at 85.
(2 .4) This factor would appear to have been at the heartof the
problem of applying humanitarian law in the Vietnam con-
flict. See R R Baxter "Ius in Bello Interno : Th e
Present and Future Law" in John Nor-ton Mo or e Ced ) Law
·an d Ci v i l v,la r i n the Mode r n Worl d 518 at 524:
"The nature of the conflict between the two governments
in Vietnam turns of course on the answer "to t h e questions
whether war across a~ provisional d emarcation line is
i~tern~tional conf~ict and when a provisional demarca-
tlon llne hardens lnto what a mounts to an internatio na l
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The 1949 Diplomatic Conference, from which emerged the
Conventions of 1949, decided against incorporating in Article
3 any conditions to define the situations in which Article 3
is applicable, but the various suggestions may be summarized
as follows:(25)
1. That the party in revolt against the de jure Government
possesses an organized military force, an authority
responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate
territory and having the means of respecting and en-
suring respect for the Conventions.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse
to the regular military forces against insurgents or-
ganized as military and in possession of a part of the
national territory.
3. a. TIlat the de Jure Government has recognized the in-
surgents as belligerents; or
b. that it has claimed for itself the rights of a
belligerent; or
c. that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as
belligerents for the purpose of the Conventions
only; or
d. that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda
of the Security Council or the General Assembly of
the United Nations as being a threat to interna-
tional peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggres-
sion.
4. a. That the insurgents have an organization purporting
to have the characteristics of a State;
(25) Pictet op cit (n 5) 35-36.
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b. that the insurgent civil authority exercises de
facto authority over persons within a determinate
portion of the national territory;
c. that the armed forces act under the direction of
an organized authority and are prepared to observe
the ordinary laws of war; and
d. that the insurgent civil authority agrees to be
bound by the provisions of the Conventions.
The above criteria postulate some measure of recognition
of the insurgent party on the grounds of its military strength,
territorial occupation, the reality of existing or intended
governmental infrastructure based upon responsible authority,
a degree of international acceptance, and both the ability
and willingness to abide by the fundamental tenets of inter-
national humanitarian law. Clearly, however, while some
basic grounds may be isolated , upon which to implement Article
3, there exists little unanimity and for the following rea-
son:
"So far as the identification of a situation as an
internal war is concerned, the horizontal authority
whereby it is left to each state to appraise the
facts leads inevitably to the pursuit of different
practices consequential upon such appraisals."(26)
In a decentralized system, such divergence of appraisal will
be unavoidable in the absence of clearly defined and generally
t d i t e r i A d i 1 H· . (27) .accep e crl erla. ccor lng y, 1991ns suggests tnat
greater attention should be given to the considerations of the
causes, domestic or international, of a conflict, and further
suggests that this role might be successfully undertaken by
C2Bl Higgins op cit Cn 23).
(27) Ibid.
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the United Nations. Howe ve r , it is submi t t'e d that objec-tive
appraisals are unlikely to be glven by any body essentially
political and not judicial.
BELLIGERENT AND INSURGENT STATUS
Before proceeding to a discussion of the criteria which
must be present to render Article 3 applicable, it is neces-
sary to view the development of Article 3 in the light of
the traditional methods in international law of dealing with
conflicts in which only one party enjoyed the status of State-
hood. Traditionally major domestic violence has been classi~
f i b 11·· b 11· (28) R b Ll .led as re e lon, lnsurgency or e 1gerency. e e ilon
comprises sporadic vlolence capable of suppression by the
national police or militia. International law accords no
protection to those in rebellion. Rebellion thus constitutes
a state of domestic violence below the threshold of intensi ty
being the minimum level required to attract the jurisdiction
of international law.
More recently the concepts of belligerent and insurgent
status have fallen into complete disuse. (29)
Indeed, there is some doubt as to whether the status of
insurgency actually exists in law, and, if it does then only
(28) Id 86.
(29) Id 88. See also Dietrich Schindler U State of War,
Belligerency, Armed Conflict" in Antonio Cassese (ed)
The New Humanitarian Law of Arrr;edConfli"ct 3 at 19.
But see Eldon van Cleef Greenberg "Law and the Conduct
. -cif the Algerian Revolution" (1970 ) Harvard International
Law Journal 37 for discussion of a recent conflict in
which a claim of belligerent status was made. I
I
I
. . d . 1 d f i d f h i (30)ln an lmpreclse an 11 - e lne . as lone
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The recognition
of insurgency, implied or express, constitutes an acknowledg-
ment by the recognizing State that the insurgents are legal
contestants and not mere lawbreakers; it may constitute
"an expression of belief by a foreign power that the
insurgents should not be executed as rebels if captured
by the legitimate government."(31)
Recognition of insurgency consists in recognition by a foreign
power of the fact that a s Late of political rebellion exists
. (32 )
ln a partlcular country; it appears that the granting
of insurgent status is appropriate where the level of the
conflict
over the
jeopardizes lithe sovereignty of the parent State
b 11
' . ,',(33) f .. .re e lng comrnunlty or orelgn lntercourse lS
seriously affected. For the purposes of humanitarian law,
the institution of recognit~on of insurgency, even were it
still a viable concept in international law, is largely
irrelevant since it embraces no concrete guarantees of humane
treatment; it merely entitles insurgents to exerClse, in re-
lation to the recognizing State, some of the rights of a
belligerent within the area of confli6t - eg the obstruction
f 1 · h 1 . . (34)o supp les to t e egltlmate government.
Of far greater significance is recognition of an adversary '
as a belligerent, whereupon the rules of war come into full
legal effect. Article 3 is relevant only in cases in which
(30) M Greenspa~ The ModernL~WofLandWarf~~e 619.
(31) Id 621.
(32) Id 620.
(33) Lord McNairSelected Papers ~ndBibliogr~phy 135.
(34) Greenspan op cit 620.
. , fb-~' ° (35)
there has been no recongltlon 0 e~~lgerency. Thus
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where recognition of belligerent status has been granted,
the conflict assumes the 'character of an international armed
conflict and should the party accorded belligerent status be
sufficiently possessed of the attributes of a State presumably
the provisions of Article 2 would be applicable. Assuming
that the parent State is a signatory to the Conventions of
1949, the full provisions of the Conventions come into opera-
tion when the belligerent party indicates that it accepts the
binding force of the Conventions in the particular situation
and when there is evidence that such belligerent in fact
applies the provisions of the Conventions.
There are various criteria which have traditionally
governed the granting of belligerent status and these may be
summarized as follows:
1. Extent of the Conflict
There must exist within the State an armed conflict of
( 36 )
a general character, ° beyond the scope of mere
local revolt. (37)
2. Territorial Control
The insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial
. f . I . (38)proportlon 0 natlona terrltory.
3. Observance of the Rules of \var
The insurgents must conduct the hostilities in accordance
with the rules of war and through organized armed forces
responsible to an identifiable authority. (39)
(35) L Oppenheim Int ernationaTLaw vol 2 370.
(36) Higgins op cit (n 23) 88; J E Bond The Ru le s of Riot 34.
(37) Gerhard von Glahn Law Amon g Na t i o n s 552.
(38) Bond op cit 34; Hi ggins op cit 8 8 ; McNa i r op cit (n 33)
120; G Schwarz enbergerolrit ernationalLaw vol 2 691;
Van Glahn op cit 55 2.
(39) Higgins op c i t 88 ; McNair op cit 120; Schwarzenberger
OD cit R91: Unn ~l~hn ~~ ~;+ C~~
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4. Stable and Effective Administration
The insurgents must have the elements of a regular and
stable government exercising in fact the manifest rights
f . t th under 1"ts control. (40)o sovere1gn-yover .e areas
5. Attitudes of Third States
There must exist a need on the part of other States to
take a stand on the existence of the internal conflict,
and to define and classify their attitudes and policies
towards it. (41)
Recognition of an insurgent group as a belligerent before the
above conditions have been met may constitute interference
in the affairs of another State and thus an international
. (42)
wrong to that State. Where the status of belligerency
may be legitimately accorded then such recognition implies
recognition of all governmental acts of the insurgent party
i th i h " " I d drni " (43) T 'Wl ln t e terrltory lt contro s an a ffilnlsters. _n tne
absence of recognition by the parent State, recognition of
. (44)
belligerency by a number of other States wlll be adequate;
in such a case, those States will impliedly assume the rights
and duties of neutral Powers. Recognition of belligerency
1n no way, however, implies recognition of the insurgent group
as de jure government:
"It does not transform the authority thus recognized








Bondop cit (n 36) 88; Greenspan op cit (n 30) 19;
McNair op cit (n 33) 120; Schwarzenberger op cit Cn 38)
691; Von Glahn opcit Cn 37) 522.
Riggins op cit Cn 23) 88; Von Glahn op cit 522.
Greenspan op cit 19.
Schwarzenberger op cit 69~.
Oppenheim op cit (n 35) 320.
H Lauterpacht "Recogni-tion of Insurgents" (1939) 3
Modern Law Review 1 at 20.
49.
This Vlew would appear to conflict with the view that under
certain circumstances the full application of the Convention
may f6110w upon recognition of belligerent status. The truth
-----is simply that the concept of belligerency was not developed
in the context of humanitarian law and that its legal signifi-
cance related to areas of the law of war such as the law of
neutrality, not humanitarian law at all.
Moreover, the circumstances ln which a participant in a
conflict will be entitled to demand recognition as a belli-
gerent are less than clear. It would appear that belligerent
status would be appropriate in a civil war situation which
resembles an international conflict except for one party's
lack of status in the international system. At the same time
however, certain commentators have identifi~d Article 3 as
. (46)
embodying the concept of belligerent s~atus. Certainly
in drafting Article 3 some delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference were under the impression that Article 3 merely
. ' ( 47)
reaffirms the traditional belllgerency concept. Yet the
differences are real. The full legal effects of war are
attendant upon a recognition of belligerency while Article 3
merely provides elementary humanitarian safeguards. The fact
that the effects of belligerent status and Article 3 are able
to be confused suggests the complex problem Article 3 has
posed of defining in workable terms the area of conflict to
which it is intended to apply. This consideration and the
demise of the belligerency concept are attributable to one
(46) See for example DePue. op cit (ri 1) 83: "a list of
objective criteria gathered from various antecedent
proposals and enumerated in the 'Final Record of the
[1949J Diplomatic Confere~ce of Geneva' suggests that
the framers were simply alluding to classic forms of
belligerency" . .
(47) Bond op cit (n 36) 52.
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factor above all: the ext reme reluctance of States to admit
. . f Li (48 )external regulatlon of domestlc con lCtS . To overcome
. this clearly defined criteria must be devised for the appli-
cation of Article 3.
CRITERIA FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 3
A legacy perhaps of the belligerency concept is the
(49)argument that the humanitarian purpose of Geneva Law in
itself is sufficient ground to require the application of
such law to internal conflicts. This is, of course, a state-
ment of the ideal, and does not represent the ever present
balance of humanity and necessity, the latter in the case of
internal conflicts being the powers a State may feel ·entitled
to maintain untrammelled in dealing with subversive and revo-
lutionary elements. It is simply no solution to demand that
humanitarian law be applied in all circumstances; practical
questions of a legal and political nature (eg the fact that
one party lS not in traditional ~erminology a full subject ln
international law, or the fact that rebels are regarded as
criminals under the law of the country concerned) must be
given due attention. The following statement is cited ln
support of the argument for the universal application of
humanitarian law in armed conflicts:
!lA clearly ascertained state of hostilities on asuf-
ficiently large scale, willed as war at least by one
of the parties creates a condition in which the rules
of warfare become operative .... Once a situation has
been created, which but for the constitutional law of
the state concerned, is indistinguishable from war,
practice suggests that international law ought to step
(48) Id 61.
(49) Higgins op cit (n 23) 89.
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in to fulfill t he same function wh i ch it performs
in wars between sovereign states, ie to humanize
and r egularize t h e c o n duct o f hostilities as be-
tween the parties.ll(SO)
However, it is readily apparent that even the above excerpt
stipulates various minimum criteria (a clearly ascertain~d
state of hostilities on a sufficiently large scale, willed
as war at least by one of the parties; situation indistin-
guishable from war). There mu s t exist minimum criteria to
determine at what level Article 3 will become applicable.
There has been little conformity of approach and the
criteria to emerge from the 1949 Diplomatic Conference range
from lenient to strict. Generally, what has to be determined
1S the intensity, duration and extent of the conflict; it is
b 1 h h b d M k Li ( 51 )Y no means c ear ow t ese may e measure. L,ac 1n re -
ports the opinion of an ICRC Commission of Experts sitting
in 1962 as being that
"the existence of (an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character) cannot be denied if the hostile
action directed against a legal government is of a
collective characte r a n d co nsists of a minimum amoun t
of orga ni zation. I n determining whether these pr i mar y
conditions exist the factors to be considered include
the length of the conflict, the number and framework
of the rebel groups, their installation or action in
a part of the territory, the degree of insecurity,
the existence of victims and the methods employed by
the legal government t o re-establish order." (JDY i t al ics )
On the basis of these criteria, Zacklin concludes that the
type of conflict wi t h wh ich Article 3 deals is broader t h an
that of civil war and that to limit the application of Ar-
ticle 3 civil war situations is too restrictive. It is
submitted that this conclusion is correct. More recent pro-
posals of the ICRC (1972) state:
(50} H Lau t erpachtRe cognit 'ioniri Inte rn'at io'n aT La w vo 1 3
246 quo t ed in Hi ggins op cit 89 .
(51) R Zacklin "International Law and the Protection of
Civilian Victims of Non- Tn te r-ne.t i.o naj. Armed Conflict s"
in M K Ma wa z ( e d) Es say s on Tn t e r n a tion al Law 2 82 a t
288-289.
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"The fo l l.ow.i ng situations, among others, will be con-
sidered non-international armed conflicts ... when
they occur on the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties and they involve military or civilian
victims:
1. A hostile organized action:
a. which is directed against the authorities in
power by armed forces; and
b. which constrains the authority in power to
have recourse to their regular armed forces
to cope therewith.
2. Hostile organized actions which take place between
the armed forces of two or more factions, whether
or not these hostile actions entail the interven-
tion of the authorities in power."(52)
The criterion suggested here is no more than the existence of
a conflict in which the authority ln power employs its regu-
lar armed forces. That the scope of the application of
Article 3 was initially at least regarded as being far more
restricted is demonstrated by the following commentary:
"Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the
conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts,
with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities
- conflicts, in short, which are in many respects simi-
lar to an international war, but take place within the
confines of a single country. In many cases, each of
the Parties is in possession of a portion of the na-
tional ter~itory, and there is often some sort of
front."C53J
B d C54) th f 11' . f' . . -on proposes e 0 oWlng specl lC crlterla tor
the classification of a conflict as non-international in terms
of Article 3:
1. The use of regular combat troops.
2. Th€ duration of the ~onflicts.
3. Foreign troop participation.
4. Intensity of the conflict.
5. Imposition of emergency measures.
(52) Quoted In Zacklin op cit.
(53) Pictet op cit (n 5 ) 36.
(54) Gp 'c i t (n 36) 182-184.
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The difficulty with the above and other criteria is that
they remain hopelessly unspecific. With regard to -Bond's
proposals it is precisely the duration and intensity of the
conflict which are required to be measured and even having
been measured for how long must a conflict be waged and at
what intensity before it can be said to come within the ambit
of Article 3? Is the criterion of "hostile action of a col-
. f ., ,,(55)
lect1ve character and a m1n1mum amount 0 organ1zat1on
helpful? The conflict in Northern Ireland can surely be so
described and yet the call for the implementation of Article
3 in that situation has not been widely made, if at all.
An example of how detailed criteria may be specified 1S
provided by the Institute of World Polity in a document "The
Law of Limited International Conflict,,(56) which lists the
following as indications that internal conflicts should not
be regarded as purely domestic:
"1. Imposition of martial law or a state of siege
generally or in certain areas over a long period
of time.
2. Organization of emergency military or para-
military security agencies, inter-departmental
committees or councils operating with extra-
ordinary powers similar to those exercised in
wartime.
3. Enforcement of laws and institutions commonly
associated with wartime such as high draft calls,
extraordinary measures with respect to food and
other necessities, transportation and the ~ike.
' 4 . Drastic increase in detentions and other depriva-
tions of civil rights for political or security
reasons, detentions over long periods without
trial, increase in trials not characterised by
minimal due process, or at least, due process as
it was supposed to exist in the state in normal
times."
( 55 ) Supra Si.
(56) Quoted in Bond op cit 183-184.
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From the wide ranging proposals discussed above, is it
possible to arrive at a workable generally acceptable yard-
stick for the application of Article 3? This issue may have
been rendered a little less difficult by the inclusion in
Protocol 11 (relating to the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflict) of certain criteria governing
the scope of application of that Protocol. Article 1 pro-
vides as follows:
"1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 without modifyirig its existing
conditions of application, shall apply to all
armed conflicts which are not covered by Ar-
ticle 1 of Protocol (I) ... and which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to en-
able them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Pro-
tocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence
and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts. lI
Article 1 of Protocol 11 therefore postulates the following
criteria in respect of insurgent forces:
1. A measure of organization.
2. Responsible command.
3. Territorial control sufficient to enable those forces:
a. to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations; and
b. to implement the provisions of Protocol 11.
Does Article 1 of Protocol 11 take one any further in
attempting to establish the parameters within which Article 3
1S intended to function?
55.
Firstly, it is submitted t h a t t he abo ve cri te r i a shou l d be
used to govern Ar t i c l e 3 situations.
(57)
Forsythe s ugge s t s
that the scope of Ar ti c le 3 is i:b r o a de r an d that " rthe r e are
two general types o f internal war, legally speaking a Proto-
col 11 situation and a Common Art i c l e 3 situation". This is
no doubt true but to r equire such an interpretation will be
to introduce yet ano ther fac tor i nto an already over-comple x
set of laws. In terms of t his approach one wo ul d have to
distinguish five distinct conflict situations:
1. international armed conflicts ln the traditional sense;
2. international armed conflicts as defined by Article 1(4)
of Protocol I;
3. non-international armed conflicts as defined by
Article 1 of Protoco l 11;
4. non-international armed confl ic ts unde r Article 3 of
the Conventions of 1949 which are not cove red by
Article 1 of Protocol 11; and
5. purely domestic conflicts which are not subj ect to any
external regulation whatsoever.
To successfully distinguish each level and type of conflict
will certainly prove to be an i nsuperable task. In any event
a government which is sufficiently honest and h umane to ad-
mit the applicability of Ar t i c l e 3 is extremely unlikely t o
quibble over the application of the greatly wa t e re d-down pro-
visions of Protocol 11. Therefore as a matter of practical
good sense i t must be assumed that t he scope of Articl e 3 wil l
be more or less the same as that of Protocol 11. The achieve-
ment of even so small a modicum of ce r tainty ln t h e application
(57!-/ David P Forsythe "Lega l Mana ge meni: of I n i:erna l Wa r : The
1977 Pr oto col on No n - i n t e rnat i ona l Arme d Con flict s "
7 (1978) 7 2 A ,] I L 2 72 at 286 .
,/
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of Article 3 would be a small prlce indeed to pay for a
somewhat narrower scope of application.
Furthermore, while it is admitted that the threshold for
the application of the Protocol is set rather higher than is
desirable there lS no reason to suggest that it is applicable
only in civil war situations, as was apparently the opinion
of several delegates to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference. (58)
It is clear that such an interpretation is too strict. The
advantage in identifying the scope of Article 3 with that of
Protocol 11 is that no State could realistically assert that
Article 3 does not apply where the conditions for the applica-
tion of Protocol 11 are present. Such conditions undoubtedly
refer to a category of conflict situations well beyond mere
riots, civil disturbances and acts of urban terrorism but
certainly not limited to civil war situations. Some sacrifice
is made in limiting the scope of Article 3 by identifying it
with the scope of Protocol 11 but in postulating a set of
minimum criteria a recalcitrant government is deprived of the
loophole of denying the applicability of Article 3 at all.
Article 1 of Protocol 11 constitutes progress ln this
sense that it attempts to define, however loosely, the limits
of the application of that Protocol. (58a) However ultin\a.tely it is open
(58) Id 285. See also G.I.A.D. Draper "Humanitarian La~7 and
Human Rights" 1979 Acta: Juridica 193 at 202, 205.
(58a) Contra Asbiorn Eide "The New Humanitarian Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict" in Cassese (ed) op cit
(n 29) 277 at 299 where it is argued that the "threshold"
provision of Article 1 (stipulating the level which an
armed conflict must attain before Protocol 11 is appli-
cable) is irrelevant:
. "(I)t must be immaterial what level the conflict has
.r e a ch e d - these provisions contain nothing more than
what f'o Ll.ows from the general law of human rights,
which today must be considered part of the jus cogens."
This may be true but in practical terms is unlikely to
(continued on the next page)
57.
to the same crucial objection as Article 3. Protocol 11 fails
to provide "for author i tative re s o l u t i on b y third parties of
. l' ,. , th Lns t rumen t !". (59) ITI1hu c .i tcompetlng calms a rlslng unaer e v
is left in fact to the established go ve r nme n t to decide whe ther
the conflict in which it is i nvolved has escalated to the point
where it falls to be regulated by Protocol 11. The drafting
history of Protocol II -demonstrates clearly that no reliance
can be placed upon States to make an objective and humane
appraisal of a situation of internal conflict. Protocol 11
was only adopted after the original draft had been considerably
cut down at the insistence of States which, having ensured the
definition of conflicts fought against colonial, alien or
racist regimes as international, then obstructed as far as
possible any attempt at regulation of internal conflicts which
. h ' h e i ,,(60)mlg t occur In t ell' own terrltorles.
THE OBLIGATIO NS OF THE PARTIES
The issue of the application of Article 3 is concerned
not only with which parties are bound but also how they are
bound. In the light of the overwhelming practical problem of
the delineation of Article 3 conflicts this problem may appear





persuade States susceptible t o possible domestic con-
flicts to adopt a liberal and e n thusiastic approach to
applying Protocol 11. See L C Green "The New Law of
Armed Conflict" (1977) 15 Canadian Yearbaokor Inter-
national Law 3 at 40.
Forsytbe op cit (n 57) 286.
Id 277-282.
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Article 3 provides that in the case of armed conflict
not of an international character the parties to the conflict
shall be bound to apply the provisions contained in the Ar-
ticle. This immediately raises the problem of how parties
which were ' no t signatories to the Conventions can be bound by
them. To overcome this logical difficulty, recourse must be
had to one or more of a number of legal fictions. Obviously,
the obligation of the established Government, as a Contrac-
ting Party to the Conventions of 1949 is clear; moreover
such obligation is absolute in the absence of any reciprocity
clause. With regard to the locus standi of the insurgent
. (61)
group, several solutlons have been proposed:
1. Partie~ sufficiently established and organized to form
a belligerent community possess sufficient personality
to make them bound by the treaty obligations of the
State and to be responsible to third States for viola-
tions of these obligations.
2. The above solution is only relevant if the insurgent
group fulfills the requirements for recognition as a
belligerent party (for which see above); the formal
nature of belligerent status and the degree of recog-
n~tion involved invariably precludes the granting of -
such status to mere insurgent groups. Recognition as
a belligerent is, for the purposes of humanitarian law
at least, outmoded. Therefore, weightier consideration
should perhaps be given to the suggestion by Draper
that for the purose of the Conventions a new kind of
personality has come into being, formed "with individuals
(61) See generally D pot ConnelllnternatiOnalLaw vol 2
9.73;"974.
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grouping the mselves in a particular way so that they
. 1 fl . " ( 6 2 )become a party to an lnterna con lct.
3. A further approach is to argue that Article 3 will bind
parties who are without personality. There are several
grounds upon which this contention may be based:
a. Such parties will be bound on the basis that the
original adherence of the established government
binds all the subjects of the State even though
some of them may rebel against that government -
i e treaties made on behalf of the State bind the
State as a whole and therefore all treaties already
in existence when the civil dispute commenced are
(63)
necessarily binding on the insurgent parties also.
However this theory is inconsistent with the tradi-
. tional view that rebels are not subject to inter-
national law until they are accorded belligerent
status. (64)
b. Article 3 may be regarded as setting the established
law independently of contractual obligation. (65)
This then lS to argue that Article 3 is merely a
statement of law which has already come into being
as custom. It is certainly possible to state that
Article 3 now reflects the true position in cus-
tomary law, but given the innovatory nature of the






G I A D Draper The RedCrossConv'ent·ions 17.
Greenspan op cit (n 30) 623-624).
See generally "The Geneva Convention and the ':Dreatment
of Prisoners of War in Vietnam" (Note from the Harvard
Law Re v i.ew ) reprinted in R A Falk(ed 1 The Vietnamv]ar
and International Law vol 2 398.
Greenspan op cit (n 30) 624.
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unlikely that the above argument can be sustained.
As has been pointed out above, the rules of warfare
traditionally govern only hostilities between States
or civil wars in which t h e rebel party has been
recognised as a belligerent.
c. It may be argued that "if the responsible authority
at [tpe head of an insurgent or rebel group] exer-
cises effective sovereignty, it is bound by the very
fact that it claims to represent the country, or
(66)
part of the country." The essence of this argu-
ment lS that any body which claims to be a govern-
ment and demands to be recognized as one must, In
order to substantiate its claim, act as one. How-
ever, it is unlikely that an insurgent authority,
which merely claims to represent the people, there-
fore necessarily assents to the obligations of a
government. The assertion that consent is present
is probably normative rather than descriptive in the
circumstances of an internal conflict.
O'Connell(67) points out that the arguments falling un-
der 3. above, that personality of the parties in law is not
required for insurgent groups to be bound by Article 3, are
not supported by the Conventions themselves; these do clearly
assume personality in the parties for Article 3 itself stipu-
lates that the parties to the conflict ,s h ou l d endeavour, by
means of special agreements, to bring into operation all or
part of the other provisions of the Conventions as a whole.
(66) Pictetop cit (n 5) 87.
(67) Op cit (n 6~) 973.
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This V1ew 1S probably correct; furthermore, the fact that
an insurgent group must have attained a certain level of
"status", as an indication of the intensity of the conflict
(eg a measure of organization, territorial control, respon-
sible command, etc, as set out in Article 1 of Protocol 11),
further indicates that some form of personality is required,
1n which case the contention by Draper above would appear to
be the most logical. As a practical issue, however, the
following submission is probably the most realistic:
"By definition, insurgents cannot adhere to a treaty
prior to the commencement of hostilities, and if the
applicability of Article 3 were made to turn on acces-
sion afterwards, there would be too great a risk of
non-adherence merely as a short-sighted response to
the pressures of the moment .... Accordingly i~ does
not seem unfair to bind insurgent groups without
their consent."(68)
RECIPROCITY
Considerable difficulty is posed by the question of
. . H.. (69)rec1proc1ty.. 1gglns states that:
~Article 3 calls for humanitarian rules to be applied
irrespective of whether the insurgents have been re-
cognised by the legitimate government or by third
parties."
This approach is correct in that clearly application of
Article 3 is not dependent upon recognition of the parties.
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that Article 3 is binding
on all parties (see above) and is not subject to reciprocity.
Thus where Article 3 is admitted to be of application, then
the obligation upon all the parties to implement its provi-
sions is absolute and does not depend upon the actualimple-
mentation thereof by any other party. However, this situation
(68)
(69)
opcii (n 64) 405.
Op cit (n 23) 90:
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should not be confused with that in which the entrenched
authority refuses to admit the applicability of Article 3 on
the grounds that the insurgent party is unable or unwilling
to implement the provisions of Article 3, and such lack of
compliance is in itself an indication that such party does
not exercise sufficient control to implement these provisions.
If the insurgent party does not apply the provisions of
Article 3 then "it will prove that those who regard its actions
br-i d . h ,,(70) I .as mere acts of anarchy or rlgan age are rlg.t . t lS
therefore apparent that the absoluteness of the obligation
contained in Article 3 is all but meaningless; it may be
avoided on the ground that the conflict does not come within
the ambit of the Article. In practice, if not in theory, a
form of reciprocity will inevitably arise if Article 3 is to
. (71)
be applled at all. Furthermore, it is submitted that
even such reciprocity will be difficult to arrive at, since
Article 3 leaves unaffected the legal status of the parties:
"it does not limit in any way the Government's right to
suppress a rebellion by all the means - including arms -
provided by its own laws; nor does it in any way affect
the Government's right to prosecute, try and sentence





Pictet op cit Cn 5) 37.
But DePue . op cit Cn 1) 84 argues that precisely because
the implementation of Article 3 is not dependent upon
reciprocity there will exist "no incentive to assure
continuing adherence by the insurgent". This may well
be true but in such a case the established authority is
extremely unlikely to continue to hold itself bound and
thus a form of negative reciprocity will be established.
Pictet op cit 44.
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'. ·.:cor d i n gl y , where a me mber of an insurgent group does not
hol d himself morally bound to observe the basic humanitarian
principles contained in Article 3, there will exist no re-
straint upon his actions since upon capture he will face pro-
secution in any event for treason or for some offence in terms
of security legislation. It is incorrect to assume Article 3
creates categories of war crimes; it is further incorrect to
(73) .suggest that In terms of common Article 49(I), 50(II),
129(III) and 146(IV) a Government is required to introduce
some form of legislation to punish persons who violate Article
3. Breaches of prohibitions contained in Article 3 therefore
fall to be dealt with in the normal way under the criminal
law of the State concerned. However, it must be borne in mind
that all acts so prohibited constitute war crimes in terms of
international customary law and grave breaches of the Conven-
tions themselves. Consequently, lI any derogation from this
law by way of r eprisal or agreement is as illegal in relation
to these provisions as In relation to other obligations of
this type under the Geneva Conventions.,,(74) Moreover, it
would appear that any Party to the Conventions may demand of
any other Party that the latter, where engaged in an internal
armed conflict, act in compliance with the minimum standards
laid down in Article 3. (75)
(73) See for example F J Berber IIS ome Thoughts on the Laws
of War and the Punishment of War Crimes ll in Nawaz
op cit (n 51) 260 at 264.
(74) Schwarzenberger op cit (n 21) 717.
(75) Id 719.
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THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 3 I N PRACTICE
"It is premature ... to dis miss t he r elevan ce of
Common Article 3. That law, 'warts and all', is more
important a nd h as re c e i ved more a ttention than h a s
been gene rally r e al i zed. First of a l l , i t is treaty
law, unive r s a l l y a dhere d to in t h e sense o f being
formally adop t e d . It e s tab l ishe s be y on d doubt the
legitimacy of the concern of modern international
law with i nte r nal war. Moreo ver, Common Art i cle 3
was in 1949, and r emains, r evolutionary in content,
being th~ ~first pie c e o f globa l ly accepte d interna-
tional law r equiring a state to tre at its own national s
according to community standards.,,(76)
The a bove statement reflects the significance of Article 3 In
the development of the law relating to internal armed con-
fllcts but Article 3 must stand or fall o n the basis of t he
extent to which it has been effectively implemen ted in the
past. Forsyth(77) argues that "considerably more attention
has been paid to the 'initial ques tion' o f t h e a pplicability
of Common Article 3 than has bee n ge ne r a l l y reco gnised. He
summarizes t he initial r elevan ce o f Article 3 b e twe e n t he
years 194 9 to 1975 as follows:(78)
In the follow ing conflict s i tua t i on s the a pp l ica b i lity
of Article 3 was exp l i c it ly acknowledged by go ve rn -
ment officials: Guate mala (1 9 54), Fr a n ce i n Alge r i a
(1956), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (195 9), Yeme n (19 62),
United States in Vietnam (1964), Dominican Republic
(1965), Uruguay (1 97 2), and Chil e ( 1973). I n the
cas es of Fran ce, Leb a non, Cuba and Yemen the a pp l i ca-
bility of Art i c le 3 was acknowle dged by th e insurge n t
for ces as well . In a number of other conflict situa-
tions the applicability of Article 3 was not acknow- (79)





Forsythe op cit (n 57) 274.
Ibid.
Id 275- 276.
These were: Algeria (France; 1955), Cyprus (UK; 1955-
195 8), Hungary (195 6), Ma lays ia (1 956), Ken ya (UK;
19 5 6-19 59), South Vi e tna m (19 5 7- 1 966), Rhodesia ( UK;
1959-1980), Lao s (1 96 1- 197 2), Indone s ia (19 66- 196 9),
Aden (UK; 1966 - 196 7 2 , Bolivia (1 97 1), Norther n I r ela n d
(UK; 1971-pre sent), Guinea Bi ss a u (Portugal; 1971-1974),
Mo z ambique (Portugal; 1971-197 4), Burundi (197 2), .
Phillipines ( 1 97 2-pre s ent), Ango l a ( Portugal; 19 73 -
1976), Thailand ( 1 97 3-197 5), Iraq ( 1 97 4-1 97 5), Ethiopia
(197 4- 1 97 9), Le banon (19 75-pre s e n t).
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Given the fact that by one estimate over a thousand
internal armed conflicts have taken place in the period
since the formulation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949(80)
the above survey can hardly be regarded as convincing evidence .
of the widespread application of Article 3. It may be in-
structive to examine very briefly by way of example the role
of Article 3 in the Algerian conflict of 1954-1960~81) The
Algerian conflict is one of five or six conflicts in which
the parties involved on both sides have acknowledged the
applicability of Article 3. In June 1956 the French govern-
ment (Algeria being French territory) authorized the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (rCRC) to send a mission
to Algeria after the rCRC had offered its services ln con-
formity with Article 3. The rebel group (FLN) was anxious to
.a vo i d any attempt to characterize the conflict as internal
because it claimed belligerent status but was nevertheless
prepared to accept Article 3 as the minimum law applicable.
Despite the willingness by the French and FLN to apply
the provisions of Article 3 ~nd therefore the initial obstacle
of obtaining consensus on the need and obligation to apply
Article 3 was overcome)., the record of compliance with the pro-
visions of Article 3 by' both sides left much to be desired.
Terrorism and torture were employed extensively and indis-
criminately. By January 1957 the death rate for civilians
had reached some 200 a month. Prisoners taken by both sides
were often summarily executed. Truncated judicial procedures
were instituted by the government in cases against individuals
(80) See DePue op cit (n 1) 72.
(81) For a comprehensive discussion see Greenberg op cit
(n 29).
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charged with committing an act of civil war.
That the regulation of the conflict by humanitarian law
was not more effective may be attributed ln part at least to
the failure of the parties to conclude a general agreement
providing for the implementation of some of the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions applicable to international conflicts.
The government declined to do so through fear that the status
of the FLN could thereby be enhanced, the rebel authority be-
cause the conflict could thereby be labelled as internal and
so preclude the recognition of the FLN as a belligerent.
Status was for both parties the crucial issue and since this
is a political goal, political rather than humanitarian con-
siderations ,governed the responses of the parties. This amply
demonstrates the argument that regulation of internal conflicts
is effective only ln so far as the established authority allows.
Yet it would be inaccurate to describe the operation of
Article 3 in the Algerian conflict as ineffective, even with-
( 8? )
out the conclusion of a general agreement. As Greenberg ~
points out
"the laws of war were still very much in evidence: both
sides accused the other of breaches, while denying their
own alleged contraventions; officials and others spoke
- and acted - as if they mattered."
Thus the willingness to admit the applicability of Article 3
created an awareness of applicable humanitarian restraints
which in turn was translated into practical benefits. In the
closing stages of the conflict there appeared to be a tendency
in the judgments of the judiciary to admit the distinction be-
tween terrorists and regular rebel forces, and possibly to
(82) Id,71.
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imply that such regulars could be accorded prlsoner of war
status. (83) It is submitted that without the initiative
constituted by Article 3 the possibility of such ad hoc
treatment of prisoners (in advance of the law since A~ticle
3 makes no provision for prisoner of war status) would have
been excluded altogether.
Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the Algerian con-
flict is an example of the practical application of Article
3 at its best, simply because it has been so rarely acknow-
ledged that Article 3 is applicable. The defects(84) of
Article 3 are clear even in the Algerian situation and no
amount of polemics can disguise the fact that Article 3 is
all but irrelevant to most instances of internal conflict.
Firstly, Article 3 fails to define the conflicts to which it
is intended to apply; this poses an insuperable problem in
all but exceptional cases such as the Algerian conflict.
Secondly no provision is made for the independent adjudica-
tion of when Article 3 is applicable and when not. Thirdly,
the provisions contained in Article 3 are superficial, they
do not, for example, attempt to regulate the actual conduct
of hostilities. The safeguards which Article 3 supposedly
embraces are entirely inadequate and do not prevent many
forms of abuse and maltreatment prevalent in internal conflicts.
The principles set out in Article 3 are so general as to be




Forsythe op cit (n 57) 277; Greenberg op cit (n 79) 64.
See generally Miller op cit (n 2) 275-277; Bond op cit
Cn 36) 33-61.
For a valiant attempt to put flesh on the bones of
Article 3 see James E Bond "Application of the Law of
War to Ir;ternal Conflicts 11 • (j.g 73) 3 Georgia Journal of
Internatlonal and ComparatlveLaw 345.
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or no pressure c an be b rou ght upon t he established gove r n -
ment to conform t o t h e r equir e ments of Article 3.
The inadequacy of Ar t i c l e 3 is universally acknowledged,
although some spots (eg the Al gerian conflict) in t h e history
of Article 3 are less dis mal tha n others. Protocol 11 of
1977 was devised to r eme dy the defects of Article 3 and so
the future of Article 3 is now inextricably bound up with
that of Protocol 11. It is valuable, however, to consider
alternative courses which the development of Article 3 could
have taken.
PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO ARTICLE 3
There are essential l y two a pproaches wh i ch may be taken.
Firstly, the scope of application of Article 3 may be left
unchanged but its substantive provisions extended to give
adequate humanitarian protection to those i n vo l ve d in the
conflict. Thus it has been suggested that Article 3 be amen-
ded to include more specific details relating to judicial
punishment for c omba t a n ts captured in internal conflicts.(86)
Such submissions include the following:
1. combatants or civilians should not be punished solely
for taking part in the conflict;
2. e xecutions should be deferred during hostilities;
3. a gene ral a mnesty s ecured a t the end of hostilities;
4. relief consignme nts of medical a nd hospital s upp l i e s ,
essential foods, clothing a n d other items intended for
( 86 ) L J Chimango "The Rel evance of Humani tarian International
Law to the Liberation Struggles in So uthe r n Afr i c a - the
Ca se o f Mozambique in Retrospect " ( 1 9 75) 8 Comparat ive
a n d Int e rna tional Law Journal of Southern Africa 2 87 at
302.
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categories of civilians should be provided for;
5. arrangements should be made for relief supplies to
captured personnel while a status analogous to Prisoner
of War Status might be granted to captured combatants . .
. h· th t t d b R b i ( 87)The alternat1ve approac 1S - a sugges e y u 1n.
Writing in 1972, Rubin concludes that because of the fairly
stringent threshold qualification contained in any interpre-
tation of Article 3, little success has been enjoyed in imple-
menting humanitarian provisions 1n terms of that Article and
that therefore no strengthening of the substantive provisions
of Article 3 is likely to have humanitarian results. More-
over, Rubin correctly points out that where one lowers the
threshold of intensity beyond which international interest
and concern ("international purview") is admitted and approved,
one diminishes the possibility of agreement as to substantive
safeguards. Therefore Rubin suggests that it would be possible
to render Article 3 more effective by broadening its scope,
without either lowering the threshold or including further
substantive provisions:
"For example, there seems very little reason why
Article 3 should not be made applicable to all armed
conflicts, whether or not of an international charac-
ter, to which no more specific Conventional regime
applies, ie Article 3 could be made to fill entirely
the set of armed conflicts not within the scope of
Article 2.,,(88)
However, it is submitted that ultimately in following
this approach, if any material advance is to be made, the
(87) A P Rubin "Status of Rebels under the Geneva Conventions
of 1949" (1972) 21 International and Comparative Law
JOurnal 472 at 486.
(88) Ibid.
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lowering of the threshold of intensity cannot be a vo i d e d .
Rubin himself recogni zes that it might "be poss ible even to
lower the threshold of international purview over internal
political turmoil by using looser terminology than the phrase
"armed conflict". This approach has the disadvantage that
it will inevitably give rlse to problems of recognition.
(89)Rubin suggests that mere legal argument will not
suffice to persuade an insurgent party to abide by the provi-
sions of humanitarian law unless some self interest is offered
to it other than an interest in maintaining internal stability)
security) etc) or any other value which will be advantageous
and therefore persuasive to an established authority. Thus
the insurgent must be granted some legal incentive to induce
it to comply with the provisions of humanitarian law. It
would require protracted negotiation to arrive at the formu-
lation of such an incentive b u t it should not prove impos s i bl e .
Rubin suggests that one answer could be to vest rebels with
international status (but not POW status) from the moment
they appear) thus giving such rebels at least some interest
ln maintaining humanitarian values. More specifically:
"It might be possible to conclude an agreement by wh i.ch
all States bound themselves to offer asylum to members
of any political movemen t declaring Article 3 of the
Conventions (or) indeed) Article 2) applicable as f a r
as its o wn actions were concerned. This inducement to
public declaration and actions under the Conventions
could be coupled with a specific reminder that indi -
viduals guilty of grave breaches of the Conventions are
subject to penalties in any State."(90)
Had this proposal been i mple mented in practice it would surely
have proved unworkable and therefore one can probably be
( 89 ) Id 4- 9 5 •
(90) Ibid.
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thankful that it has not been taken up in Protocol 11. The
greatest difficulty has been encountered in persuading even
the government involved to honour its obligations under
Article 3; this task could only be rendered more onerous if
neighbouring States which will often have conflicting interests
are involved as well.
Baxter(91) adopts a Vla media, proposlng both a reV1Slon
of the scope of Article 3 and the insertion of specific pro-
visions. Thus according to Baxter's formulation, the relevant
portion of Article 1 Protocol 11 would read:
"This Protocol shall apply to any case of armed con-
flict not of an international character which is
carried out in the territory of a High Contracting
Party and in which:
(1) organized armed forces, subject to a system of
military discipline, carry on hostile activities
in arms against the authorities in power, and
(2) the authorities in power employ their armed forces
against such persons.
This Protocol has no application to situations of
internal disturbance or tension."
The merits of this approach are, apparently, that it is
founded upon objective criteria and would be easier to apply
than if based upon subjective factors such as the motive,
purpose or cause of the rebel group. Baxter further recom-
mends provisions requiring the humane treatment (without
gOlng so far as to grant prisoner of war status) of those who
have engaged ln belligerent acts and are hors de combat, and
provisions guaranteeing the due process of law in the prose-
cution of rebel members.
Ironically, Protocol 11 ra~lly follows neither of the
two approaches discussed above nor the via media suggested by
(91) Gp cit (n 24) 518 at 533.
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Baxter. i.If anything, it has restricted the scope of appli-
cation of humanitarian law in internal conflicts and its
substantive provisions do not amount to a great deal, cer-
tainly not as far as prisoners are concerned. It would seem
that for at least the foreseeable future Protocol 11 will be
taken as the norm; the hoped-for broadening in scope and
content of Article 3 is now a dim prospect indeed.
CONCLUSION
Article 3 is still relevant if only because for most
States it remains the only humanitarian law applicable in
internal armed conflicts. Its continued relevance is inex-
tricably bound up with the future of Protocol 11 since it
must be accepted, for reasons stated above, that both must
be taken to refer to essentially the same conflict situations.
Article 1 of Protocol 11 sets the threshold of application
high and presumably this approach will be followed with re-
gard to Article 3. The drafting history of Protocol 11 re-
affirms only too clearly the reluctance of States to admit
international regulation of internal disputes. Thus there
remains considerable doubt as to whether the application of
Protocol 11 will avoid the pitfall of Article 3 viz the ease
with which States have been able to refute suggestions that
.Ar t i c l e 3 applied to their domestic conflicts. And there
seems to be no good reason to believe that States who evade
the application of Protocol II -;will be disposed to apply
Article 3.
These considerations are, of course, relevant only to
some of those conflicts which traditionally have been regarded
as internal. Article 1(4) of Protocol I has cut across such
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delineations and as such represents a radical change. The
implications of Article 1(4) are considered in the following
chapter.
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it
has been seen, represented an innovation in that never before
had international regulation of a domestic conflict gained
recognition in an international instrument. Protocol I of
1977 has retained the distinction between international and
non-international conflicts but has in the form of Article
1(4) restated the definition of the former. This Chapter
1S an examination of the policy underlying Article 1(4), why
it has arisen, and its strengths and weaknesses.
The Protocols of 1977 represent a major shift 1n the
direction of humanitarian law and as such reflect the 1n-
creasing influence of the Socialist and emerging Third World
blocs. However, probably the most crucial 1ssue which the
Protocols raise is the question of to what extent political-
considerations may be permitted to intrude in the formulation
of humanitarian law. Armed conflict has, of course, always
constituted a means towards a political end; any attempt,
therefore, to regulate that means must contain some political
element, and the attempt by States to promote military neces-
sity at the expense of humanitarian imperatives undoubtedly
constitutes an overt political manoeuvre by States to retain
for themselves a political weapon, warfare, with the minimum
loss of effectiveness possible. It should not, therefore,
be surprising when Third World States embark upon the same
exercise. Because humanitarian law in armed conflict has
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historically been a Western development, (1) and because the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also
founded upon Western ideals, the humanitarian policies in
war demanded by developing States appear to be crude and ill-
fitting. Yet such policies reflect the reality, in a sense,
of prevailing forms of warfare; In the period since World
War 11, the ideological bases of warfare had been expanded
to justify conflict waged against colonial or racist govern-
ments, and out of this ideology arose the new concept of
" ... ,,(2) Th _.. 1 Wwars or natlonal llberatlon . e tradltlona estern
concept of war fought between States has become rapidly out-
moded and the relevance of humanitarian law designed to deal
with such conflict has thus also been eroded. Account must
be taken of developing forms of conducting war and it would
be naive to imagine that the process whereby any new formu-
lation is worked out would not be political. But in this re-
gard two important factors should be borne in mind:
1. The political process by which humanitarian law must
evolve if it is to be effective is one of consensus,
given that there exist no absolutely effective forces
for compliance; any law which does not enjoy the sup-
port of virtually all parties will be worth little.
(1) See, for example, Lewis F Shull "Counter-insurgency and
the Geneva Conventions - Some Practical Considerations"
(1968) 3 International Lawyer 49 at 51:
"(T)he Conventions of 1949 very clearly reflect that
the balance of power lay, at the time the treaties
were negotiated, with the North Atlantic community of
nations. Thus all of the basic concepts very strongly
reflect the tactics and organizational concepts of an
American/European orientated armed force."
(2) R R Baxter "Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics?"
(1975) 16 Harvardlnternational Law Journal 1 at 4.
2. The purpose of humanitarian law is to alleviate suf -
fering, not to further political objectives; it i s
in this crucial sense that humanitarian law must be
a-political.
Accordingly Protocols I and 11 stand to be judged on the
following grounds:
1. do they further humanitarian ends?
2. do they constitute effective and enforceable(3) law?
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 1974-1977
The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and De-
velopment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, convened by the Swiss Federal Council, held
four sessio~s(4) in Geneva from 1974 to 1977. The object of
the Conference was to study two draft Additional Protocols
prepared, after official and private consultations, by the
ICRC and intended to supplement the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949. "In view of the paramount importance of ensuring
broad participation in the work of the Conference, which was
of a fundamentally humanitarian nature, and because the pro-
gressive development and codification of internatio~al humani-
tarian law applicable ln armed conflicts is a universal task
in which the national liberation movements can contribute
.. 1 ,,(5) h n f .. ...posltlve y, t ~ ~on erence lnvlted the natlonal llberatlon
(3) Effective and enforceable in the sense of being capable
of practical implementation. In this respect the tests
of new humanitarian law have been stated to be feasibility
and clarity (George S Prugh "Current Initiatives to Re-
affirm and Develop International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Conflict" (1974) 8 InternationaTLawyer
262 at 264).
(4) South Africa was represented only at the first.
(5) Extract from the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International




movements recognized by the regional intergovernmental
organizations concerned to participate fully in t h e delibera-
tions of the Conference and its Main Committees, although
only delegations representing States were entitled to vote.
National liberation movements which accepted the invitation
and were represented at the Conference included the African
National Congress (SA), the African National Council of
Zimbabwe, Frelimo, the Panafricanist Congress (SA), SWAPO,
the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Zimbabwe African
People's Union, and others.
On the basis of its discussions, the Conference drew up
the following instruments : Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions -of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International and Armed Conflict (Protocol I), and Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Confli c t s
(Protocol 11).
The Additional Protocols were adopted by the conference
on 8 June 1977 and were open for signature by States for a
period of one year from 12 December 1977, and since the end
of that peribd have been open for accession.
Article 1(3) and (4) of Protocol I providesas follows:
(51 (continued)
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 1974-1977,
reproduced in (19781 42 (2) Law and Contemporary Prob-
Lerns at 309. See also F R Ribeiro "International Humani-
tarian Law: 'Advancing Progressively Backwards'" (1980)
97 SALJ 42 at 43.
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"3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims, shall apply in the situations re-
ferred to in Article 2 common to those Conven-
tions. (6)
4. The situations referred to in the preceding para-
graph include armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation, and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Go-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations." .
The above may be compared with Article 1 of the Draft Addi-
tional Protocol submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Con-
ference for consideration; Article 1 thereof consisted simply
of the following provision:
The present Protocol, which supplements the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection
of War Victims, shall apply in the situation referred
to in Article 2 COIT@on to these Conventions.
A majority of the experts attending the ICRC conference which
formulated the Draft Additional Protocols did not support the
introduction of a second paragraph stipulating that the situa-
tions referred to in common Article 2 include armed struggles
waged by peoples in the exercise of their right of self-
determination. This view was adopted on the ground that it
was inconsistent with the system embodied ln the Conventions
to qualify particular conflicts, and that further there was
no need to include a specific provision concerning such strug-
gles in Protocol I, since in the majority of cases they would
(6} The situations referred to in Article 2 are:
a. All cases of declared war or of any other armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more of the
Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them; and
b. all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a Oontracting Party, even if that occu-
pation meets with no armed resistence. See Ch 2 supra.
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be covered by Article 3 co~~on to the Conventions or by
Protocol 11. Alternatively, it was suggested that either
such armed struggles be declared in the Preamble to be in-
ternational in character or that members of national libera-
tion movements should be brought ~vithin the ambit of a
broader definition of those entitled to prisoner of war sta-
t
(7)
us. However, these reservations were overruled by the
Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977 and Article 1(4) of Pro-
tocol I came into being. This was not achieved without con-
siderable legal and political debate; academic opinion as
to the worth of the Protocols is divided, and the absence
thus far of widespread support in the form of ratification or
accession by a significant number of States places some doubt
upon the practical relevance of the Protocols. Probably,
however, it is premature to disregard the Protocols on this
basis and their general acceptance lS still more than possible.
THE BACKGROUND TO ARTICLE 1(4) : GUERILLA WARFARE(S)
Virtually all commentators are agreed that the Conven-
tions of 1949 are inappropriate and thus inadequate for the
regulation of modern conflicts. Revisiofr of the law of war
(which came to fruition in the form of the Protocols of 1977)
has therefore been urgently required for some time. The
difficulty of such revision has been to arrive at the regula-
tion of low intensity conflicts which have invariably been
(7) See generally ICRC Commentary on the Draft Additional
Protoc·ols 6.
(8) See generally Peter Cornelius Mayer-Tasch "Guerrilla
Warfare and International Law" (1973) S Law and "State 7.
See a~so Shull op cit (n 1) for examples of specific
practlcal problems in humanitarian law arising from
guerilla war tactics. .
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fought by means of guerilla warfare. As a tactic employed
by regular combatants recognizable as such, guerilla warfare
is of course legitimate; however, the concept of guerilla
warfare has increasingly become identified with that form of
conflict in which irregular trooDs, indistinguishable from, .
the civilian population and with little regard for humani-
tarian rules of war, conduct subversive operations against a
State.
The dominance of guerilla tactics as a means of waglng
war is undisputed and this cannot be regarded, in the light
of the unwillingness of States to wage war by conventional
means for fear of escalation and use of nuclear weapons, as
h D (9) d °b h . b °1° . fOIla mere p ase. raper escrl es t e sUlta 1 lty 0 guerl a
tactics to modern conditions as follows:
"The guerilla fighter's substantial role of sabotage has
become the more pronounced in our own time when the soale
and speed of destruction and disruption are communsurate
with the technology which has produced the systems and
installations exposed to sabotage .... The sensitive
nature of much of our modern communications systems,
urban organization generally and power and food supply
enhances the effectiveness of the guerilla fighter at
an increasing rate to which the contemporary law of ~7ar
has not yet adapted itself."
The difficulties in revising the law of war to take ac-
count of the phenomenon of guerilla warfare have been twofold:
1. The totally different local conditions of guerilla
operations, different historical and cultural back-
grounds, and the widely divergent political, ideologi-
cal and social structure of States and societies in-
volved in guerilla conflicts render problematical the
formulation of general rules to govern those conflicts. (10)
(9) G T A D Draper "The Status of Com.bat~nts and the Question
of Guerilla Warfare" (1971} 45 BYTL 173 at 178.
(10) Edward Kossoy Living with Guerrilla 144.
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2. Guerilla warfare generally, but not necessarily, tends
to negate the distinction between combatant and civi-
lian which the traditional law of war has always upheld.
Guerilla warfare has been most successfully waged where
the guerilla forces have been indistinguishable from
the local population and in this way have avoided detec-
. (11)
tion. But as Draper points out, the rationale of
the limitation of the right to bear arms and to kill in
combat to the armed forces of a State or other recog-
nized belligerent entity is that . such limitation is of
benefit both to the armed forces themselves and to the
civilian population. Regarding the first, the armed
forces , of a belligerent know their opponents and are
able to identify them. In humanitarian terms, the
civilian population is disqualified as a lawful object
of attack and capture. By virtue of "restricting the
activity of military engagement, both as to the actor
and victim, military and humanitarian needs are met
within a rough principle of balance". (12) How is the
revised law of war to maintain this balance while at
the same time adapting to the present reality?
In fact, as a study of the Protocols of 1977 reveals,
the first difficulty has been met by simply reclassifying
certain conflicts (which in the past have typically been . waged
with guerilla warfare tactics) as international, thereby
bringing the full weight of the law of war into force, and
the second, by relaxing the requirement that combatants must




distinguish themselves at all times from t h e civilian popu-
I t i (13)a lon.
The merits of these solutions have, of course, been
much debated. At this point, however, it is important to
note that the decision to undertake guerilla warfare has fre-
quently been a political one. More recently guerilla activi-
ties have been conducted as a means of securing specific
political objectives by groups or organizations disassociated
from States or other belligerents, and directed at particular
h . . I d ( 14 ) Accor-d i Igovernments, t elr natlona s an property. ccor lng y
any revision of the law of war to take account of the pre-
dominance of guerilla warfare as a means of waging war must
inevitably appear at least outwardly to further the political
objectives for which guerilla wars are generally fought. This
certainly is a major criticism levelled against the Protocols
of 1977.(15) But it should be borne in mind that the revision
of the law of war to accommodate specific phenomena is not
unprecedented. Article 44(3) of Geneva Convention III of
1949 extends prisoner of war status to members of regular
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. This provl-
sion originates directly from the case of the Free French
forces fighting ln World War 11 who were technically not eli-
gible for prisoner of war status upon capture. While it is
unlikely that the achievement of overt political ends was the
object of this provision, nevertheless it arose to meet largely




See Article 44(3) of Protocol I;
Draper op cit (n 9) 184.
Infra 99 f f.
Ch IV infra 137ff.
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It is agreed that law, particularly humanitarian law,
should be impartial and consistently applied. Accepting,
therefore, the need to take account of guerilla warfare, and
the fact it has become a highly political tool, the criterion
of revision of the law of war is simply whether the law as
revised is impartial and consistently applied. The politi-
cization of guerilla warfare tends to blur these issues but
it is submitted that the test of impartiality and consistency
must always apply. If the need for revision of law objec-
tively exists, and the law as revised is still impartial and
consistently applied, then the overtly political objectives
for which guerilla warfare is used should not be relevant.
THE RATIONALE OF ARTICLE 1( 4) OF PROTOCOL I
The emergence of Article 1(4) represents t he culmination
of a lengthy process, begun, probably, even before the Con-
ventions of 1949 since Article 3 common to those Conventions
was at its inception almost outdated, already overtaken by
the growing predominance of guerilla warfare. Soviet legal
theory has long maintained that wars fought to gain or re-
tain colonial possessions are truly international conflicts
since a liberation movement, whatever its technical legal
status, is legitimately a full actor in the international con-
text by virtue of its possessing "national sovereignty", ie
"the sum total of those inalienable rights of a given human
h i h t . t . ,,( 16 )group w lC s amp 1 as a natlon .
(16) George Ginsberg "'Wars of National Liberation' and the
Modern Law of Nations - The Soviet Thesis" (1964) 29
La\v and Contemporary Problems 910 at 913 ..
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The rationale for asserting Article 1(4) type conflicts
to be international armed conflicts tends to encompass several
aspects, as the following statement demonstrates: (17)
"A colonial conflict within a State assumes an inter-
national outlook if it is rooted in an action which
is condemned or supported by a jus cogens rule of
international law for other states have a legal in-
terest in such conflicts. A colonial war is, in
essence, an international war because:
a. Colonialism offends the jus cogens rules of non-
aggression and self~determination. A war waged to
maintain colonial order is fundamentally condemned
in international law.
b. On the other hand a war fought to remove colonialism
provided it involves the use of reasonable or com-
mensurate force is fundamentally backed by inter-
national law. Other states have a legal obligation
to help colonised people to defend themselves a-
gainst colonial aggression.
c. By its nature colonisation is imposed by an alien
people on an indigenous population. Consequently,
the conflict is between two peoples having different
political and social backgrounds and invariably, a
racial one as well."





Consequently for the sake of convenience it is proposed to
discuss the rationale of Article 1(4) in terms of this division.
Political
The process whereby one arrlves at the development and
formulation of law, be it humanitarian or other, must necessari-
ly be political and this is, of course, generally accepted.
(17) U 0 Umozurike "The Geneva Conventions and Africa" 1971
East African Law Journal 275 at 282.
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However in the r-e cen z ',::I e ve l o pme n t of the humanitarian law
of war, of which Arti cle 1(4) is merely a single aspect, two
quite distinct elements of the political process are evident:
1. "The legislative process is inherently a political
process, in the sense that conferences to develop




2. "Beyond this inherent political element, the legislative
process has been heavily politicized in that elements of
real pOlitik have been interjected directly into the
process. States not only struggle because of disagree-
ments over such things as extent of legitimate govern-
mental control compared to rights of international or-
ganizations or transnational movements; they struggle
also in an effort to strengthen the power of their
( 19)
group and weaken the power of an opponent."
Few would deny that the motivation of a number of States
at least in supporting Article 1(4) was blatantly political.
More particularly humanitarian law was regarded as a means by
which greater legal restrictions could be placed upon South
Africa, Rhodesia and Israel, and increased status conferred
upon liberation movements, thereby strengthening the cause of
those movements ln their struggles against the above States
. . 1 (20)ln partlcu are Article 1(4) to a greater or lesser extent
(18) D P Forsythe Humanitarian Politics 127.
(19) Id 128.
(20) D P Forsythe "Support for a Humanitarian 'Jus in Bello'"
(1977) 11 International Lawyer 723 at 725-726; see also
D E ,Graham "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of
War; A Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the
'Just War' Concept of the Eleventh Century" (1975) 32
Washington and Lee Law Review 2S at 53; Charles Lysaght
"The Attitude of Western Countries" in Antonio Cassese (eel)
The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 349.
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reflects the predominance of t hese political conc e rns and
' .
interests. The logical and obvious basis for s e l ecting only
conflicts waged by national liberation movements against
colonial, alien or racist regimes for classification as
international conflicts lS simply that the justness of, their
cause demands that they be regarded and treated as such. A
war of national liberation is "a bellum justum which deserves
o d h i d f ° to ,,(21)the support of all countrles attache to t e l ea 0 JUs lce.
The prevalence of political considerations are defended
on the ground that such considerations "express the present
trends and political orientations of the majority of States,,;(22)
\
similarly "(t)he rules of any legal system inevitably reflect
the preferences of the dominant group(s) in that community,
° ( 23)
and the international legal system is no exceptlon". How-
ever, it is submitted that the international legal system does
require special consideration in that the effectiveness of
international law depends entirely upon as broad as possible
an acquiescence therein by members of the international com-
munity. It is therefore imperative that selective and partisan
•
(21) Dan Ciobanu "The Attitude of the Socialist Countries" In
Cassese (ed) op cit 399 at 413. For a discussion of
Article 1(~) in relation to the just war doctrine see
infra. However it should be noted that commentators are
not unanimous in ascribing t o the just war doctrine an
important role in the emergence of Article 1(4); see,
for example, Charles Lysaght "The Attitude of Western
Countries" in Cassese (ed) loc cit 3~9 at 351.
(22) Antonio Cassesse "A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and
the New Huma n i t a r i a n Law of Armed Conflict" in Cassese
(ed) op cit (n 20) 461 at 470.
(23) J E Bond "Amended Article 1 : The Coming of Age of the
Guerilla" (1975) 32 Washington and Le e Law Review 65 at
67.
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measures should not be permitted so to alienate members of
the world community that in areas where it is desired to
improve humanitarian safeguards the result will be entirely
opposite. Possibly the only effective means of securing the
compliance of States in the implementation of the laws of war
. h 1 f' t '. (24) St t . t .1S tee ement 0 rec1p OC1TY ; a es recogn1ze cer a1n
humanitarian methods to be valuable and apply them where such
application is reciptrocated. A partisan rule, representing
the interests of a sector only, lacks the appeal to the in-
terests of other sectors which is vital if rules of humani-
. . 11 . d (25) It' 1tar1an law are to be pract1ca y 1mplemente . 1S C ear
that humanitarian law which is not acceptable to a significant
(26)
majority of States, including the major military powers,
will be of little practical use in that it will fail to ob-






See R R Baxter "The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars
of National Liberation ll (1974) 57 Rivista di Diritto
Internazionale 193 at 199-200:
"One of the most powerful inducements to compliance
with the law of war is that both sides equally par-
ticipate in its benefits and burdens. A belligerent
is encouraged to comply with the law because it hopes
that this will encourage its adversary to do the same.
To the extent that the law of war imposes burdens,
each belligerent knows that in legal, if not in factual
terms its burdens are no more onerous than those borne
by its enemy. 11
See further R R Baxter "Forces for Compliance with the
Law of War" (1964) 58 Proceedings of the American Society
of International Law 82; Ribeiro op cit (n 5) 49.
At the Final Session of the Diplomatic Conference in 1977
Article 1 was adopted by 87 votes in favour, 1 against and
11 abstentions. This might suggest that Article 1 has in
fact found widespread acceptance. The conciliatory atti-
tude of Western delegations has been ascribed to the
absence of any vital interest affected: "With colonial
disengagement almost complete, they were unlikely to be
involved in wars of self-determination, as defined, in
future" (Charles Lysaght op cit Cn 20) 354). However the
test is, of course, the number of States which have ac-
ceded to or ratified the Protocols. As at 1.1.80 only
11 States had done so, none of them significant powers.
See infra 148 Cn 1).
Baxter op cit Cn 2) 25.
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. . "(2 8)
followlng repercusslons:
1. Where there exists significant disparity in the commit-
ments of States to humanitarian law, as would occur if
a large number of States became parties to the Protocols
and a large number did not, then consensus as to pre-
viously existing law would be threatened. The present
universality of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 would
not of course be lost since the Protocols are merely
supplementary, but certainly that universality would be
effectively diminished in practice where different
groups of States are bound by different treaty obliga-
tions.
2. The representation of partisan and sectional interests
In any body of humanitarian law will act as a deterrent
to the subscription by other States to that law, thus
inhibiting the development of new law.
Whereas many commentators have criticised Article 1(4)
precisely on the ground that it relies upon the overtly poli-
tical purpose, goal or objective of the insurgent party as the
sole criterion for determining the applicability of the Pro-
tocol, Bond would suggest that the value of Article 1(4) re-
i d i n vth i h " " (29) "". .Sl es In t lS very c aracterlstlC. He Justlfles thls
proposition by arguing that such political goal, objective,
or purpose is in itself a highly relevant indicator of the
likely duration and intensity of the conflict, and he pre-
supposes that where wars of national liberation are fought In
(28) Ibid.
(29) Gp cit(n 23) 72-74.
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the cause of self~determination, such conflicts are likely
to be of so protracted and fierce a nature as to render im-
perative the implementation of the full provisions of humani-
tarian law. This is a ~valid point but there seems to be no
good reason for assuming that only conflicts waged against
colonial, alien or racist regimes reach the proportions which
would require the implementation of the full humanitarian
law relating to international conflicts. Bond concedes that
while the purpose or objective of the participants in a con-
flict is a useful criterion, other factors must also be given
due consideration, although none is in itself conclusive:
"Other criteria must be identified: the duration of
the conflict, the use of regular troops and the invo-
cation of emergency governmental powers all measure
the intensity of the conflict. As with the purpose
criterion none of these is by itself an adequate indi-
cator."(30)
On this basis it cannot therefore be feasibly suggested that
wars of national liberation are invariably of such intensity
and scale as to justify the bringing into force of the full
provisions of humanitarian law.
Factual
for example, is asserted to be "an international process in
(30) Id 74.
(31) See, for example, Urnozurike op cit Cn 17).
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fact".(32) Similarly, writing in 1964, Falk(33) correctly
observes that the traditional role of non-interference in
domestic conflicts is incompatible with the revolutionary
ideology of Communist nations and the anti-colonial stance
of the Afro-Asian bloc. Ideological wars have been and are
being increasingly fought in t h e guise of civil wars. Thus
(34)
Falk states:
"The facts of external participation are more important
than the extent or character of insurgent aspirations
as the basis for involing transformation rules designed
to swing from the normative matrix of domestic juris-
prudence to the normative matrix of international
concern."
The fact of external participation is probably the most con-
vincing ground for regarding wars of national liberation as
international conflicts. However , it must be again noted
that external participation is not necessarily confined to
wars of national liberation and therefore, it would appear
arbitrary to exclude other conflicts traditionally regarded
as domestic but possessing the characteristics of an inter-
t . 1 fl . ( .. 1 ) (3 5 ) F h h bna lona con lct eg C1Vl war. urt ermore, t e 0 -
jection may be raised that to regard wars of national libera-
tion on the basis of external participation as international
conflicts might well have the effect of promoting greater ex-
ternal involvement and so result in an escalation of the






Forsythe op cit (n 20) 725.
R A Falk "Janus Tormented : The International Law of
Internal War" in James Rosenau (ed) International
Aspects 6fCivilStrife 185 at 207.
Id 223.




The attitude of the majority of States (as represented
by the Socialist and Third World blocs) participating in the
Conference appears to have centred upon the need to develop
ff . . ( 3
7 ) A ' . 1the law and not merely a lrm It. ccoralng y, In re-
spect of Article 1(4) in particular, the Conference was not
bound to maintain the traditional distinction between conflicts
fought between States and conflicts waged within the territory
of a single State. Rather the proper perspective "was to place
the body of international humanitarian law within the frame-
work of general international law,,(38) and this involved taking
account of the development of international law through the
United Nations. Accordingly recourse was had to the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, and the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to
Self-determination. On the basis primarily of these instru-
ments it is asserted that "(t)he practice of the United Na-
tions is strong evidence that general international law has
recognised the international character of the armed conflicts
between peoples from colonies and other non-self-governing
territories, and the forces belonging to colonial powers.,,(39)
(37) Ciobanu op cit 404.
(38) Id 410.
(39) Id 411. The question of how a rule becomes part of the
body of customary international law and therefore binding
on all States is extensively treated in Ch V infra. Here
the suggestion apparently is that the practice of the
United Nations contributes to the formation of such
customary law.
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Even prior to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference re-
liance has been placed upon United Nations "law" in order to
establish a legal basis for the classification of wars of
national liberation as international conflicts. Abi-Saab(40)
has argued that while the term "Power-" as used in Article
2(3)(41) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ordinarily refers
to a State it may sometimes be used to refer to other entities
and draws support for this proposition from, inter alia, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States which provides as follows:
"The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing
Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of a State administering it;
and such separate and distinct status under the Charter
shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-
Governing Territory have exercised their ri ght of self-
determination."
Since in Abi-Saab's view the right of self-deterQination has
crystallized into an established legal principle, it follows
that recognition of the insurgent or rebellious group by the
entrenched government or any other State is not required.
All that is necessary is that the liberation movement should
express its willingness and intention to be bound by the pro-
visions of the Conventions.
-However, the objection which may be made to Abi-Saab's
analysis is that it fails to fit the practical situations.
Can the liberation movements in Southern Africa be said to
(40) Georges Abi-Saab . "Wars of National Liberation and the
Laws of War" (1972) 3 Annales d'Etudes Internationales
93.
(41) Article 2(3) provides: "Although one of the Powers in
conflict may not be a party to the present Convention,
the Powers who are parties thereto shall r e main boun d by
it in their mutual relations. They shall f u r t h e r more be
bound by the Convent ion in relation t o the said Power, if
the latter accepts and applies the provisions t hereof . "
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be possessed of territory which in terms of the Declaration
on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States is "sepa-
rate and distinct from t he territory of a State administering
it"? There may have been grounds for applying this analysis
to a genuine colonial situation, as in the case of Portugal
and her African possession; but it cannot, for example,
really have been and be appropriate to the Rhodesian and South
. (42 )
African situations, respectlvely.
Moreover is it true that the right of self-determination
has crystallized into "an established legal principle" with
the legal consequences that Abi-Saab argues for? It is often
simply presumed that there does exist a right of self-deter-
mination and that further it confers upon a people the right
of force in order to exercise their principal right. Far-
reaching consequences could be argued to follow upo n recognl-
tion of such rights:
"(I)t would be illegal for the government in power to
use force in suppressing the right of self-determina-
tion of a people subjugated by it; moreover, it could
not avail itself of the help of third States (the latter
could, on the contrary, legitimately intervene in favour
of the national liberation movement) and, lastly, it
would be obliged to recogni ze freedom fighters (those
who fight alongside the liberation movements) as legi-
timate belligerents.,,(43)
(42) Baxter op cit (n 2) 14. See also John F DePue "The "
Amended First Article to the First Draft Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 - Its Impact
upon Humani tarlan Constraints Governing Armed Conflict':
(1977) 75 Military Law Re view 71 at 90: "[The Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations and Co-operation a mong States]
appears to be directed to persons suffering from alien
subjugation or other externally imposed interference and
to offer no benefit to the subjects of domestic mis-
treatment." For other grounds of cr it icism o f Abi- Saab's
interpretation o f Article 2(3) see L J Chimango (197 5)
8 Comparative and I nternat ional LavJJournal of Southern
Africa 28 7 .
(43) Natalino Ron zitti "Wars of National Liberation - A Legal
Definition" (1975) 1 Italian Yearbook of International
"Law 192 at 193.
Accordingly, the only ground upon which
94.
But it is frequently impossible to determine whether a con-
flict is being waged in the cause of self-determination or
not, for "one man's war of national liberation can be another
man's war of national secession". (44) While this uncertainty
exis~s it diminishes considerably the force of arguments which
propose the effective translation of the right to self-de-
termination into practice, as, for example, conferring the
ancilliary right of an oppressed people to the use of force~
/
the resultant conflict to be regarded as an international con-
flict for the purposes of humanitarian regulation.
Alternatively the Charter of the United Nations may be
relied upon as a legal basis for the recognition of wars of
national liberation as international conflicts. The Charter
unequivocally prohibits a State from employing a threat, or
the use of armed force, except in instances of legitimate
individual or collective self-defence or 1n support of Security
Council action pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter, and no
specific article of the Charter establishes a positive right
to use force on a self-help basis in order to achieve any of
the enumerated purposes of the Charter, including that of self-
d . . (45)eterm1nat1on.
it may be asserted that force is permitted to be used to
achieve self-determination is that such force 1S employed as
a means of self-defence, as permitted by Article 51 of the
Charter. Colonialism, the argument runs, is itself a form of
(44) Baxter op cit (n 24) 195; see also John Dugard "Swapo:
The Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello" (1976) 93 SALJ
144 at 149-150; Lysaght op cit Cn 20) 353-354.
(45) Graham op cit (n 20) 38.
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aggresslon and therefore the use of force to remove the
colonial shackles is merely a form of self-defence, a response
to the earlier and initial aggression. However, it is doubt-
ful whether self-defence against colonial domination In the
exercise of the right of self-determination can be identified
with self-defence as described in Article 51 of the Charter:
"Self-defence is the right of one State acting indi-
vidually, or the right of several States acting col-
lectively, to resort to force as a result of an attack
on one of them by an aggressor. A sine qua non for
such a right is an 'aggressor State' and a 'victim
State'. In the case of self-defence against colonial
domination this necessary requirement is absent. It
is possible to identify the aggressor State (the
colonial power) but it is not possible to identify the
victim State . . . . . As there is no unlawful use of force
against another State by the colonial aggressor the
question of self-defence does not arise."(46)
Accordingly there appears to be some considerable support
for the contention that public international law envisages
that where the use of force is permitted, then such force is
confined to use by States as qualified and recognised members
f h · . 1 . (47)o t e lnternatlona communlty.
On the various grounds discussed above it is possible to
conclude that the Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations and Co-operation among States in particular do not
support the argument that it is the intent of these documents
to sanction the resort to force by peoples fighting for self-
d . . (48)etermlnatlon.
Even were it to be conclusively demonstrated (as has not
t b (49)) h h Chye een t at t e arter and various other United
(46) Dugard op cit (n 43) 149.
(47) Graham op cit (n 20) 38.
(48) Ibid.
(49) Dugard op cit 148 .
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Nations resolutions permit the use of force by national
liberation movements in an international war against colonial
or racist regimes, it would be necessary to establish that
such a rule formed part of the body of customary international
law(50) if all States were sought to be bound irrespective of
their assent or lack of it. Resolutions of the Geneva As-
sembly of the United Nations do not as a rule constitute
binding law; nor are they necessarily definitive and authori-
... - . 11 (51) Thtive statements of POSltlve lnternatlona _awe ey may,
of course, be important in establishing the usage element in
(52)
custom.
It deserves to be stressed, however, that the final out-
come of the ,1 9 74 - 1 9 7 7 Diplomatic Conference has rendered
almost superfluous arguments which invoke the Charter and
certain resolutions to justify in law the resort to force by
peoples fighting for self-determination, and thus superfluous
counter-arguments raised by opponents of this approach.
Article 1(4) as adopted by the Diplomatic Conference would
perhaps appear to infer a right of peoples to the use of
force in fighting "against colonial domination and alien occu-
pation, and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination". In any evept, it is expressly
provided that for the purposes of humanitarian regulation at




See Ch V infra.
For a more complete exposition see H W A Thirlway
International Customary Law and Codification Ch, 5 :
"International Legislation through the United Nations".
See Ch V infra. In respect of wars of nationallibera-
tion, it has been suggested that the declarations and
resolutions of the Genera l Assembly have a "confirmatory
function" CCdobanu op cit (n 21) 410 n 53) but clearly
Article 1(4) was an innovatory development and so even if
the scope of the declarations and resolutions in ouestion
wer-e not disputed, they could at most have possessed a
"stimulatory function".
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new law. Clearly the Conference did not consider itself
bound to formulate rules in conformity with traditional con-
cepts of the law of war; its function was also to develop
the law. (53) Nor was it (or at least a significant section)
restricted to "the letter of the Charter" in construing the
declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly of the
U · d N· (54 )nlte atlons. Accordingly "(i)rrespective of whether
customary international law recognised wars of national
liberation or self-determination as inter-national conflicts
or recognised the right to wage war ln the cause of self-
determination, it was still legitimate and appropriate to
propose that the treatment of such wars should be assimilated
to wars between States for the purpose of the particular
humanitarian treaty under consideration at the Conference.,,(S5)
Article 1(4) is now the legal basis, previously sought in the
Charter and Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, for the classification of wars of national libera-
tion as international conflicts for the purposes of humani-
tarian regulation at least. Recourse need no longer be had
to the Charter and various resolutions. However, this asser-
\
tion must be qualified by two important considerations:
1. The Additional Protocols are binding only upon those
States whi~h have ratified or acceded to them. (56) In





Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 404.
Id 410.
Lysaght op cit (n 20) 352.
See Ch V Lnf r a ;
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2. Article 1(4) specifically refers to conflicts waged
in, the exercise of the right of self-determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and the
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States. Thus the uncertainty of the scope of the doc-
trine of self-determination is incorporated in Article
1(4) itself.(57)
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ARTICLE 1(4)(58)
Article 1(4) in its draft form was vigorously and VOCl-
ferously opposed by most Western delegations to the 1974-1977
Diplomatic Conference who had apparently anticipated that
wars of national liberation would be covered by a draft
Protocol II 'and not assimilated to international armed con-
f Li t (59)lC s. The fact that Article 1(4) was ultimately adopted
by the Conference in 1977 with only one vote against (Israel)
suggests that the lapse of time had somewhat muted the ini-
tial opposition. (60) Article 1(4) has, however, been criti-
cized by numerous commentators and it is proposed to discuss




See Lysaght op cit (n 20) 353.
To avoid repetition it is not proposed to deal separately
with arguments in favour of Article 1(4). Those which
have not already been canvassed in the preceding section
(liThe Rationale of Article 1(4) of Protocol I") are
discussed in reference to the arguments here raised
against Article 1(4}.
Lysaght op cit 350. The arguments propounded by Western
delegates are briefly summarized by Ciobanu op cit (n 21)
406-409.
(60) See supra 87 (n 261.
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1 . Article 1(4) ignores and contradicts the traditional
norms and distinctions inherent in the law of war;
2. it constitutes a return to the 'just war' doctrine;
3. it undermines the principle of reciprocity;
4. wars of national liberation are only temporarily rele-
vant; and
5. the language of Article 1(4) lacks clarity.
Article 1(4) ignores and contradicts the traditional norms
(61)
and distinctions inherent in the law of war. .
It has been stated that traditionally international law
has distinguished between international and non-international
armed conflicts on the basis of a "geo-military" scale. (62)
Accordingly a conflict can only be classified as international
when it has attained a particular threshold of intensity or
a geographical boundary has been crossed. It is not, of
course, entirely accurate to assert as above that international
law has traditionally used a geo-military scale to distinguish
international and international armed conflicts; the criterion
has always been whether the conflict is one waged between
States. But in the past it has invariably occurred that only
conflic~waged between States resulted in particular intensity
or fighting (although in the period since World War II it has
become manifestly clear that this is no longer the case).
"A certain level of violence had to be produced (a
level that only states could produce) or regular troops
of a foreign state had to enter an internal conflict
before the conflict became an international armed con-
flict in law."(63)
(61) Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 406.
(62) D P Forsythe "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humani-
tarian Law" . (1975) 69 AJIL 77 at 80.
(63) · I b i d .
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It might, therefore, be more precise to state that the logical
basis upon which the distinction between international and
non-international conflicts should be founded is that of a
'1' 1 (64)geo-ml ltary sca e; any development in the law of war
which does not recognize this argument merely compounds the
error of a previous approach.
Similarly Forsythe(65) criticizes Article 1(4) on the
ground that it fails to preserve the distinction between those
norms governing the initiation of war and those norms regula-
ting the process of war (the traditional distinction between
jus ad bellum and jus in bello). Thus into the body of rules
regulating conduct during the conflict itself Article 1(4) has
introduced rules for determining whether the cause of a con-
flict is valid or not:
"[Article 1(4)J requires a normative judgment about the
cause of fighting alien to jus in bello and traditional
humanitarian law; some wars (are) to be international
in law because of the justness of the caus e and the
nature of the target regime, not because of any geo-
military scale of violence.,,(66)
B t f th ~ t (1 d d' d -0 (67))u 0 course e counLer argumen a rea y lscusse a ove
which may be raised in this regard is simply that any develop-







Op cit (n 61) 80. Contra the vi.ew of For sythe ~op cit (n 20) .
725 that the distinction between jus in bello and j~s
contra bellum is maintained in Protocol I. It should be
noted, incidentally, t h a t Forsythe's view of Article 1(4)
seems to have been s omewhat modified in comparison with




Yet the rejection of a geo-military criterion f or classi-
fying a conflict as international or non-international has
certain consequences which prompt some doubt as to Article
1(4)'s credibility as good law. Firstly, the criterion which
Article 1(4) embodies is arbitrary:
"It is this element of arbitrariness in selecting one
particular, politically determined, category of non-
interstate armed conflicts which to my mind is most in
conflict with proven principles of. legislation.,,(68)
Kalshoven points out that Amended Ar-tic e 1 Q+) lS inconsistent
ln so far as it fails to make any provision for the case of
civil wars, and yet it is clearly more logical to assimilate
civil wars of sizeable proportions to the category of inter-
national armed conflict than wars of· national liberation.
This has not been proposed. It has been asserted that wars
of national liberation maybe defined in distinction to inter-
S fl . d· . 1 ( 6
9 ) l' f f' 1tate con lCtS an C1Vl wars; yet a war 0 natlona
liberation cannot be assimilated to one of these, then it
would appear difficult to objectively justify the classifica-
. f h .. (70)tlon 0 suc wars as always lnternatlonal.
Moreover, even if it were assumed not arbitrary to aSSlml-
late only wars of national liberation to international conflicts,
(68) F C Kalshoven "Reaffirmation and development of inter-
n~tional humanitarian law : the first session of the
Diplomatic Conference" (1974) 5 Netherlands Yearbook of
Inte~national Law 3at 32. See also DePue opcit Cn 41)
75: "The determination as to when [the protections of
Protocol IJ shall be accorded the members of insurgent
. mo ve me n t s is [in terms of Article 1(4)J exclusively a
function of the movement's ostensible political or
" . ideological aspirations."
(69)
(70)
See generally Ronzitti op cit (n 42).
This is not to say that some wars of national liberation
cannot be objectively regarded as international (see 89ff
supra). But it is arbitrary to assert, without reference
ma geo-military scale, that all wars of national
liberation are per se international.
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Article 1(4) is arbitrary in another respect. There appears
to be no good reason for excluding from the protection of
Protocol I wars fought in the exercise of self-determination
but not fought against colonial, alien or racist regimes, and
yet certainly this is one possible interpretation of the effect
of Article 1(4). (71)
Secondly, it is argued that the criterion which Article
1(4) embodies for determining which conflicts are to be assimi-
lated to international conflicts lS subjective. Article 1(4)
makes no provision for the final and impartial determination .
of the existence of the types of conflict to which it refers.(72)
This could have the crippling result of allowing a loophole by
which a party to a conflict may evade its humanitarian obliga-
tions by choosing a classification of that conflict which pre-
eludes the applicability of the measures sought to be applied
and alleging that the adversary party or parties has or have
misinterpreted the law and the facts. (73)
Nevertheless, it is urged that Article 1(4} does not in
fact contain an element of subjectivity; colonial regimes,
racist governments or governments occupying the territory of
th t b 1 f b . . . . f . . ( 74 )ano er coun ry are capa e 0 0 Jectlve ldentl lcatlon.
For the same reason Forsythe has argued that Article 1(4} can
be understood without reference to subjective considerations
such as just wars, aggression or self-defence. (75) These are






Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 412.
Id 413.
Baxter op cit (n 2) 16. This refers to the so-called
"built-in non-applicability clause" for which see
147 infra •.
Cassese op cit (n 22) 467.
Op cit (n 20) 725.
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Africa will allow herself to be labelled as racist, the
Soviet Union herself as an alien regime in Afghanistan or
any other State itself as a colonial, alien or racist regime.
The effectiveness of humanitarian law in conflict depends upon
consensus between the parties as to the necessity for humani-
tarian regulation; to make the implementation of such humani-
tarian determinate upon attributing the fault of the conflict
to one side, as Article 1(4) does, is to preclude ab initio
any possibility of consensus~
It would appear difficult to refute the assertion that
Article 1(4) provides no legally satisfactory basis for de-
fining the situations sought to be regulated by Protocol I but
rather relies upon subjective and arbitrary criteria. This
has prompted the suggestion that a case may be made out for
the contention that, so far from being an international con-
flict, a war of national liberation is ln fact a civil or
internal conflict. (76) Because a people fighting for self-
determination has not yet achieved its independence, the con-
flict whe~ein that people is engaged cannot be classified as
international. Such classification should only be available
upon independence, and that independence is itself dependent
upon recognition by other States of the liberation movement
as a State, and upon that authority's becoming a party to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Until that point has been reached,
the insurgent authority lacks international personality. This
approach possesses the considerable advantage of eliminating
dispute as to what law applies to which conflicts:
(76) R R Baxter in John Norton Moore (edl Law and Civll War
in the Modern World 518 at 521.
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"The characterization of all war-s of national libera-
tion waged in pursuit of self-determination as internal
conflicts avoids well-nigh insoluble problems of charac-
terization of internal conflict. For if a conflict 11
fought within a State in the cause of self-determination
is governed by international law but a conflict not
legitimately in pursuit of self-determination is governed
by Article 3 alone, then a decision concerning what body
of law to apply turns on highly subjective value judg-
ments about the nature of the conflict."(77)
However, this solution is unacceptable for to classify wars of
national liberation as invariably non-international conflicts
is surely as arbitrary as classifying them as always inter-
national?
Article 1(4) constitutes a return to the 'just war'
. (78)
doctrule
The just war doctrine presupposes that recourse to war
is permissible where the cause therefor is just. This doctrine
is in direct opposition to the rationale of the humanitarian
law of war which regards war in any form as absolutly evil and
undesirable, but nevertheless recognizes that it is not possible
to eliminate it arid so seeks to mi t iga te its effects. Article
1(4) b d .. h' doc t r-i (79) fmay e construe as revlvlng t e Just war ctrlne ' or,
although it does not in any sense justify the recourse to arms
in the cause of national liberation, it does promote wars of
national liberation to a privileged position in international
law. Article 1(4) would appear to place considerable emphasis





Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 407-408. See generally Antony Shaw
"Revival of the Just War Doctrine" 1977 Auckland Univer-
sity Law Review 156; Dugard op cit (n 4~1f5-t47, Graham
op cit (n 20).
Contra Lysaght op cit (n 20) 351 who maintains that the
case of the proponents of Article 1(4) was "founded on
the nature of the conflict rather than its justification
or motivation 11 •
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"If the war (is: just, the law of international armed
conflict applie(s), ipso facto. If the war (is) not
just, the application of the law depend(s) upon the
geo-military scale of the conflict."(SO)
However, the assertion that Article 1(4) constitutes a
revival of the just war doctrine must be treated with some
caution for clearly, as a provision in a humanitarian docu-
ment, Article 1(4) does no more than confer certain rights
and impose certain obligations upon all parties to the con-
flict, viithout regard to the justness of cause. This is in
accordance with the traditional view of the role of the law
of war: "the efficacy of the laws of war depends upon their
being supported regardless of who started the war or for what
reason". (81) Nevertheless the allusion to the just war doc-
trine arises because it is seemingly the justness of the
causes for which conflicts waged against colonial, alien or
racist regimes in the exercise of self-determination which
requires that such conflicts be treated as international con-
flicts without reference to a geo-military scale of their in-
tensity.
The concern exists that the hint of the just war doctrine
which may be discerned in Article 1(4) could result in a
selective and impartial application of the humanitarian law
of war. The issue in question is whether Article 1(4) implies
"a better treatment for the members of the liberation movements
and conversely a diminished protection for the combatants en-




Graham op cit (n 202 so.
Forsyth op cit (n 202 723.
Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 413.
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( 83)
Sucn an implication would be developed in t h e following way:
1. the freedom fighter, by virtue of the inherent justness
d
. 1 . d . . (84)
of his cause, must be accorde specla conSl eraTlon;
2. such consideration demands that the means which the
freedom fighter may employ (ie his methods of combat)
should not be subject to such restrictions as may diminish
the possibility of attaining the desired end, the justness
of which is not questioned;
3. restrictions embodied in traditional legal concepts have
in any event been largely formulated by the colonialist,
imperialist and racist States against whom the wars of
liberation are waged; these restrictions may therefore
be amended and rejected with impunity.
Ciobanu(8S) concludes that in respect of socialist States (who
were after all strongly in favour of Article 1(4)) there is
insufficient evidence that the law of war was to be developed
and applied in this way. While Protocol I remains untested in
practice the fear of unequal and selective application of the
law can be no more than a fear; whether that concern wi L), be
justified remains to be seen.
A second ground for the concern which has been expressed
in consequence of the tentative re-emergence of the just war
doctrine is that wars of national liberation will now tend to
(83) Graham op cit (n 20) 41.
(84) This is at least inferred by Ronzitti op cit Cn 42) in
suggesting that "it would be illegal for the government
in power to use force in suppressing the right of self-
determination of a people subj ugated by it. "
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and applied in this way. While Protocol I remains untested in
practice the fear of unequal and selective application of the
law can be no more than a fear; whether that concern will be
justified remains to be seen.
A second ground for the concern which has been expressed
in consequence of the tentative re-emergence of the just war
doctrine is that wars of national liberation will now tend to
(83) Graham op cit (n 20) 41.
(84) This is at least inferred by Ronzitti op cit (n 42) in
suggesting that "it would be illegal for the government
in power to use forc e in suppressing the right of self-
determination of a people subj ugated by it. 11,
(8S) Gp cit 413-414.
Article 1(4) does not, of course, confer
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escalation. There are two considerations involved. Firstly,
the fact that Article 1(4) extends increased protection to
participants in wars of national liberation may encourage
greater participation in, and more widespread use of such
forms of conflict, where previously participants would have
. ( 86 )
been deterred from participating by a lack of protectlon.
Secondly, in a real sense, the classification of wars of
national liberation as international conflicts almost implies
that such conflicts should be international in scale. Thus
Graham argues that the effect of a return to the just war
doctrine is to largely vitiate current conflict management
norms and so legitimize "through positive inTernational law




any right to the use of force, nor does it confer rights upon
only certain parties to a conflict; Graham's point of view
is probably over-stated. Article 1(4) does, however, exclude
from assimilation to international conflicts, conflicts (eg
civil wars) which may more properly be so assimilated than
wars of national liberation. Fear of escalation is real be-
cause attempts to contain hostilities might be construed as
a device to thwart aspirations of self-determination, and
because third parties may consider the justness of the libera-
tion cause entitles or even requires them to intervene In
support of the liberation movement. (88)
(86) Id 411.
(87) Op cit (n 2Q) 43.
(88) , Graham op cit 43; see also Ciobanu op cit 413.
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The Principle of Reciprocity
It is argued that the law relating to international
armed conflict should not regulate non-State parties, as
this eliminates "that reciprocity between judicially equal
States which is one of the primary inducements for obedience
to law". (89)
It cannot be disputed that the element of reciprocity
constitutes probably the single most important factor in in-
ducing compliance with the law of war. (90) Given the cardinal
importance of the role which reciprocity plays, it follows,
therefore, that for the law of international armed conflict
to be effective, much depends upon the resources, capabilities
and willingness of the parties thereto to implement, and abide
by, the provisions of humanitarian law so as to minimize the
suffering in conflict. Two considerations are important lD
this respect:
1. Ability. The point has frequently been made that the
very nature of struggles fought for national libera-
tion preclude the implementation of the full conven-
tions and Protocols. Liberation movements lack the
material and organizational means of giving effect to
(91)
that law, furthermore a substantial part of that
law will in any event not be relevant to the type of
conflict being waged.
(89) Forsythe op cit (n 51) 80.
(90) DePue op cit (n 41) 78.
(91) Baxter op cit (n 2) 16; see also DePue op cit 113-114
on the question of whether implementation by insurgent
movements of the law relating to prisoners of war in view
of the fact that Geneva Convention III (Prisoners of War)
"contemplates the existence of a stabilised battle are a
and parties with sophisticated administrative .and logis-
tical infrastructures" (id 113).
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. (92)
However, as has been pOlDted out, a similar
objection could have been raised against the inclusion
in Geneva Convention III of 1949 of members of resis-
tance movements who are hardly likely to be in a
materially better position than members of liberation
movements to implement their obligations. Yet the body
of humanitarian law as represented by the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocols is now inordinately com-
plex and it cannot be realistically supposed that libera-
tion movements will be able to comply with it in all
respects. Such non-compliance will detrimentally affect
the reciprocity principle and so probably result in com-
pliance by both sides considerably short of full imple-
mentation of the law.
2. Willingness. Historically, liberation movements have not
demonstrated overmuch regard for humanitarian imperatives
(although it would be naive to imagine the liberation
movements are alone in respect of their brutal methods)
and in particular have not failed to make the civilian
population a prime object of attack. Because the majority
of States apparently regard the causes for which libera-
tion movements are currently fighting as just, the fear
has been expressed that the law will be applied selec-
. (93) (94)
tlvely. Thus Graham - asserts that the doubtful
ability and willingness of liberation movements to apply
the humanitarian law of war, by which they are now bound
(92) Lysaght op cit (n 202 352.
(93) Supra 106.
(94) Op cit (n 20) 45.
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1n terms of Article 1(4)
"has led many observers to the conclusion that
[Article 1(4)J would in reality severely limit
the defensive efforts of a government while
offering assistance to tho~e individuals engaged
in a struggle against i:t."
(95) o. Li.k h A ° 1As ' has been argued above, 1t 1S un 1 ely t at rt1c e
1(4) goes this far, but whether liberation movements will
be induced by the benefit of increased humanitarian pro-
tection to abandon inhumane methods and tactics 1S a
crucial question and one which does not suggest an opti-
mistic answer.
Bond, (96) however, takes a contrary and more positive
view of future compliance by members of liberation move-
ments with humanitarian law, and this view is founded
upon the effect of Article 1(4). Bond states that Article
1(4) possesses the merit of placing a conflict of national
liberation under the scrutiny of world opinion and this
will bring pressure to bear upon the parties to the con-
flict to conform to humanitarian standards:
"Article 1 forces particpants to act in a less
parochial context: they must act their drama of
horror on the stage of the world."(97)
Bond correctly states that Article 1(4) does have the
effect of shifting emphasis from the question of the
applicability of law to that of the permissibility and
legitimacy of the conduct:
(95) Supra 106.





"Guerillas and governors have almost never claimed
that they had the right to violate the Geneva rules,
instead, they have argued that the Geneva rules did
not apply to them. By expanding and clarifying the
scope of coverage, Article 1 will preclude claims
of non-application. For the first time participants
will have to justify their often outrageous con-
duct in terms of the Geneva principles. 1l(98)
Support for the rationale of this view is to be found In
the recorrunendation that llpr ovisions be made to assure that
in war-time, violations of the laws of war will be observed
and made public as much as possible", thus contributing to
a "'mobilization of shame'''. (99)
The difficulty of this approach lS that it relies upon
world opinion which has repeatedly shown itself to be
biased and fickle. The shooting down of two civilian
Viscount aircraft in Rhodesia, for example, seems to have
roused world opinion as a whole not at all in comparison,
say, to bare allegations of South African military strikes
into Zambia. Moreover it is possible (although Article 90
of Protocol I may make it less so) for one side simply to
deny allegations of atrocities or inhumane methods or al-
ternatively hold the other side responsible. For example,
in response to an appeal by the President of the ICRC to
all parties involved in the Rhodesian conflict to respect
at least the minimum humanitarian rules in the course of
Ibid.
Bert V A Raling llAspects of the Criminal Responsibility
for Violations of the Laws of War" in Cassese (ed) op
cit (n 20) 199 at 207. Article 90 of Protocol I makes
provision for an International Fact-Finding Corrunission
and such Commission, in terms of Article 90(2)(c)(i) is
specifically stated to be competent "to inquire into any
facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the
Conventions and this Protocol or other serious violation
of the Conventions or of this Protocol ll. But the role
of the Commission is not primarily to publicize grave
breaches or serious violations but to mediate between
the parti~s to the conflict (Raling loc cit).
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their struggle, Hr Joshua Nkomo , joint leader of the
Patriotic Front, stated on 16 June 1977 that the ANC/
Zimbabwe would have "no difficulty in declaring its in-
tent to abide by such principles for they have always
(100.)
guided our action since the beginning of our struggle".
.. Lv vt e rnpo r-e r i I I -'- ( 101)Wars of National 11berat1on are on y e mpo r a r1 y re evanL
Graham(102) suggests that wars of national liberation are
likely to be a significant phenomenon only for a short period
of time and therefore ~n approach which alters the basis of
the law to accommodate such a phenomenon should be treated
with caution:
"(T)he now popular 'wars of national liberation' are a
temporally and geographically limited phenomenon and
... the entire structure of t he law should not be know-
ingly qnd ~agerly distorted in order to accow~odate
them."tl03)
Objectively there appear to be good grounds for regarding wars
waged against colonial, alien or racist regimes 1n the exercise
of self-determination as an anachronism shortly to disapP3 a r.
In Africa only the struggle against South Africa on her own
borders and in South West Africa 1S likely to be characterized
as falling within Article 1(4). Thus Article 1(4} is "'dated',
1n that it only refers to three situations that are bound to
d . . -'-h f'ut ur-e " (10 4 ) Ar t i 1 1 ( 4) . d .1sappear 1n L e near ~ . r 1c_e 1S date 1n
a further sense as well: G I A D Draper has rather cynically
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Ciobann opcit (n 21) 406.
Op cit (n 20) 54.
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. ( 10 5)
e xe r-c i.se " . States which have evolved by this pro-
cess are unlikely to permit its use against them. Cassesse
suggests that Article 1(4) should have been broader in scope
so as " to include wars for self-determination conducted by
peoples or minorities who are gravely and systematically
oppressed by authoritarian regimes" generally and not neces-
. h i hI· 1 1· . t (10 6) Thsarily reglmes w. lC are co onla , a len or raC1S . e
likely objection to be made against the broadening of Article
1(4) is that it could then be used against the proponents of
Article 1(4), the socialist and Third World countries, many
of which are authoritarian. (107) Article 1(4) is designed,
it would appear, to regulate specific conflicts and none others.
. (10 8)
The language of Article 1(4) lacks clarlty
Commentators, whether in favour of Article 1(4) or not,
have generally criticized the provision for a lack of clarity
and unambiguity. How, for example, is the phrase "in the
. (09)
exercise of the right to self-determination" to be lnterpreted?
The terminology of Article 1(4) is imprecise and could possibly
be so interpreted as to include within its scope of applica-
tion "a wide range of conflicts going far beyond what was con-
templated by those states which have led the campaign for appli-
cation of the whole of the law of war in wars of national







"Humanitarian Law and Human Rights" 1979 Acta Juridica
193 at 203.
Op cit (n 20) 468~
See 116 infra.
Ciobanu op cit (n 21) 408.
See Lysaght op cit (n 20) 354 where he argues that Article
1(4) would be improved if it contained a definition of the
conflicts to which it applies rather than referring to
"a rather diffuse United Nations Resolution".
Baxter op cit (n 2) 16.
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of Article 1(4) to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies. ( J.l1 )
An allied criticism but one which may be levelled against
the whole body of the humanitarian law of armed conflict, com-
prising the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, is




Revision of the law of war 1S not often or easily achieved.
Almost thirty years elapsed between t h e Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the final emergence of the Additional Protocols in
1977. The political motivation which, while it would be wrong
to give it greater emphasis than it deserves, at least partly
underlies Article 1(4), although understandable in the sense
of being inevitable, 1S, it is submitted, to be regretted.
Firstly, it has set the law of war upon a course which
will pre~ail until the next revision of the law, and even then
there is no guarantee that the law will revert to a completely
a-political stand. The result could be a stalemate between
States on the one hand unwilling to allow further politiciza-
tion of the law of war and on the other States unwilling to
concede the political benefits gained thus far.
Secondly, although consensus of sorts was reached at the
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference, this consensus must, if the
law is to be effective, be translated into a widespread com-
mitment by States to the i mplementation of this law. This
has not been forthcoming.
(111)
(112)
Bond op cit (n 23) 65.
David P Fbrsythe"Three Sessions of Legislating
Humanitarian Law : Fo r wa rd March , Re t r -e a t or Parade
Rest?" (1977) 11 I nterna t ional Lawyer 1 31 at 1 33.
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Thirdly, commitment by States, if forthcoming, 1S likely
to be selective. States more likely to be involved ln inter-
national rather than domestic conflicts will probably accept
Protocol I only with reservations, while States more suscep-
tible to internal conflict may be unwilling to accept Proto-
col 11 or even Protocol I since
"many of these States are themselves confronted with
tribal peoples already asserting their right to 'self-
determination', and receiving encouragement from nei¥h-
bours who are opposed to the existing government.,,(l 3)
Does Article 1(4) measure up to the criteria stated
above(11~) of:
1. advancing the humanitarian cause? and
2. effective and enforceable law?
Ad 1: Article 1(4) extends increased protection to certain
combatant groups and therefore prima 'facie advances the humani-
tarian cause~ But it is submitted that it is unfortunate that
some neutral a-political criterion was not used to extend such
increased protection to all combatants in conflicts, internal
or international, above a certain geo-military scale. The
selectiveness of Article 1(4) is difficult to justify.
Ad 2: Doubt has been cast'upon the willingness and ability
of liberation movements to implement humanitarian law at the
level and on the scale required by the Conventions of 1949 and
Protocols of 1977. An even greater obstacle and one which, it
is submitted, is insuperable, is how States, against whom wars
of liberation are being waged, are to be persuaded to acknow-
ledge the relevance of Article 1(4) when to do so is at the
(113) L C Green "The New Law of Armed Conflict" (1977) 15
Canadian Year Book of International Law 3 at 41.
(114 ) Supra 76.
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same time to acknowledge that they are colonial, alien or
racist regimes? Without the co-operation of all parties in-
volved in a conflict situation humanitarian law is absolutely
meaningless.
The fear of this writer is that in time the conflicts to
which Article 1(4) refers will have been fought without the
implementation of any humanitarian law. Such conflicts will
be fought in a vacuum of humanitarian law which would have
been avoided if a more realistic and practical approach had
been adopted.
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C H APT E R IV
PRISONERS OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
The traditional approach In determining who is entitled
to prisoner of war status has been to limit such status to
the regular armed forces of parties to international armed
conflicts and by definition such parties must be States.
Protocol I does not in fact deviate from this approach but
merely enlarges the definition of those who may be considered
as parties to an international conflict. Article 1 of Protoco l
I cannot be seen in isolation but rather as the complement of
Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the same Protocol, which govern the
question of prisoner of war status. The object In bringing
wars of national liberation within the category of interna-
tional armed conflicts is primarily to afford greater protec-
tion in law to those who fight for such liberation movements.
Therefore the immediately practical effect of Article 1 will
depend for the most part upon the feasibility of those provi-
sions which further define prisoner of war and combatant sta-
tus. Since the most significant departure from previous
practice to follow upon the implementation of Article 1 is
the extension of prisoner of war status to freedom fighters
upon capture, Article 1 will be meaningless if the additional
provisions governing prisoners of war are shown to be unwork-
able and defective. These provisions must be judged not only
upon the validity of their content-but also upon the degree
to which they are effectively integrated with existing rules
as embodied in Geneva Convention III of 1949.
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PRISONERS OF WAR UN DER GENEVA CONVENTION III OF 1949
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides as follows:
"A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Con-
ventions, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy.
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to
a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfil the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
Members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority






Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who
on the approach of the enemy spontaneously
take up arms to resist the invading forces,
without having had time 't'o form themselves
into regular armed units provided they carry




The object of the law of war is to contain all suffering
within the narrowest limits possible and this lS most effec-
tively done by designating a class of persons as wholly out-
side the operation of war. Thus there arises the fundamental
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distinct ion be twe e n combatants, who are legitimate objects
of armed attack, and non-combatants, who are not. There is
"1 d(1) da further distinction to be made between prlvl ege an
unprivileged belligerents and the rationale of such a dis-
tinction is to determine whether belligerents are entitled
. to the status of prisoner of war. (2) Thus Baxter contends
that hostile conduct consisting of spylng, guerilla warfare
and sabotage is not In itself violative of the rules of
war. Similarly those who use such means of conducting war
are not unlawful belligerents, but merely unprivileged In
the sense that such belligerents cannot claim protection under
international law. The concept of the protection to which the
prisoner of .war is entitled is based upon the supposition that
war is fought between disciplined forces according to the
minimum dictates of humanity. To statehood is attributed
certain capabilities of conducting warfare in this way; a
consequence of war between States therefore, is that captives
are accorded the status of prisoners of war and treated accor-
dingly. The evolution of the prisoner of war concept has thus
depended largely upon the ability and willingness of States to
commit to battle identifiable and disciplined forces bound by
certain rules; a corollary of this observance of law is the
right of prisoners to be treated in a particular manner, which
has likewise the foundation of law. Prisoner of war status lS
therefore granted to those who are presumed to conduct the
waging of warfare In a legitimate manner, and this presumption
is invariably made in favour of the regular armies of States.
(1) R R Baxter !ISo-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency'
Guerillas and Saboteurs" (1951) 28B Y T L 323,
(2) G Schwarzenberger International Law and Order 224.
Spies,
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,I n cases where the presumption cannot be made, then the
forces in question are required to meet prescribed conditions,
ie:
1. that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates. This requirement is designed to establish
the element of control without which observance of the
laws of war will be at best haphazard. It has been
suggested that this condition
"is fulfilled if the commander of the corps lS
regularly or temporarily commissioned as an
officer or is a person of position and authority,
or if the members are provided with certificates
or badges granted by the government of the State
to show that they are officers, or soldiers, so
that there may be no doubt that they are not
partisans acting on their own responsiblity.ll(3)
It does not appear that any particular level of command
is r-equ i r-eq; any group, of whatever size, under the
responsible authority of a leader, meeting the other
conditions, will be entitled to prisoner of war status
(4)
upon capture. Miller(S) argues that given the nature
of military operations, effective leadership and control
should be present in almost all instances.
2. that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance. There is little clarity regarding t he prac-
tical implementation of this provision. The assertion
in the British Manual of Military Law that
(3) British Manual of Military Law (The Law of War on Land)
Part Ill.
(4) See Schwarzenberger op cit (n 2) 229 where he states that
individual terrorists will be excluded from the protection
of the Convention on the ground of lack of responsible
command.
(5) R I Miller (ed) The Law of War 29.
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"it is reasonable to expect that the s i.Lh o ue t t e
of an irregular combatant in the position
standing against the skyline should be at n e e
distinguishable from the outline of a peac e ful
inhabitant and this by the naked eye of an or-
dinary observer from a distance at which -the form
of an individual can be-determined" (6)
1S clearly wholly impractical and unrealistic; it is
surely not required that the uniform of combatant must
be different in shape to the clothing of civilians?
The requirement of a fixed distinctive sign will be best
met by the adoption of a distinctive uniform, and this
would presumably include camouflage dress, which is,
after all, distinctively military. However, some form
of head-gear "completely different in outline from
civilian head-dress", (7) would suffice, particularly if
some form of badge or brassard is also worn. A distinc-
tive slgn will be fixed if "worn regularly and not taken
off to permit concealment of the character of the indi-
vidual". (8) To be distinctive, the sign must be generally
worn by members of the group and by members of that group
only.(9)
3. that of carrying arms openly. This provision should not
be misconstrued as requiring the carrying of arms "visi-
bly" or "ostensibly". (10) Surprise is a legitimate method
of attack and the requirement that forces should carry
arms openly is not intended to restrict such tactics.






British Manual of Military Law op cit (n 3) 33.
Miller op cit (n 5) 29.
J Pictet (ed) ICRC Commentary vol III 60.
Id 61.
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Rather, its purpos e is to exclude f :( ~' i(l privileged
belligerency (and s o to e n co ur a ge compliance) forces
which take up arms intermittently and then conceal them-
selves as non-combatants - ie civilians. Arms" probably
more so than any fixed and distinctive sign, identify
the combatant. Thus Miller(11) states that "a farmer
who works nights as a soldier and hides his weapon by
night" does not qualify as a privileged belligerent.
4. that of conducting their operation~ in accordance with
the laws and customs of war, especially the prohibition
upon "the employment of treachery, maltreatment of
prisoners, wounded and dead, i mproper conduct towards
flags of truce, pillage, and unnecessary violence and
. (12) (13)
destruct1on". Bond argues that whether irregu-
lars (guerillas) obey the laws and customs or war is
irrelevant:
"Desirable as it may be for all parties to a con-
flict to obey the laws and customs of war, why
should one's failure to do so affect his status
or even his subsequent treatment other than the
severity of punishment should he be prosecuted
for violating the law of war?"
This approach has been largely adopted 1n the provisions
of Protocol I of 1977 dealing with prisoners of war but
the requirement in Article 44(2) of Geneva Convention 111
of 1949 that the laws and customs of war be observed in
order to qualify for prisoner of war status is probably
based on the argument that the law of war is most suc-




Op c i 't (n 5 1 30.
British Ma n ualof ,Mi l i t 'ary Law op c i t (n 31 34.
J E Bond The Rules of Ri o t 114.
Li.f .
evident. Prisoner of wa r s t a t u s is such an induceme n
Were compliance waived as Bond suggests it should be ~
the effectiveness of that law would be diminished. Of
course, this is not to argue that non-compliance by
individual members precludes the recognition of members
of the group as a whole as privileged belligerents.
Rather, compliance must be general and substantial but
"there can come a time when the level of compliance lS
so low that all members of the organization or unit will
be denied prisoner of war treatment and those individu-
ally guilty of violations of the law of war will be sub-
. . 1 f he i ." (14)]ect to trla or t elr war crlmes .
5. A fifth condition, not expressly mentioned as such, lS
that irregular forces must belong to a Party to the con-
flict. This is clearly necessary for otherwise the Con-
ventions would not come into operation at all. This
question was raised in a case which came before the
Israel Military Court in 1969, Military Prosecutor v
Kassem and Others. ( 1 5 ) Th d f d t b f the e en an s, mem ers 0 e
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, crossed
into Israel armed in uniform. The court found that this
organization was illegal in Jordan, did not fall under
the authority of the Jordanian Government, nor did any
other State with which Israel was in a state of war ac-
cept responsibility for the acts of the Popular Front.
The court held that
(14) Miller op cit (n 5) 30.
(15) 42 International Law Reports 470 at 475.
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"the l iterature o n the s ubj e ct overlooks the most
basic condi t i on o f t h e right o f combatants to b e
considere d upon capture as p r i soner s of war,
namely the c ondition that t h e i r regul ar f orces mus t
belong to a be l l igerent par t y . I f t hey do n o t be-
long to t he Gove r nme n t o r Sta te for whi c h t hey
fight, then i t seems to us t hat , from the outset
they do not po s s es s the right to en j oy the status
of prisoners of war upon capture."
( 16) .Schwarzenberger suggests that glven the humanitarian
purpose of the Conventions, the interpretation given by
the court in the above case to the words "belong to a
Party to the conflict" was too strict and that
"an organisation can 'belong' to a country,
irrespective of whet he r it is recogni zed by t he
government or whether, under the l aw o f a par-
ticular State, it i s legal or illegal."
It is difficult to see how, on the basis of Schwarzen-
berger's i n t erpretation, any group of irre gular forc es
could be excluded fro m protection under the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 on the gr ou nd that it does not belong
to a party to the conflict. It is unlikel y that this
was the intention of the drafters of the provision.
The requirement of belonging to a Party to the conflict
presupposes that thereby irregular forces will be sub-
ject to a measure of control and order. Ther e f o r e i t
is submit ted t hat the decision in Hilitary Pros e cutor
V Kassem ~n d O the~s is correct. Th e posit ion is quit e
different, of course, i n t erms of Protocol I.
Members of r egular arme d f orces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recogni zed by the De-
taining Powers are also entitled to prisoner of war status
and treatment upon capture. Th e origin of this provision .c an
(16) Op cit (n 2 ) 227.
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be traced to the particular situation of the Free French
Forces participating in World War 11 against Germany on the
side of the Allied Forces. In no sense are the forces in
question irregular: therefore their compliance with the
four requirements of being under responsible command, etc,
is presumed. Such forces are distinguishable on the ground
alone that in the ,v i e w of their adversary, they are not
operating or are no longer operating under the direct authori-
ty of a Party to a conflict in accordance with Article 2 of
. (17) hor i h i hthe Conventlon. The government or aut orlty to w lC
these .forces owe allegiance must purport to act on behalf of
a Party to the Conventions, which are otherwise not applic-
able. (18) Alternatively, such authority or government should
declare in terms of Article 2(3) that it accepts and intends
applying the obligations contained in the Conventions. Given
the legislative background of this provision, it is unlikely
that it could be used by ct national liberation movement to
galn prlsoner of war status for its members. States would
probably be unwilling to overtly and manifestly associate .
themselves with liberation movements for fear of retaliatory
action against themselves. Therefore it is probable that In
practice this provision would come into force only when a
government or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power
is associated with another belligerent party, as was indeed
the case in~respeC,.t. of the..Free French. Forces ~
(17) Pictet op cit (n 9) 63.
(18) Miller op cit (n 5) 31.
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ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS
It is now universally recqgnised that the conditions
prescribed in Article 4 of Geneva Convention 11 of 1949 for
the granting of prisoner of war status are far too restric-
tive and in any event do not take into account the reality of
modern forms of warfare. The criterion of Statehood upon
which Article 4 is founded is simply no longer valid Slnce
the vast majority of conflicts in the past thirty years have
been fought not between States but on a low intensity scale
within a single State.
The traditional starting point for determining prisoner
of war status has been the distinction between combatants and
civilians . . The latter are ineligible for such status in any
circumstances, the former eligible in certain circumstances.
However, even this criterion, as with the Statehood criterion,
has been eroded by evolving forms of warfare to the point
that it is often difficult to distinguish between combatant
rebel forces and the civilian population. Furthermore, the
distinction ignores differences among participants whithin
(19)
each category.
In the light of the increasing irrelevance of Article 4
to present day conflict situations it is not surprising that
even prlor to the emergence of the Additional Protocols of
1977 there should have been attempts to find alternative for-
mulations of the conditions to be complied with in qualifying
for prisoner of war status. The simplest appr9ach is simply
to define a combatant as one "who resists the opposing force
(19) Bond Cn 131 150-152.
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by directly participating in military operations ll and a
(20)
prisoner of war as a former combatant. Prisoner of war
status, then, follows upon determination as a combatant, an
approach which lI e l i mi n a t e s the restrictive and excessively
. .. I' (2 1) I th . h .formal Art1cle 4 cr1ter1a . n a sense 1S approac 1S
followed in Protocol I, although ln defining a combatant some
. '.' . d (22)of the Art1cle 4 cr1Ler1a are reta1ne .
A more conventional approach is that adopted by Miller
( 2 3)
who suggests that the definition of persons entitled to treat-
ment as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva Convention
III of 1949 should be broadened to include irregular forces
which
1. are organized as military
.....un i LS,
2. are commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates, and
3. conduct open warfare against legitimate military ob-
jectives.
The weakness of such an approach is that it is not free of
the classification of a conflict as either international or
non-international. Where a conflict is defined as the latter
then participants cannot upon capture claim prisoner of war
status notwithstanding strict compliance with the Article 4
conditions. It is unfortunate that the Additional Protocols
of 1977 perpetuate this flaw.
It is probable that the nature of prisoner of war status
will vary from conflict to conflict and that in each such
~
( 2 0). D:l-1.6 5-16 6 •
(21) Id 166.
(221 Infra 134ff.
(231 Miller Cn 52 286.
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status will be approached on an ad hoc basis. Strict rules
regulating who qualifies in law as a prisoner of wa r are un-
likelj to be granted much attention; rather prac t ical con-
siderations will over-rule purely legalistic categorizations.
This pragmatic approach lS well illustrated by that adopted
by the Allied forces in Vietnam in the following form:
1. Prisoners of War. Detainees are classified as prlsoners
of war when determined to be qualified under one of the
following categories:
a. a member of a regular unit;
b. a member of an irregular unit who is captured while
actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act
under arms, other than an act of terrorism, sabo-
tage or spying;
c. a member of an irregular unit who admits of or for
whom there is proof of his having participated or
engaged in combat or a belligerent act under arms
other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying.
2. Non-Prisoners of War. Detainees are not entitled to the
classification of prisoner of war when determined to fall
within one of the following categories:
a. 'c i viI defendants:
i. a detainee who is not entitled to prisoner of
war status but who is subject to trial by
domestic courts for offences against domestic
law;
ii. a detainee who is a member of an irregular unit
and who was detained while not engaged In ac-
tual combat or a belligerent act under arms,
arid there is no proof .t.h a t the detainee ever ,I.
p'ar-t Lc i.p ate d In actual combat or a belligerent
act under arms;
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iii. a detainee who i s s us p e c t e d of being a spy,
sabateur or terror ist.
b. returnees - ie those pr eviously disaffected members
of regular and irregular units who voluntarily sub-
mit to governmental control and undergo a process
of rehabilitation;
c. innocent civilians - ie those persons not members of
any unit, regular or irregular, and not suspected of
being civil defendants.
The above categorization demonstrates how irrelevant the
classical Article 4 conditions were ln determining the status
of detainees in Allied hands. To some extent this approach
reflects Bond's formulation above that captured combatants
(24)
equal prisoners of war, but this is not unqualified since
terrorists, spies and saboteurs are excluded. The concern is
essentially to separate genuine participants who observe the
laws and customs of war at least to the extent of not being
spies, saboteurs and terrorists, from those who clandestinely
participate. The requirement of engaging in combat or a
belligerent act under arms presupposes at least a measure of
open identification with the opposing regular forces.
Humanitarian regulation of conflict depends ultimately
upon what is practically possible in a given set of circum-
stances and this will not always accord strictly with the
legal position. Thus an entrenched authority may, even with-
out being legally obliged to do so, accord a de facto if not
de jure prisoner of war status to captured rebels if it re-
gards its position strong enough to do so. This may be prudent
(24) Supra 127-128.
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for another reason: to avoid inflaming latent sympathy
among 't h e local populations by harsh treatment of captives.
This may well be an important factor in the South African
context. On the other hand, where an authority is particu-
larly threatened it may consider harsh treatment of captives
an effective deterrent against possible support for the rebel
cause.
It is clear from the Vietnam experience ~hat the trend
has been to regard prisoner of war status increasingly as a
loosely defined ad hoc concept, depending to a large extent
upon the strengths and attitudes of the parties to the con-
flict. It is submitted that Additional Protocol I of 1977,
so far from having served to harness this trend in a workable
legal frameworK, has combined the weakness of Article 4 of
. (25 )
Geneva Convention III with a glaring defect of lts own.
THE PROVISIO NS OF PROTOCOL I OF 1977
Article 43(1) and (2) provide as follows:
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are
under a command responsible to that Party for the con-
duct of its SUbordinates, even if that Party is repre-
sented by a government or an authority not recognized
by an adverse Party. > Such armed forces shall be sub-
ject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict.
(251 Infra 186 • .
· 132.
2 . Members of the armed forces of a Party to a c o nf l i c t
(other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by
Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants,
that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.
3.
Article 44(1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) provides as follows:
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43 who falls into
the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict, viola-
tions of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of
his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the
power or an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner
of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian popu-
lation from the effects of hostilities, combatants are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged In an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to ·an attack. Recognizing
however, that there are situations in armed conflicts
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed
combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain
his status as a combatant, provided that in such situa-
tions he carries his arms openly:
a. during each military engagement, and
b. during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment pre-







4. A combatant who falls i nto the power of an adverse
Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth
in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his
right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless,
be given protections equivalent 1n all respects to those
accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and
by this Protocol. This protection includes protections
equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the
Third Convention in the case where such a person 1S
tried and punished for any offences he has committed.
5 •
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any
person to be a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4 of
the Third Convention.
THE CONTENT OF ARTICLES 43 AND 44
In terms of Geneva Convention 111 of 1949, the regular
forces of Parties to a conflict (by definition States) are
presumed to qualify for prisoner of war status, while irregu-
lars attached to a Party to a conflict are required to comply
. h h f " d i (26) ,W1t t e our cond1t1ons 1scussed above . 1n order to be
granted such status upon capture. In a sense Articles 43 and
44 of Protocol I follow this approach by simply making a pre-
sumption of eligibility for prisoner of war status in favour
of all forces involved in a recognised international conflict
/'
(international in the extended sense of Article 1( 4)0£ Protocol I).
(26) 121tJ·.
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This is achieved by defining the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict in Article 43(1), conferring combatant status in
Article 43(2) upon such forces and stating in Article 44 that
any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party
shall be a prisoner of war. It might even appear that the
conditions for conferral of prisoner of war status upon ir-
regular forces have been retained in some form. Article 43(1)
defines the armed forces of a Party to a conflict in terms of
1. an element of organisation, and
2. subjection to responsible command,
and apparently prescribes the subjection of such forces to
"an internal disciplinary system which ... shall enforce com-
pliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict". In addition Article 44(3) states that "com-
batants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a mili-
tary operation preparatory to an attack". Although a great
deal less stringent it might be thought that these require-
ments approximate very roughly to the four conditions govern-
ing irregulars in Arti~le 4A(21 of Geneva Corivention Ill. In
fact, it is clear that the requirement of subjection to an 1n-
ternal disciplinary system at least is not prescriptive but
merely descriptive: (27) in terms of Article 44(3) and (4) a
combatant (ie a member of the armed forces ·o f a Party to the
conflict) cannot forfeit his status of pr1soner of war upon
capture, with one important exception. However, what of the
(27) W Thomas Mallison and Sally V Mallison tiThe Juridical
Status of Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Pro-
tocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts" (1978)
42(2) Law a n d Contemporary Problems 4 at 20. Contra
F R Ribeiro I1Internatio nal Humani i:arian Law : "Advan c i.ng
Progressively Backwards"t.1980) 9TSALJ 42 at 58. .
position where the armed forces of a Party to a conflict
simply do not display the characteristics of organization
and subjection to r esponsible command? A literal interpreta-
tion of Article 43(1) would preclude the conferral upon cap-
ture of prisoner of \-lar...status upon such forces. In terms of
the definition of armed force~ in Article 43(12 only forces
which display such characteristics qualify and so constitute
combatants (Article 43(2» and prisoners of war upon capture
(Article 44(1». It is probable that the extent and level of
command and organization would not be required to be ln any
way great. Moreover, because the Diplomatic Conference 1974-
1977 apparently considered that only those liberation move-
ments attending the Conference would in fact be able to
avail themselves of the extended definition of international
(28) .
conflicts in Article 1(4) of Protocol I, thlS problem
may well never arise since the armed forces of such movements
almost invariably display a measure, if no more, of organlza-
tion and command. However the provision is ambiguous and for
that reason unsatisfactory.
Furthermore it is a great deal less than clear how the
approach embodied in Articles 43 and 44 is to be reconciled
with that embodied in Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention Ill.
The following hypothetical example may illustrate the diffi-
culty involved. South Af~ica enters a war being waged by
UNITA against Cuban and Angolan government forces. The three
States (South Africa, Cuba, Angola) involved are all parties
to both the Conventions and Pr-o tocoLs . The question which
arises is this: to qualify as prisoners of war upon capture
(28) MaJ,lison and Mallison op cit 16-17.
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are UNITA forces obliged to fulfil the four condit ions laid
down in Article 4A(2) or do they qualify in terms of Articles
43 and 44? (It is likely that UNr TA forces would not be re-
garded as sufficiently regular to qualify under Article 4(3)
of Geneva Convention III of 1949). The answer is provided
ln Article 96(3) of Protocol I which states:
"The authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type
referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, [ie armed strug-
gles against alien, colonial or racist regimes] ma y
undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol ln
relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral
declaration addressed to the depositary .... "
Assuming the above hypothetical situation, the only means by
which UNITA could brinR the Protocols and Conventions into
operation with regard to themselves is the unilateral decla-
ration as provided for in Article 96(3). For purely politi-
cal reasons, given the international support the Angolan
government enjoys as a popular and representative government,
the conflict as it relates to UNITA forces would not be clas-
sified as an Article 1(4) conflict. UNITA could therefore
not deposit a unilateral declaration in terms of Article 96(3)
and so UNITA forces could qualify for. prisoner of war status
only in terms of Article 4A(2). Thus is can be seen that
overtly political considerations will determine conferral of
prisoner of war status. Such partiality and inconsistency
make a mockery of the apparently humanitarian purpose of the
new law.
What of the position where in an Article 1(4) conflict
irregular forces assist a High Contracting Party in a war
waged against it by a liberation movement? Article 96(3)
clearly envisages that only the authority representing a
liberation movement may make a unilateral declaration under-
taking to apply the Conventions and Protocols. Will such
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irregular forces be required to comply with the Art i c l e 4A(2)
conditions while the liberation forces qualify for prisoner
of war status? Again such a situation 1S very far from de-
· s i r a bl e .
Even greater difficulties are to be encountered in the
interpretation of Article 44(3) and (4). These are apparent
from the comments made in committee by delegates to the Diplo-
matic Conference in explanation of the votes on Articles 43
and 44.(29) A number of problems of interpretation arise.
1. "combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves"
The first sentence of Article 44(3) thus establishes the
general rule applicable at all times in all circumstances and
to all combatants. It is not stipulated how combatants should
so distinguish themselves but since in exceptional circum-
stances discussed below combatants are obliged to carry arms
openly as a minimum requirement, normal circumstances would
bl . h . f (30)presuma y requlre t e carrYlng 0 arms openly and more.
To the general rule contained ln the first sentence of Article
44(3) there is one exception, as described in the second sen-
tence of that Article. A different interpretation was placed
upon the provision as a whole by the Syrian delegate.(31) In
his view there exists no general obligation upon members of
resistance or liberation movements to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population (ie regular armies are required
to so distinguish themselves but members of liberation or




Official Records vol XV 155-188.
Mallison and Mallison op cit (n 26) 21-22.
Official Records vol XV 160.
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ceding the launching of an attack in which they are to partici-
pate. Such an interpretation is clearly unfounded. However,
note must be taken of the views of the Norwegian delegate that
the situations in which combatants are unable to distinguish
themselves are those of guerilla warfare generally - ie it
is presumed that distinction is not possible in any guer"illa
conflicts. (32) This accords with the Egyptian approach that
a guerilla 1S a legitimate incognito combatant, who should be
given the benefit of the doubt whenever freedom of manoeuvre
requ1res disguise at any stage of the combat. (33) Neverthe-
less, it would appear that a cautious approach must be adopted
in determining those situations of armed conflict in which a
combatant cannot distinguish himself from the civilian popula-
(34) .
tion. In the view of the New Zealand delegate such sltua-
tions could seldom arise. Several delegates (United Kingdom,
Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, United States, New Zealand)
stated that such a situation could only arise in occupied
territory, ie territory occupied by the Adverse Party. Such
an interpretation would considerably limit the applicability
of the exception to Article 44(3) but whether the provision
will eventually be so interpreted is more than a little doubt-
ful. The position of the United States, for example, 1n





when the Diplomatic Conference as a whole adopted the pro-
visions of Protocols I 2~d 11, had changed considerably from
the position taken in con~ittee previously. Explaining the
vote of the United States in the Plenary session, Ambassador
Aldrich stated:
"As regards the second sentence of (Article 44(3)},
it was the understanding of his delegation that
situations in which combatants could not distinguish
themselves throughout their military operations could
exist only in the exceptional circumstances of terri-
tory occupied by the adversary or in those armed con-
flicts described(~o)Article1, paragraph 4, of draft
Protocol I .... " ::>
Article 44 was adopted by seventy-three votes in favour, and
one against, with twenty-one abstentions. It is likely there-
fore that the interpretation to be given to the second sen-
tence of Article 44(3) will be substantially the same as that
of the United States delegation in the Plenary session. Again,
h i , h dl d i r ab I F' 1 Ri.be i (36) . ,t 1S 1S ar y eS1r e. 1rst_y, as 1 1ro p01nts out,
the phrase "owing to the nature of the hostilities" as found
in the second sentence of Article 44(3) surely means that
"(t}he decisive element is ... the nature of the hostilities
not the cause of the conflict". The position outlined by
Ambassador Aldrich above cannot be reconciled with this V1ew;
to state that the situations in which combatants cannot dis-
tinguish themselves are those conflicts described in Article
1(4) of Protocol I is to make the criterion precisely the
cause of the conflict. Secondly, where a rule detracts from
the protection of civilians, as Article 44(3) must be held to
do, then such a rule should be interpreted as restrictively
(35) "Official Records vol VI 149. See also Mallison and
Mallison op cit Cn 27) 23-24.
(36) Gp cit (n 27) 61.
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as possible. In any event it s houl. d be possible to argue
for the qualification of the exception in the following re-
spect: impossibility of distinction does not refer to the
fact that to so distinguish himself would jeopardise the
. . ( 37)
safety of a combatant or the success of hls operatlon.
2. "during such time a? he is visible to the adversary"
There is no indication to what extent a cOJooatant must
consider himself visible - whether to the naked eye alone or
visible in terms of any form of surveillance, electronic or
otherwise, which is used to observe adversary forces. The
. ( 38)
Syrlan delegate asserted that the test must be whether
the combatant knew or ought to have known that he was visible
to the enemy. Given the fact that the second sentence of
Article 44(3) detracts in some measure from the humanitarian
absolute that "the civilian population must at all times be
•
able to be distinguished from combatants, it should be in-
terpreted r~strictively and thus it may be contended that a
combatant is obliged to display his arms if, while engaged
in a military deployment, he should realize that he is under
electronic surveillance. However, it would appear that the
"concept of visibility to the adversary seems most likely to
refer to natural visibility by eye, since electronic or
special means are not indicated.,,(39) More relevant lS the
fact that no guerrilla would ever consider himself bound to
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Such an obligation would undoubtedly be construed as an
-,
attempt by developed nations to use humanitarian law to s u i t
their own purposes, since in all likelihood the technology
in question would not be available to developing Third World
States and liberation movements. Nothing would be achieved
therefore, by extending the concept of visibility to include
electronic surveillance.
3. "while he is engaged ina militarydeployrrient"
The definition of the term "deployment" similarly poses
problems of interpretation. The various interpretations given
in committee included "any movement towards a place from which
an attack was to be launched" but excluding movements of a
. (40 )
strategic nature, "any uninterrupted tactical movement
, (41)
towards a place from which an attack was to be launcned",
and "the last step in the immediate and direct preparation for
an attack when the combatants are taking up their firing posi-
t
. ,,(42)
lons . The wide divergence between these approaches will
provide a Party to a conflict with ample grounds for denying
prisoner of war status to adversaries should it wish to do so.
Unless substantial and real agreement is reached on how the
exception to Article 44(3) is to be applied, the inevitable
disputes over its implementation will much reduce its poten-
tial effectiveness.
(40) Official Records vol XV 156 (British delegate).
(41) Id 166 (delegate of the German Federal Republic).
(42) Id (Egyptian delegatel.
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PROTECTION OF NON-PRISONERS OF WAR
In terms of Article 44(2) of Protocol I, a combatant
cannot be deprived, for violations of the rules of inter-
national law, of his right upon capture to be a prisoner of
war except as provided by Article 44(3) and (4). A combatant
can be denied prisoner of war status on the sole ground of
failing to meet the conditions as set in the second sentence
of Article 44(3). Even where a combatant is so denied prisoner
of war status he is, nevertheless, in terms of Article 44(4)
entitled to protections equivalent ln all respects to those
accorded prisoners of war. Thus three categories of prisoner
may be found:
1. prisoners of war;
2. prisoners who in terms of Articles 43 and 44 do not
qualify as prisoners of war but retain equivalent
protection;
3. prisoners who fall under neither (1) nor (2) above.
This last category would consist of those participants
who for some reason or another (most probably the fail-
ure of an authority representing a liberation movement
to make a declaration under Article 96(3), but possibly
ln exceptional cases the failure of a liberation move-
ment to comply with the minimum elements of organisation
and responsible command and so qualify for combatant
status in terms of Article 43(11) do not qualify as
combatants prior to capture.
A prisoner falling under (2) above will be entitled to the
same procedural and substantive protections accorded to
pris6ners of war under Geneva Convention 111 of 1949.(43)
(43) Mallison and Mallison op cit (n 271 25.
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Baxter(44) states the position in the following terms:
"(T)he armed combatant who meets the requirements [of
Article 43(3)] is entitled to the status of a prisoner
of war, while the combatant who does not meet those
requirements gets the treatment of a prisoner of war.
A technical difference, concededly, but the combatant
who does not meet the requirements and is entitled
only to the treatment of a prisoner of war may also
be tried and punished for not carrying arms openly at
the stipulated times, so the actual treatment of the
two types of combatant is actually quite different."
Of course, mere failure to carry arms openly at the prescribed
times merely deprives a combatant of the right to prisoner of
war status and renders him an unprivileged belligerent.
Failure to carry arms cannot in itself render a combatant
liable to prosecution. Presumably what is meant is that acts
of combat executed while not carrying arms openly can be
. (45 )
punlshed. On the other hand, an extreme but opposite Vlew
is that reflected by the statement by the Libyan delegate lr.
committee that the protection guaranteed by Article 44(4) was
"similar from all points of view to that prescribed by
the third Geneva Convention of 1949 and ... Protocol I
concerning prisoners of war, which meant that the sta-
tus of members of national liberation movements was no
different from that of regular soldiers as regards their
right to the status of prisoners of war except perhaps
in name.,,(46)
(44) R R Baxter 'Modernizing the Law of War' (1977) 78
Military Law Review 165 at 176.
(45) It is submitted ~hat this is not correct. Failure to
carry arms does not deprive a participant of his com-
batant status, but merely his right to prisoner of war
status. Thus Hercules Booysen Volkereg 457 would seem
to suggest that such a combatant could be prosecuted
for war crimes ("oorlogsmisdade") but not for mere acts
of combat and in this respect constitutes a departure
from the Geneva Convention III in terms of which a so-
called unprivileged combatant is liable for prosecution
for his acts of combat (see Baxter op cit (n 1}).
(46}Officia:lRecor"ds vol XV 174.
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The true position is probably closer to Baxter's point of
view. Thus the protection envisaged a.n Article 4 l t ( 4 ) shall
be equivalent in the procedural and formal sense that a
participant who has forfeited his right to be a prisoner of
war will be subject to the usual penal laws of the country
of jurisdiction. Several delegates contended that in such
situations a combatan t would be liable for prosecution for
acts which, if commit tted by someone who had complied with
the conditions prescribed in Article 44(3), would be regarded
as lawful acts of combat. (47) This must be taken as accurate
since Article 44(3) unequivocally states the right to com-
batant to status, which automatically follows upon membership
of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, will be lost
if a combatant does not comply with the Article 44(3) condi-
tions. Where an individual thus loses his combatant status
but is subsequently captured while complying with the Article
44(3) conditions, it is submitted he must be accorded prlsoner
of war status but will remain liable (subject to the safeguards
of Geneva Convention III and Protocol I) for prosecution for
acts committed while an unlawful combatant. (48) He will be
entitled to prisoner of war status because in terms of Article
44(5) of Protocol I, it is clear that a combatant who upon
capture is denied prlsoner of war status in terms of Article
44(4) can only be so treated if failing to meet the prescribed




(47) Id. 170 (Netherlands); 178 (United States}.
(48)
(49)
Booysen.op cit ( n -4 5 2.




While it is fairly clear (as regards procedure for prose-
cution) what protections are afforded to captured combatants
some attention must be given to Article 45(1) of Protocol I
which provides as follows:
"A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into
the power of an adverse Party shall be presumed to be
a prisoner of war and therefore shall be protected by
the Third Convention, if he claims the status of pri-
soner of war, or if he appears to be entitled to such
status, or if the Party on which he d~pends claims
such status on his behalf by notification to the de-
taining Power or to the Protecting Power. Should any
doubt arise as to whether any such person is entitled
to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to
have such status and, therefore, to be protected by
the Third Convention and this Protocol until such time
as his status has been determined by a competent tri-
bunal".
It would seem that all prlsoners must be presumed to be prlsoners
of war and where doubt arises then the status of a prisoner
must be determined by a competent tribunal. For example, a
belligerent who is captured while failing to comply with the
Article 44(3) conditions and claims that he is a prisoner of
war must be presumed, in terms of Article 45(1), to be a
prisoner of war, although he is quite clearly disqualified.
Since the doubt as to whether he is entitled to prisoner of
war status must be overwhelming, his status must be determined
by a competent tribunal. Ynus it appears that in every indi-
vidual case prisoner of war status must be presumed until
otherwise determined by a competent tribunal. A corresponding
provision is found in Article 5(2) of Geneva Convention III
which states:
"Should any doubt arlse as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the Present Convention until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal."
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The scope of this provision is far from clear; the official
commentary states that if "would apply to deserters and to
persons who accompany the armed forces and have lost their
identity card".(50) . I t 1S clear, at any rate, that no general
presumption of prisoner of war status was intended to be made
and that belligerents who were clearly not entitled to prisoner
~f war status could not claim the operation of the provision.
Thus Article 45(1) of Protocol I would appear to constitute
a rather radical departure from the previous position.
The cumulative effect of Articles 43, 44 and 45 of Proto-
col I remain to be considered in the following section.
CONCLUSION
It has been asserted above in respect of prisoners of
war that Additional Protocol I of 1977 has combined the weak-
ness of Article 4 of Geneva Convention 111 of 1949 with a
glaring defect of its own. The applicability of the Conven-
tions of 1949 is restricted, with the single exception of
Article 3, to conflicts fought between States. This has proved,
in the light of post-World War 11 conflicts, to be a major
fault, Slnce 1n very few instances could such conflicts be
described as international in the accepted sense. Protocols
I and 11, 1n maintaining the distinction between int~rnational
and non-international conflicts, do not extend the protection
of prisoner of war status to combatants who are not involved
in an international conflict in the traditional sense nor1n a
conflict against a colonial, alien or racist regime. The
already problematical question of which rules to apply in
(50) Pictet op cit (n 9) 77.
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in which conflicts is aggravated by the fact that Protocol I
introduces a subjective and selective criterion (conflicts
waged against colonial, alien or racist regimes). As has
(51) .
been stated above, thlS amounts to a built-in non-
applicability clause since no State or power against which
the Protocol is sought to be implemented, would admit to be
being colonial, alien or racist. (This leads to the subject
of the following and final chapter which attempts to evaluate
how States may be bound by international customary law and
the relation of the Additional Protocols to such customary
law). Nmonly do the new provisions of Protocol I have to
be reduced to some certainty (no easy task, judging by the
divergence of views apparent in the drafting process) but they
have to be reconciled with the provisions of Geneva Conven-
t Lon Ill. "Th e r e is a growing fear (particularly among those
who are required to implement the humanitarian law of war in
the field) that the law is becoming unwieldly and over-com-
plex. This apprehension seems increasingly to be well-founded.
. (52 )
As far as South Afrlca is concerned, it is unlikely
that the provisions in Protocol I regarding prisoners of war
will have any practical effect. In the absence of inter-
national a~med conflict situation, South Africa is entitled
to prosecute prisoners taken under the criminal law. The
lack of such prosecutions indicates that South Africa has
adopted an ad hoc approach, probably not dissimilar to that of
the Allied Forces in Vietnam, whereby SWAPO soldiers are sought
to be rehabilitated where possible.
(51) 32.
(52} For a statement of the South African position see
H Booysen "Terrorists, Prisoners of War and South Afri ca"
(1975) 1 South African Yearbook of International Law 14.
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. c H APT ER V
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps not profitable to attempt a prediction of
the impact which the Additional Protocols of 1977 will or
will not come to have. In theory they represent a radical
step in the humanitarian law of war. In practice their
significance will depend on the number of States willing to
implement them and with only a handful of States (1)(none of
them militarily of foremost importance) committed to applying
the Protocols, it is likely that for the foreseeable future
there will be at least a large minority of States not so
committed. It might be thought that such States will be free
to adopt an independent attitude for as long as they wished,
and there is little doubt that South Africa would wish to do
so. However,the position is rendered rather less simple by
an aspect of international law which tends to be over-looked,
viz customary international law. Because Article 1(4}
and those provisions extending the definition of prisoners of
war have a moral content for the nations of the Third World
and Communist Bloc, in so far as a just cause (the liberation
of oppressed peoples) is upheld, it will be logical to assert
ln time that the new law of war should be implemented by all
nations. Were this conviction of righteousness to be supported
(1) As at 1. 1.80 these are Botswana, Ecuador, El Sa lvador,
Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Niger, Sweden, Tunisia and
Yugoslavia.
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by acceSSlon to the Additional Protocols by a large number
of States including leading powers, the claim would undoub-
tedly be made that the law contained In the Protocols con-
stituted customary international law and as such was binding
on all nations whether parties to theProtocols or not. It
is probable, for example, that many of the more important
rules provided for in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have
passed into customary .international law and as such are unl-
versally binding. It is extremely unlikely that in a war be-
tween a State bound by the conventions and a State not so
bound, either party could in law deny prisoner of war status
to captured members of the enemy forces where they would have
been entitled to such status had the Conventions been appli-
cable.
The interaction between treaties and customary inter-
national law is important and is dealt with in some detail
(2 )below. This aspect is reflected in an historical analysis
of the evolution of the law, as found in both custom and
treaty law: ( 3)
1. the Articles of War phase, in which "rules of military
law and discipline are formulated which benefit prisoners
of war, worthy of ransom, and privileged classes of
enemy civilians";
2. the Manual phase, viz the use of manuals for the guidance
of armed forces in the field;
3. the Codification phase, in which "rules unilaterally
evolved in the two previous phases and found generally
C2 ) Infra 159 f f .
(3) G Schwarzenberger TnternationalLaw arid OrdeY> 172.
I .
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acceptahle are transformed into .muLti .,.il.teral treaty law
and the uncontroversial parts of such codifications tend
to be treated as being declaratory of international cus-
tomary law";
4. the Development phase, in which "further e.fforts are made
to strengthen and extend the application of the law [of
war] by way of multilateral treaties".
Clearly the Additional Protocols are characteristic of the
latter but it is possible that in time they may come to be re-
garded as the codification of established law. However the
continuing relevance of custom to the law of war is by no
means undisputed. Miller(4) suggests that the potential for
the development or reaffirmation of customary internat ional
law is negligible in those areas of the law which have been
thoroughly defined by way of treaties:
"The most recent evidence of the customary law may date
from the nineteenth century and may have doubtful rele-
vance to the relations of belligerents in the second
half of the twentieth century."
In respect of the law contained in the Geneva Conventions,
which have acquired virtually universal acceptance, this may
well be true. The Protocols, on the other hand, are unlikely
to enjoy such acceptance since their effect is to prefer one
class of combatant against others. This partiality will there-
fore preclude general application. But it is conceivable in
time that although a party to a conflict has not acceded to
the Protocols and is unwilling to apply them he may be bound
to do so on the ground that they constitute customary inter-
national law, much as the Conventions o£ lS49 do now. Where
there exists a dispute as to the law applicable In a particular
(4) Richard I Miller The Law of War 14.
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conflict situation, and certain parties "deny that their ac-
tions fall to be regulated by any law, then the question
arises of determining whether such parties are bound by cus-
tomary law or not, ie whether or not the legal provisions
sought to be avoided have passed into the body of customary
law and are therefore binding on all parties, their assent
thereto being no longer relevant. This issue lS important ln
assesSlng the legal position of States opposed to the appli-
cation of the Protocols. Because of the clearly innovatory
nature of Article 1(4) of Protocol I ln particular the
position of that provision in customary international law must
be established. Claims, even prl0r to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, have for some time been made that wars
of liberation conducted against racist or colonial regimes are
. . 1 fl . ( 5 ) Ch' 1 () b .lnternatlona con lCtS. an ten, Artlc e 1 4 e sald
to reflect a development in customary law? Has the provision
regarding the extended definition contained ln that Article
of international conflicts already passed into custom or is
the incorporation thereof in Protocol I merely an indication
that that provision is undergoing the process, gradual and
as yet incomplete, of being absorbed into customary law?
Accordingly this thesis would be incomplete without an
attempt to describe the means by which the Additional Protocols
could become binding as customary international law. While the
claim that the Protocols constitute customary law has not been
widely proposed, it is almost certain that in time it will be
and depending upon State practice this claim may not be without
(5) See for example U 0 Umozurike liThe Geneva Conventions
and Africa"1971 East African: Law Journal 275 at 282.
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foundation. It is also highly relevant therefore to consider
how a State can avoid the binding ef f e c t of such law.
FORMATION , OF CUSTOJv1ARY I NTERNATIONAL 'LAvJ
(6) . . . h •. t i 1 1Schwarzenberger dlstlnguls es ln lnterna lona aw
three law-creating processes, V1Z customary international lay],
treaty law and general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations. (He further suggests that the Charters and
Judgments of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremburg
(1946) and Tokyo (1948) may possibly have given rise to a fourth
law~creating processl. Thus for a rule to be incorporated into
the body of international law it must have arisen via at least
one of the above law-creating processes. Evidence of a rule of
custom may be found in the following:
"Diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press re-
leases, the opinions o f official legal advisers, offi-
cial manuals on legal questions, eg manuals of mili tary
law, executive decisions and practices, orders to nava l
forces etc, comments by governments on drafts produced
by the International Law Commission, state legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals
in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern
of treaties in the same form, the nractice of interna-
tional organs, and resolutions rel~ting to legal questions
in the United Nations General Assembly."(71
But to acquire the status of a legally binding rule of general
application the existence of such rule must be proved and it
is this aspect of proof which is of most concern to this study.
Thus in a sense it is illogical to speak of custom as a source
of international law since custom is the substance of inter-
national law, ie is the rule itself, the existence of which is
. d t b . d (8) B' t B 1 . (91 . .requlre 0 e prove .u as rownle pOlnts out, ln
(61 G Schwarzenberger Tnte'rn'ationaT Law vol 2 14.
(7) Ian Br-ownLi.eT'r- i.nc'LpI'es '0'£ Public T n te'r nat 'i on aT Law 5.
(81 D P 0' Connell 'Interna tional 'Law vol 2 7-8.
(91 Op cit 7.
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international law there 1S no such t hing as a formal source
of law, in the sense of a law-creating body. Brownlie con-
. (10)
t1nues:
"As a substitute, and perhaps an equivalent, there is
the general principle that the general consent of States
creates rules of general application. The definition of
custom in international law is essentially a statement
of this principle (and not a reference to ancient custom
as in municipal law).1I
The material sources of custom are more or less those outlined
by Brownlie above although clearly some are a great deal more
significant than others. But it is necessary to prove the
existence of rul~ as rules indicated by the material sources
of custom. Such proof is achieved by demonstrating a form of
consensus about the application of such rules. This gives r1se
to another logical difficulty. Proof inevitably involves
reference to those sources providing evidence of the rules
sought to be proved. Thus the distinction is made betwe en lithe
practice of States, which constitues the material element of
custom, and evidence of the practice of States which is not
. t If . 11 (111 H h . d . . .. 11 se pract1ce. owever t 1S 1st1nct1on 1S common y al-
. ·bl k (12) d·most 1mposs1 e to ma e . an 1t may be preferable to accept
that custom is both evidenced by and manifested in international
conventions, judicial decisions, academic opinions, military
manuals, etc.
(10) Ibid.
(11) H W A. Thirlway International Customary Latvand Codifica-
tion 57.
(12) See Michael Akehurst IICustom as a Source of International
Law" (1974-75) 47 B .YI.L 1 at 4: "Th e d i s t Lnct Lon be-
tw~en acts whi~h are constitutive of practice and acts
. Wh 1Ch are only confirmatory of it is singularly thin. 1I
See also 4, 8. .
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O'Connell(131 states that customary international law
comprises two basic elements:
1. "a generalized repetition of similar acts by competent
State authorities"; and
2. "a sentiment that such acts are juridically necessary
to maintain and develop international relations."
It is submitted that together these elements constitute the
-,.
consensual foundation upon which customary international law
is established.
USAGE
Starke(14} defines usage as "an international habit of
actions that has not yet received full legal attestation".
Usage constitutes that practice which necessarily precedes
the emergence o£ a customary rule. As such it must be dis-
tinguished from custom itself. Custom represents The whole,
practice the process:
"The term 'practice' is used to indicate the aggrega-
tion of steps which are formative of law, wnereas the
term 'custom' is reserved for the law itself ... the
word 'practice' is descriptive of the fact of an aggre-
gation of juridically significant acts. The word
. 'custom' stands for the proposition that the practice
is actually productive of law .... Perhaps it may -be
said that 'practice' is evidence of the act of creation,
'custom' is the result."(151
Usage is not restricted to physical acts of States(16)
but includes claims and other statements as State practice. (17)
(13) Op cit (n 81 15.
(14) J G . Starke Tntroductionto Tnternat·ionalLaw 38.
(15) O'Connell op cit (n 8) 8.
(16) Akehurst op cit (n 122 1-3.
(17) Id 4.
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Nor is it generally relevant whether such claims are made in
. . . . ' (18)
abstracto or in the context of some concrete sltuatlon.
State practice can also include omissions and silence on the
. (19)
part of States. However the degree of proof required to
demonstrate that a customary rule has been created by absten-
tion, rather than positive usage, is high and such proof must
be overwhelming. Furthermore it must be shown that such ab-
stention is motivated "by the -consciousness of a duty to ab-
t . " (20)s aa n • Mere neglect on the part of a State to act or
make some claim or statement will not qualify ~s usage.
It is submitted that usage or practice must embrace the
following elements:
1. Consistent and Uniform. The conduct in question must
. . 1 . . . (21)be ldentlca under slmllar external Clrcumstances.
It is not required that uniformity exist absolutely;





Contra Thirlway op cit (n 11l 58 where he states that
the practice required must be concrete in the sense that
"each State does not merely assert the desirability, or
even the existence of the rule of law in question, but
by a definite and formal decision accepts the rule for
the regulation of its own interests .... " The difference
is probably only one of emphasis. Concrete acts will
carry more weight than abstract statements. See
O'Connell op cit (n 8l 19 where he states that "overt
actions count for more than abstract claims, declarations
and municipal legislation" . . However this does not pre-
clude reference to such -practice for evidence of the
emergence of a customary rule in the absence of evidence
less easily rebutted.
Akehurst op cit ( n 12l 10; Michael Virally "The
Sources of International Law" in Max Sorensen (edl
Manual of Public International Law 116 at 130-1.
O'Connell op cit 17.
Id 15; judgment of Justice R B Pal, Tokyo War Crimes
Trial, November 1948, International Military Tribunal.
for the Far East, reproduced in Leon Friedman (ed}'Ihe Law








upon, generality of will". (22) The asserted rule m~s t
be consistently applied. In the Justice case(231 the
court approved the proposition that the nature of the
rule must be such that it is unable to be destroyed or
altered by the actors individually. It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, tnat customary international law
is static but simply that its binding force and content
cannot be negated, diminished or changed by the practice
of single parties. Of course a new rule can displace an
old but must then be established in the normal way.
Material departures from a practice recognised ln a cus-
I t t i such a rule. ( 24)tomary ru e may serve 0 nega lve
. Larv dura t i f·· . d (25)No partlcu ar ratlon 0 tlme lS requlre .
, (26 )
Akehurst states:
"(T)he requirements of time is very much bound up with
the requirement of repetition.(27) If many acts are
needed to establish a rule of customary law, time will
almost certainly also be needed, if only because it is
most unlikely that many acts will occur simultaneously.
Conversely, if a single act is sufficient to establish
a customary rule, the requirement of time falls by the
wayside."
Once consensus has been achieved on the establishment
of a rule as custom, then it is law and it is not neces-
sary to stipulate that the passage of time lS required be-
fore this occurs (although in practice it is most infre-
quent that a customary rule would emerge without the
effluxion of time).
OIConnell op cit (n 8) 15.
Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal at
Nuremburgin UIiitedStates v Josef Altsto'etler,etal
(The Justice Case, December 19471 reproduced in Friedman
op cit (n 211 1196 at 1202.
Starke op cit (n 14) 41.
Brownlie op cit Cn 71 6.
Op cit Cn 12) 15.
Infra.
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2. General. The usage sought to be established as custom
must be general; if such practice is restricted to one
particular region or a particular group of States, then
it may qualify only as regional or special. Usage must
be general in the additional sense that it must consti-
, , ft' 0·' c n( 2 8 }tute a repetltlon or recurrence 0 prac lce. onne
argues that a single act is insufficient for the creation
of a rule of custom since "the common conscience [being
the foundation of law] can only be formed by constant and
(29)
reciprocal practice". Akehurst, . however, submits that
"it is possible (although very unusual) for a single act
to create a rule of customary law". A more important
criterion than either duration of time or repetition of
practice is the number of States which participate in a
re 1evant ae t . ( 301 Th ' d d d .... t ius Wl esprea an represenLa lve
participation ln a practice might be sufficient without
repetition or effluxion of time to establish a rule of
custom. Of course it is not possible to prescribe the
extent of such participation; this must be judged ln
each case.
OPINIO JURIS SIVENECESSITAS
The usage element must be accompanied by the acknowledg-
ment of the States engaged in the practice ln question that
their acts (or possibly omissions) derive from a sense of







Op cit (n 8) 16.
Op cit (n 121 13.
Id 14.
Ibid.
Miller ' OD cit ( n4") . .lO ; the Jus tice case
op cit (~ 21) 1203; St a r k e op cit (n 1 4 ) 41; Brownlie
op cit Cn 7) 7-8; P D Trooboff (ed) Law and Responsibility
lbid. in Wa rfare 5 .
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element is not essential but that it "is a convenient i f not
invariable test that a usage or practice has crystalli z e d in-
to custom". However, it is submitted that this view und~r-
states the importance ofopiriio jUT'iis ; it is difficult to
conceive how custom can otherwise be distinguished from prac-
tices which are adhered to consistently and generally but for
reasons of comity, courtesy, moral conviction, fairness or
h b i ho i (34)trough ar ltrary c Olce.
It has been stated .that the opinio juris requirement is
satisfied if it is proved that the alleged rule "is of such a
nature, and has been so widely and generally accepted, that
it can hardly be supposed that any civilised state would re-
pudiate it".(3S) This might be taken to suggest that both
usage and opinio juris need not be proved, but that proof of
the former raises a rebuttable presumption as to the existence
. (36}
of the latter. Brownlle suggests that proof of both is
not required but there is authority to the effect that con-
tinuous conduct is not prima facie evidence of a legal duty~37)
It appears reasonable then to adopt as accurate the Vlew
of the International Court of Justice that "the creation of a
rule of customary international law postulates two constitu-
tive elements: (1) a general practice of States and (22 the






Akehurst op cit (n 12) 33.
West Ra n d Central Gold Mining Co v R (19Q52 2 KB 391 at 407.
Op ci t (n 7) 8.
The Lotus, Ser A., no 10, 28 (Permanent Court of Justice);
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ICJ Reports (1969) 3.
See also Akehurst op cit 50.
Quoted in Th i r l wa y op cit (n 11) 46.
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THE RELATION OF TREATIES TO CUSTOM
A complex issue is tnee£fect which the development of
treaty law may have upon the state of customary law. This
is required to be dealt with separately since it is compli-
cated by the fact that the act itself of entering into a treaty
by a State may qualify as at least an incident of the usage
element.
Baxter distinguishes three types of treaty which in
varying degrees contribute to the formation . and delineation
C39}
of customary law:
1. Those -treaties of codification in which it is expressly
stated that the treaty is intended to set out the rele-
vant customary internationl law.
2. Those treaties the express object of which is not to
reflect customary international law but which In any
event have not at their inception created new inter-
national law only subsequently acquiesced in by States.
3. Those treaties or parts thereof which at their inception
constitute innovatory law but which in the course of time
come to be accepted as an accurate statement of the
position of the existing law.
Thus, a multilateral treaty, being declaratory of customary
international law, is distinguishable according to whether it
succeeds State acquiescence Cin which case it codifies in the
true sense - ie incorporates, defines and recognizes a pre-
(391 R R Baxter "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary
International Law" (1965-19.661 41 B Y .r L , 275 at 278.
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existing rule) or precedes such acquiescence (in which case
it constitutes the source or origin of that rule, State
acquiescence following thereupon and so ensuring the recep-
. . .. 11 , ·(40}tlon of the rule lnto customary 1nternat1ona aWL.
It is submitted that the effect of any treaty on the for-
mation of custom must be evaluated in the light of the contri-
bution it does or does not make to the usage element. Thus
the distinction that is sometimes drawn between treaties which
give rise to mere contractual obligations and the so-called
law-making treaties is not particularly relevant in this con-
text. Nor is the debate as to whether or not a treaty can be a
source of binding customary law. It is true, of course, that
"it can never be the treaty which makes law, but a custom
(41)
which adopts the treaty as the rule of law". . What is lm-
portant is that an act of treaty-making falls somewhere within
the sequence of usage. Where participation in a treaty lS so
widespread that evidence of exclusive practice 1S not required
the resultant treaty will pvobably.be regarded as a source of
customary law, but where such participation is so limited that
it cannot be regarded as more than a mere incident of pr~ctice,
it will probably be adduced simply as evidence of the customary
rule sought to be established. A distinction which must be
drawn, however, is that between a treaty which is evidence or
declaratory of a custom (in which case the treaty itself can
have no creative influence, the custom being already established)
(40} Id 277.
(41) O'Connell op cit (nBl 21.
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and a treaty which is evidence of a pr~~ti~~ b~ us a ge (in
which case such treaty may constitute a definitive step in
establishing such usage as a custom, depending of course upon
factors such as the extent of State participation, etc).
The usage element being thus all important, it is impor-
tant to classify treat ies according to the contribution made
(42)
to the usage element:
1.Stirriul~te
The conclusion of a treaty between a limited number of
parties may prompt the generalization of a rule"by subsequent
. d d .. ." (43) S h hln epen ent acceptance or lffiltatlon . uc a treaty t us
constitutes the initial and stimulatory stage in the process
of usage.
2. Crystallize
The act of treaty-making, if sufficiently widespread, may
itself constitute the last stage in the usage process neces-
sary to establish a rule contained in a treaty or series of
treaties as a rule of customary international law.
3. "Formalize
A rule of customary international law may be formulated
by a treaty ln the sense that such treaty will provide irre-
futable evidence of the reception of such rule by an indepen-
dent process of development. (44) The most obvious example of
such a treaty will be one which states that it is declaratory,
or a COdification, of existing customary law.





It thus remains to determine the effect a particular
treaty will have as an incident of the usage element. Prac-
tice comprises habitual consistent behaviour in conformity
with an asserted rule. The act itself of entering into a
treaty may constitute an incident of such practice, and it is
thus important to determine the value of such single item of
usage. D'Amato states that -
" ... generalizable provisions in bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties generate customary rules of law binding
upon all states";C452 ,
and
"if treaties do at any point in time pass into customary
law, they pass at the moment they are ratified."( 4 62
The claim, then, is that not only do "generalizable provision s"
in treaties become binding on all States, but that t h e y do so
immediately upon ratification. This contention is apparently
based upon d' Amato' s argument that simply because it is not
possible to stipulate precisely the period which must elapse
before a rule gains recognition as a rule of cust om, then that
is itself a valid ground for asserting that there 1S no divi-
ding line in time. But, as Thirlway points out -
"the fact that we cannot say precisely how many straws
make a heap does not lead us to deny the possible exis-
tence of a heap of straw.,,(472
If one accepts d'Amato's theory of the immediate passage into
customary law of certain rules contained in treaties, then the
mere act of treat~making will satisfy the usage requirement.
Is it possible then that an entirely innovatory provision,




Anthony d 1 Amat o The Co'nceptof Cl.is'toJri in' Tnte'rhation'aT Law
104 .
Id 107.
Op cit (n 11) 83.
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customary law ,([)n the basis that the treaty itself constitutes
sufficient practice? OIConnell suggests that there do exist
circumstances in which the immediate passange into custom of
rules contained in a multilateral treaty can take place:
"The moral persuasiveness of the rules, and the politi-
cal pressure underlying their acceptance, may De such
that their translation from conventional to customary
law is immediate, or almost so.,,(48)
In a similar vein, Baxter(49} states that -
"(t}he adherence of the great majority of the nations
of the world might be taken as having established stan-
dards which even non-parties would be required to ob-
serve only if the international community were pre-
pared to accept the existence of true international
legislation."
This position must be distinguished from that ln which a treaty
itself crystallizes aspects of rules which by virtue of that
crystallization become custom, such a treaty will be binding
on all States to the extent that it embodies those rules. How-
ever, the concept of international legislation is in principle
"untenable" and has no basis in practice. Nevertheless,
Baxter suggests that humanitarian law could conceivably bind
parties and non-parties alike on the basis of a multilateral
t~e~ty alone (not being declaratory of custom nor the crystal-
lization thereof, but being new law) -
"by reason of (such treaties) laying down restraints on
conduct that would otherwise be anarchical."(501
It is unlikely that an exception in favour of humanitarian law
whereby such law enjoys immediate passage into custom will be




Op cit Cn 81 23.
Op cit Cn 39) 285.
Ibid.
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passage of provisions such as Article 1(4) which has
arlsen primarily out of political and not humanitarian mo-
tives. Baxter's proposition has in any event no foundation
ln State practice whatsoever. He continues:
"The passage of human i tarian treaties into customary
international law might further be justified on the
ground that each new wave of such treaties builds
'upon the past conventions, so that each detailed rule
of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims is nothing more than an implementation of a
more general standard already laid down in an earlier
convention such as the Regulations annexed to Conven-
tion No IV of the Hague." C51}
There may be some merit in this submission if by it is meant
the mere amplification of conventions; but this can hardly
be applicable where a treaty embodies a rule (such as Arti-
cle 1(4)) which constitutes a radical departure from all
prior treaty and customary law.
The discussion thus far has related only to treaties as
forming part of the usage element but it must be borne 1n mind
that treaties must apparently be accompanied by opinio juris
. d t t t I (52} Th . . t1n or er 0 crea e cus omary aWe e p01nt 1S no con-
. (53)
clusive. Th1rlway, for example, suggests thatopinio Juris
may be presumed from widespread and universal participation in
a treaty and that express evidence ofopinio juris is not re-
quired. Akehurst(54) rejects this view and states that evi-
dence ofopinio juris is an additional requirement. It may be
proven in the following ways:
(51) Ibid.
(52) Akehurst op cit (n 12) 44.
(53) Gp cit (n .1.11 86.
(54) Gp cit 50.
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1. statements made about customary law in the text of a
treaty or in the course of negotiations preceding the
act of treaty-making, eg a statement that a rule or
rules contained in a treaty codify or are declaratory of
existing customary law;
2. statements subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty
which may allege that the rules contained in the treaty
coincide with the customary law at the time of the act
of treaty-making or that customary law has in some way
and at sometime come to reflect such rules.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS ON THE
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW(55)
It is inordinately difficult to speculate as to the in-
fluence of the Protocols upon the development of customary
law. While it is clear that the elements of usage and opinio
juris must be proven in order to establish a practice or cus-
tom, it is far less clear what constitutes sufficient proof
of such elements. The position is somewhat complicated by
the fact that the Protocols have themselves not been given
uniform emphasis. In explanation of their vote on Ar-
ticle 1(4) for example, several countries seemed to assert
th h . . . 1 fl d· . 1 ( 56 )at t 1S prov1s1on mere y re ecte 1nternatlonal aw.
(55) For the relation of international customary law to
South African municipal law see A J G M Sanders "The
applicabili ty of customary international law in South
African law - the Appeal Court has spoken" (1978) 11
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern
Africa 19 8.
(56) pee, for e xample, the statement by the Nigerian delegat e
to the effect that his dele gation had voted for Amended
Article 1 "becaus e it e mbodied the present state of in-
ternational Law a p p l i c a b l e i n armed conflict"; Official
Records of the Diplomatic Co nference on the Reaffirrria-
tion a nd Deve lopment of International Law Applicab le in
Armed Conflic ts, Ge neva (1 97 4- 1977), vol VI, 47. See also










It is also apparent, however, that many others have regarded
A I' tic 1 e 1 (4) as an innovatory development in the law of
war and by no means one which formalizes for the law of war a
legal development already well-founded in international law
generally. (57) It would seem more probable that customary
law has not developed nor will develop independently of the
Protocols. Rather it is likely that the Protocols will act
as a stimulus to the formation of custom and in this respect
constitute an incident of usage. Further conclusive proof of
the usage element as consistent and general will have to be
adduced and it must further be shown that such practice is
accompanied by opinio juris. To some extent evidence of both
is already available, viz the mere signing of the Protocols
ln the belief that they reflect international law. But such
evidence is limited and it is submitted that the signing of
the Protocols is merely an incident of usage. It must be
borne in mind that States are not bound by the co~mitment of
the delegations to a multilateral treaty such as the Protocols
and it is only by a process of ratification (initially) and
(56) (continued)
the statement of the Egyptian delegate that the purpose
of Art i c I e 1 ( 4) "had not been to introduce a new
and revolutionary provision, but to bring written humani-
tarian law into step with what was already established in
general international law, of which humanitarian law was
an integral part"; (Official Records vol VI 44).
(57) See for example statements by inter alia the delegates of
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, YugOSlavia to the effect that
Art -i c 1 e 1 (4) · constitutes an important development and
step forward in international humanitarian law (Official
Rec6rds vol VI 45, 50, 52 respectively). See too the
statement by the Syrian Arab Repub l i c (Official Records
vol VI 51) that AFticle 1 (4) fills a lacuna which had
hitherto existed in international humanitarian law. The
effect of such statements is certainly not to suggest lex
lata but at most lex ferenda. At the other extreme th-e-
Israeli dele gate expressed the view that Ar t icle 1(4)
"was in clear contradiction to the spirit and accepted
norms of international humanitarian law" (Official R~cords
vol VI 41).
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later acceSSlon to such a treaty that a State can become bound.
To date such ratification or accession has been confined to
some eleven States. Akehurst(58) states that "the fact that
a treaty has received few ratifications is not necessarily an
argument for not regarding it as declaratory of customary law"
since delay in ratification will frequently be due to "inertia
and lack of Parliamentary time". But while lack of ratifica-
tion in the years immediately succeeding the conclusion of a
treaty may not be significant, "the persuasive value of a
treaty as evidence of customary law" vIil1 diminish in time if
. (59 )
general ratification is still not forthcomlng. It would
thus seem premature to assert or deny that the Protocols have
acted as a catylyst to the development of customary law. It
is certain, however, that it will only by widespread acceSSlon
to, or at least application of, the Protocols in the belief
that they reflect law that customary law in line with the
Protocols will emerge. There is no possibility that the con-
clusion of the Protocols, without more, constitutes an example
of how custom may develop on the basis of a single act. The
absence of opinio juris on the part of many States ensured
that. Thus the Protocols constitute at most an incident of
usage and to stand as customary law will have to be proven in
the normal way. (60) . But in view of the widespread dissatis-
faction with the law of war as it existed prior to the conclu-




Gp cit Cn 12) 49.
Ibid.
See W Thomas Mallison and Sally V Mallison "The Juridical
Status of Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Protocol
of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts" (1978) 42 (2)
Law and~ontemtorarYPrOblems 4 at 18 where they state
that Artlcle 1 4) of Protocol I !lis widely regarded as a
law-making rather than a law-declaratory provision".
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( 61)
custom was not sou ght to be proven. In time this may
. d (6 2)well be achleve. .
THE POSTTIONOF NON-PARTIES
Where a rule has become r ecognized as emnodied in custom,
that rule will be binding on all States, whether they assent
thereto or not:
"The passage of the rule of a treaty into customary
international law may have certain consequences for the
parties as well as non-parties. For example, if the
treaty is accepted as a sound statement of customary
international law, denunciation of the treaty by a
party cannot absolve that State from its obligation to
observe the rules of customary international law, proof (
of the existence of which is to be found ln "the treaty." 63)
However, it appears that a customary law is binding only on
States which do not dissociate themselves from it - ie it will
be binding on those States which expressly assent to such a
rule or which do not expressly dissociate themselves from it.
Thus where a State has:
1. consistently and openly; and
2. before the emergence of a rule as custom,
rejected a particular rule, then that State may claim that the
(61) Akehurst op cit (n 12) 52.
(62) See Mallison and Ma:llison op cit .Cn 6 0 ) 18 : "If Protocol I
becomes a widely ratified multilateral convention, and
the major military powers are included a mong th e state-
parties, there is s trong r eason to believe t h at article
!1 ( 4 ) will be accepted as prescribing a s tandard or norm
in international law. States tha t flout t h e standard
should expect to be subjected to political as well as
other forms of sanctions, even if-article 1(42 cannot
be applied to them immediately as a matt er of law.
Over a period of time, the treaty s tandard, which has
been prescribed, may well be enforced as law."
(632 Baxter op cit (n 391 3GO. See also Schwarzenbe~ger
op c i t Cn 62 19. .
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rule, if part of customary international law, does not apply
to it;(64} by thus constituting itself as a persistent ob-
jector, a State may in effect "contract out of a custom lTI
. (65)
the process of formatlon". - Brownlie states:
"Evidence of objection must be clear and there is
probably a presumption of acceptance which is to be
rebutted.,,(66)
There is authority to the effect that where a State departs
from an established custom and other States acquiesce in such
revocation, then that State may be regarded as no longer bound.
However, there is some doubt whether this authority will be of
. (67)
much welght. Where objection to a proposed customary rule
is sufficiently general and vociferous, such dissent may pre-
vent the emergence of a rule as custom through lack of usage.
Note, however, that because a dissenting State is required to
express such dissent in relation only to those of its own
interests which may be affected, and because a treaty does not
purport to affect non-parties, a dissenting State may not be ,
able to avail itself of an opportunity to convey its explicit
. (68 )
non-acqulescence. Where dissent has not been effectively
expressed before the emergence of a rule as custom, it will be
binding on all States, including those which dissent.
(64) Thirlway op cit (n 11) 109.
(65) Brownlie op cit (n 7) 10.
(56} Ibid.
(57} Id 10-11.
(58} Thirlway op cit (n 11} 115.
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CONCLUSION
As a signatory to the ' 1949 Conventions alone, South
Africa would probably be justified in determining the con-
flict situations on her borders as falling to be regulated
in terms of Common Article 3. Yet South Africa has impli-
citly acknowledged the inadequacy of Article 3 and clearly,
in relation to prisoners of war, has adopted a flexible ad
hoc approach.
Had the revision of the humanitarian law of war adopted
a purely objective basis and attempted to seek more effective
regulation of a broader spectrum of conflicts to be deter-
mined according to a geo-military scale; it is quite likely
that South Africa would have supported such revision. Re-
grettably, such a course has not been followed. The result,
as far as the conflict situations in Southern Africa are
concerned, will probably be a vacuum of humanitarian law.
The political implications of the application of Protocol I
are great, more than sufficient to deter South Africa from
ever becoming a Party thereto while the present Government
is in power, and more than sufficient to preclude South
Africa's opponents from settling for anything less.
The result, it is feared, will be greater suffering In
the ensuin g conflict. The course of humanitaria n law is now
set but the warning contained in t h e fol lowing words may In
time become to be regarded as gr iml y prophe t ic:
"The future of the right to wa r and also of the laws
of war, periodically challenged, is dependent on a
natural law transcending political claims, which are
increasingly mul t ipl i e d a nd wild, and which ignore
the individual obligations that are a necessary
counterpart to t h e rights d ema nde d . It is not enough
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to a cclaim and proclaim h uman r i ghts to j u s t i f y
grantin g the m wi thout t ho u ght o f requ ital . Inter-
national law and o rder is here the ne ce s sary ya r d -
stick with whi ch the claims for r i ghts and t h e
boundaries for suc h d e mands ma y be measured.,,(1)
(1) P de G de La Pradelle Triterria:tional Review of the Red
Cross No 199 (October 1977} 402 at 406.
